Cognitive and affective processes in social actions and decisions by Moretto, Giovanna
	   I	  
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di 
Bologna 
& 
University College of London 
	  
DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN 
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
 
Ciclo	  XXII	  
Settore scientifico-disciplinare di afferenza 
M-PSI/02 
 
COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE PROCESSES IN  
SOCIAL ACTIONS AND DECISIONS 
 
Presentata	  da:	  Giovanna	  Moretto	  
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
Coordinatore Dottorato          Relatori 
 Prof.ssa Elisabetta Ladavas     Prof. Giuseppe di Pellegrino 
        Prof. Patrick Haggard 	  
	  
Esame	  finale	  	  
anno	  2010	  
	  II	  
CONTENTS	  
	  
	   INTRODUCTION	   ……...…………………………………………………………………..….	   1	  
	  
PART	  I	  	  
DECISION	  MAKING	  PROCESSES:	  CURRENT	  KNOWLEDGE	  	  
Chapter	  I	  	  
Starting	  points	  for	  decision	  making	  
1.1	   Decision	  makin	   ...………………..………………………………………………………………..	   8	  
1.2	   Reward:	  perception	  and	  detection………………..………………...……………………..	   11	  
1.3	   From	  reward	  to	  value……………………………………………………….…………………...	   12	  
1.4	   Learning	  value	  ……………………………………………………………………………………...	   14	  
	  
Chapter	  II	  	  
Different	  decision	  
2.1	   Economic	  decision	  under	  uncertainty……………..……..………………………………	   16	  
2.2	   Social	  decision	  ……...…………………………………….………………………………………..	  	   18	  
2.3	   Moral	  decision	  ……...……………………………………............................................……..….	  	   22	  
2.4	   Emotion-­‐based	  decision	  ……...……………...……………….…………………...………..….	  	   24	  
	   2.4.1	  Components	  of	  emotion………………………….…………………………………..	   24	  	   2.4.2	  Details	  on	  autonomic	  response	  component	  of	  emotion	   .....................	   26	  
	   2.4.3	  Details	  on	  endocrine	  response	  component	  of	  emotion	  ……….………	   27	  
	   2.4.4	  Basic	  emotions	   ………………………………………………………………………	   28	  	  	  
	   2.4.5	  Nature	  of	  emotions……………………………………………………………………	  	  	  	  	  29	  
	  
2.5	   Emotion	  and	  decision	  making……………………………….……………….……………....	  	   30	  
	  
Chapter	  III	  	  
Brain	  circuits	  of	  	  decisions	  
3.1	  	   A	  common	  model	  for	  economic	  decision	  making:	  Two-­‐Stage	  model…………	   34	  3.2	   Neuronal	  basis	  of	  social	  decision	  making	  ……...……...……………….….……………	   36	  3.3	   “The	  mysterious	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  ”…………………………………...……………...	   39	  3.4	   Putative	  functions	  of	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  ……...………………………....…………...	   39	  
	   III	  
	  
	  
PART	  II	  
NEW	  EVIDENCES:	  EXPERIMENTAL	  STUDIES	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Study	  I	  	  
Prefrontal	  damage	  reduces	  betrayal	  aversion	  in	  economic	  exchanges	  
	  
1.1	   Defining	  trust	  ……...……………………………………………………..........................................	  	  	  	  	  44	  
1.2	   Rational	  and	  emotional	  processes	  in	  trust	  ….…………………………………………….	   45	  
1.3	   Prefrontal	  damage	  reduces	  betrayal	  aversion	  in	  economic	  exchanges	  …….…	   47	  
	   Method……...…………………………………………...………...............................................	  	   50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   Results……...…………………………………………...………................................................	  	   60	  
	   Discussion……...……………………...………………...……….............................................	  	   65	  
	  
Study	  II	  	  
Affective	  modulation	  of	  economic	  decision-­making	  
	  
2.1	   Visual	  Awareness	  …………………………………………………………………………………….	  	  	  	   72	  
2.2	   Automatic	  processing	  of	  emotive	  stimuli	  ………………………….…………...................	  	   73	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.3	   Subliminal	  stimuli:	  methodological	  problems	  ……………………………...……………	   73	  
2.4	   Emotions	  on	  trust	  decision	  ……………………………………………......……………………..	   76	  
	   Method……...…………………………………………...………................................................	   79	  
	   Results……...…………………………………………...……….................................................	   84	  
	   Discussion……...……………………...………………...………...............................................	   88	  
	  
Study	  III	  	  
Moral	  Judgment	  after	  Ventromedial	  Prefrontal	  Damage	  
	  
3.1	   Deliberative	  and	  intuitive	  process	  ……………………………………...….…………………	   92	  
3.2	   VmPFC	  lesion	  and	  moral	  judgments	  ……………………………………...….…………	   93	  
3.3	   Searching	  psychophysiological	  evidence	  for	  moral	  judgment	  ……...…………	   94	  
	   Method……...…………………………………………...……….............................................	   95	  
	   Results……...…………………………………………...….….................................................	   102	  
	   Discussion……...……………………...………………...………............................................	   110	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  IV	  
Study	  VI	  	  
Experience	  of	  agency	  and	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  	  
4.1	   Voluntary	  action	  ……...…………………...………………………………...……………………	  	   117	  
4.2	   Measuring	  volition	  ……...…………………………………………………...…………………...	   120	  
4.3	   The	  experience	  of	  voluntary	  action	  …….....……............................................…………	   121	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.4	   Brain	  circuits	  of	  volition	  …….....………………………………………...…..........................	   125	  
4.5	   Volition	  in	  social	  context:	  Feeling	  responsible	  …….....……..........................………	   126	  
4.6	   Volition	  in	  social	  context:	  Imputing	  responsibility	  ……....…........................….....	   127	  
4.7	   Experience	  of	  agency	  and	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  ……...……………..…....………	   129	  
	   Method……...…………………………………………...………..........................................	   131	  
	   Results……...…………………………………………...………...........................................	   136	  
	   Discussion……...……………………...………………...……….........................................	   138	  
	  
	  
	   CONCLUSION………………………………………...…………………………………………………..	   	  143	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	   APPENDIX………………………………………...……………………………………………………	   	  150	  
	   REFERENCES………………………………………...………………………………………………….	  	  	  	  	  	  	  155	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	   1	  
	  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our lives consist of an ongoing stream of decisions, choices and actions. The 
question of how we make, and how we should make judgments and decisions, has 
occupied thinkers for many centuries. Even if research on decision making has made 
enormous progress in the last decade, decision making still remains one of the most 
complex and least understood animal behaviours (Lee, 2008).  
 
The study of decision making attempts to explain our fundamental ability to 
process multiple alternatives and to choose an ‘optimal’ course of action. This ability has 
been studied by various disciplines with different theoretical assumptions and 
measurement techniques although with relatively little integration of findings. Recently, 
cognitive neuroscience offers the possibility to readdress the lack of integration between 
disciplines. This integration is particular evident in the new interdisciplinary field 
popularly known as Neuroeconomics (Sanfey 2007). Neuroeconomics investigates the 
psychological and neuronal correlates of individual and social decision-making using tasks 
derived from experimental economics and Game Theory. These tasks create a simplified 
and controlled social interaction between subjects, often requiring sophisticated reasoning.  
 
The classical approach to decision making typically suggests that in order to take a 
rational decision we should produce a list of costs and benefits for all alternatives in each 
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single decision, and choose on the basis of a rational calculation (Hansson, 1994). In 
economics, rational calculation translates into finding the alternative with the highest 
benefit and lowest cost. In economic terms. people make decisions that maximize their 
utility. However, producing a complete list of cost/benefit for each option, and compare 
each possible alternative could constitute a very long process, as well as cognitively be 
very demanding. In real life, we do not always have the time to produce this long list and 
make appropriate comparisons, as sometimes the variables involved in the decision are 
different and numerous, and the circumstances often require a fast decision. We can be 
rational within the limits of our cognitive capacities (Simon 1955, 1956), so the rational 
process to take a decision has to take in consideration of the limits of our cognition 
(Khaneman, 2003). Cohen (2005) suggests that people are simply incapable of optimally 
maximizing their utility for a variety of reasons, including limited access to information 
(about the past, present or future), limited ability to learn, and limited ability to focus and 
control behaviour. Even in circumstances where it could be easy to produce the list of 
alternatives and compare them following economic criteria, subjects may prefer an 
intuitive solution based more on a generic impact of the circumstances than on a rational 
process (Greene et al. 2001). This is especially true when they take a decision in a situation 
where opposing values (for example, moral and economic) compete with each other.  
 
One possible way to provide evidence for an individual’s preference for the 
intuitive strategy can be the involvement of emotions in the decision making process. 
Emotions have evolved because of their adaptive functions for genotypic and phenotypic 
survival (Ketelaar, 2004). Emotions may assist in prioritizing certain goals, allowing the 
individual to mobilize energy and give direction to behaviour (Bagozzi, et al. 2000; Frijda, 
2006). Decision making is indeed often based on emotional processes (Damasio, 2004). 
Before deciding, we consider the possible practical and emotional effects of our choice, 
especially when the consequences of our decisions impact other people. Emotions are also 
present subsequent to the decision-making process. After having made a choice and before 
the outcomes are known we are often in state between hope and fear. When the outcomes 
materialize, they may again be a source of emotion, such as elation, happiness, surprise, 
regret and disappointment (Mellers, 2000). I think there are good reasons for emotions to 
be so pervasive in all phases of decision making. In contrast to the commonly held view 
that emotion blurs the decision-making process, cognitive neuroscience has shown that 
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emotions may help us in making the right, and perhaps the more advantageous and 
‘rational’, decision (Bechara et al, 1999).  
 
The rational and emotive approaches to decision making could represent two 
separate processes in our mind. Minsky defined mind (1986) as a “society of minds” to 
explain the idea that the human mind can be understood as an aggregate of separate 
processes, each with its own goals and operating according to its own principles. 
Psychologists have long recognized the distinction between efficient but highly specialized 
“automatic” processes and less efficient but more general mechanisms involved in 
“controlled” processing (Cohen, Dunbar and McClelland, 1990; Kahneman and Treisman, 
1984). This idea has also found its way into the decision-making and economic literatures, 
where a distinction has been made between intuitive-system and deliberative-system 
mechanisms (Kahneman, 2003; Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005). The 
intuitive/emotive system corresponds closely to automatic processing; it quickly proposes 
intuitive answers to problems as they arise. The rational/deliberative system corresponds 
closely to controlled processes; it monitors the quality of answers provided by the intuitive 
system and, in some situations, corrects or overrides these judgments. 
 
Recent investigations have tried to locate in the brain the two systems (Montague et 
al 2004; Craig, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2001; Phelps et al., 2001; Rolls, 2000; Whalen et 
al., 2001, Greene, 2007). The intuitive system is seen to involve subcortical structures 
responding directly to rewarding events, and is involved in fundamental forms of 
reinforcement learning (Montague et al., 2004), such as brainstem that release the 
neurotransmitter dopamine and the striatum that are influenced by the release of dopamine. 
These, and other subcortical structures responsive to valenced events (that is, events 
associated with positive or negative utility), make direct connections between several 
structures within the frontal lobes and temporal lobes (Craig, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2001; 
Phelps et al., 2001; Rolls, 2000; Whalen et al., 2001). These cortical areas include medial 
and orbital regions of frontal cortex, the amygdala, and insular. These cortical structures 
are classically referred to as the limbic system of the brain, and are thought to be critical to 
emotional processing (Dalgleish, 2004). In contrast the system including deliberative 
thought, abstract reasoning, problem solving, planning seem located in the anterior and 
dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex, lying along the upper and front most surfaces of 
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the frontal lobes (Duncan, 1986; Koechlin et al., 1999; Miller and Cohen, 2001; Shallice 
and Burgess, 1991) 
 
Emotions have been considered important variables affecting decisions (Cohen, 
2005). Emotions, however, did not make it into decision research because they were seen 
as a subjective variable, experimentally difficult to measure and control, intrinsically 
unstable and unpredictable. There are surprisingly few studies on social and economic 
decision making that have explicitly manipulated or measured emotion. Even in the last 
years, the influence of emotions is inferred rather than effectively measured. For this 
reason, the aim of the experimental part of this research work is to increase our knowledge 
of the role of emotions in decision making. I propose several tasks where I attempt to 
manipulate and measure emotions in social situations.  
 
In this research two different kinds of decisions are investigated.  The first kind of 
decision regards the choice to trust a stranger in order to have an economic advantage 
(study I and II). The second kind of decision involves moral dilemmas (study III and IV). 
These two kinds of choice are particular useful in investigating the role of emotions in 
decision making process because both decisions induce a clear conflict between the 
rational/economic solution and the more emotive/intuitive solution (Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene, 2007; McCabe, 2001; Berg et al., 1995). In the case of moral decisions, a smaller 
number of victims (economic criteria) is opposed to a greater sense of guilt and regret. In 
trust decisions, the fear of being betrayed and humiliated is opposed to the possibility of 
securing greater economic income.  
 
For both type of decisions: i) a formal model of rationality proposed by theorists of 
decisions or by game theory was identified; ii) I tested whether subjects follow normative 
standards and how; iii) I tested patients with focal lesion (lesion method) in brain areas 
specifically involved in emotion and decision making; iv) and I explained why subject 
follow/fail to follow normative standards. 
 
 The overall aim of this research work concerns the hypothesis that rational and 
deliberative process may work in conjunction with, and even helped by, emotions. 
Emotions could restrict the size of the consideration set and focus the decision maker on 
certain, relevant aspects of the options (Hanoch, 2001). Emotions serve to assign value to 
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objects, aid learning of how to obtain those objects, and could provide the motivation for 
doing so (Gifford, 2002). In accordance with Loewestein & Lerner (2003), I believe that 
emotions can influence the decision in several different ways: i) by predicting the 
emotional consequences of decision outcomes (expected emotions) before a decision is 
actually made, ii) by the actual emotional reaction related to the decision itself, and iii) by 
incidental emotions present before and/or during the process of decision. These three 
means of emotional involvement are not independent of each other; there is a mutual 
influence between them. However, they could have specific attributes. In the experimental 
part studies are presented that focus on the different means of emotional involvement. 
 
 Specifically in study III, I investigated how anticipated emotions can shape moral 
decisions. The study provides psychophysiological evidence (skin conductance activity) of 
the shaping role of emotions on decision making. In this study, decisions are proposed in 
which it is possible to foresee the sure effect of our action (non-ambiguous situations). I 
hypothesized that subjects should choose the option with the least negative emotional 
impact. This implies the capacity to consider the emotional content of effects (affective 
forecasting) in relation to the values (for example, economic or moral) used in taking a 
decision. Moreover the investigation of moral choice in patients with medial prefrontal 
cortex lesion (specifically the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, vmPFC) suggests that this 
area could have a specific role in forecasting the expected emotions. 
 
 In study I, I investigated the role that emotions play in the decision to trust a stranger. 
In case of a decision under uncertainty, I hypothesis that emotions could have a more 
intense influence on the decision making process because with expected emotions there are 
also emotions, especially fear, that are experienced at the time of decision making in a 
situation with a very high level of uncertainty and risk. An example of this situation is the 
‘Trust Game’ (Berg, 1995). This game involves real monetary exchanges between two 
anonymous individuals, the investor and the trustee, who receive a sum of money from the 
experimenter. The investor can keep all the money or decide to invest some amount, which 
is tripled by the experimenter and sent to the trustee. Next, the trustee decides how much 
of the tripled amount to return. Money sent by the investor is used to measure her trust, 
while money returned by the trustee is used to measure her reciprocity. This game 
generates a conflict between the possibilities of a trustful relation with a greater income for 
both counterparts and the possibility of being betrayed, humiliated and losing one’s own 
	  6	  
money. Healthy subjects usually develop strategies of choice in order to balance the 
positive and negative instances of the game. In study I it is observed how patients with 
vmPFC lesion fail in this balance.  
 
 The indirect influence of emotion on decision making was investigated in study II, 
where emotional stimuli are introduced incidentally during a decision making process in 
the trust game task.  Indirect effects of incidental emotion are those that are mediated by 
changes in expected emotions or changes in the quality and/or quantity of information 
processing. In order to understand how incidental emotion can affect decisions we 
measured the level of trust in a group of healthy subjects playing the trust game in which 
incidental emotional expression are presented. 
 
 Study IV investigates the impact of emotion on the actions of choice. The last 
component of a decision is the selection of an action representing our choice. The selection 
of action is not a merely instrumental realization of our choice but is actually the real, and 
probably the unique, evidence of the choice itself and the possible linkage between 
decision and outcome. For this reason we hypothesise that the emotive content of the 
action could affect also the subjects’ experience of linkage of actions to their effects (sense 
of agency).  
 
 This work starts with three introductory chapters outlining current knowledge about the 
decision making process. In chapter I, the definition of decision making is introduced, 
starting from the Decision Theory point of view and Economic definitions, and arriving at 
the definition proposed by Cognitive Neuroscience. In this chapter, basic concepts, such as 
reward and value, are introduced. These concepts are at the basis of the actual definition of 
decision making process in neuroscience. In chapter II, different sorts of decisions are 
described, such as economic decisions, social decisions and moral decisions. Moreover, a 
definition of emotions is provided and how these are interconnected with the process of 
decision making. In chapter III a model is proposed that is able to describe optimal 
economic decision making. These chapters introduce important concepts and definitions 
that are used in the experimental part. 
 
 In conclusion, in my research work I investigated the role that emotion plays in the 
process of decision making, by using relatively complex decisions such as those regarding 
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moral, social and economic behaviour. Results of the experiments offer the possibility to 
better understand the interaction between cognition and emotions in decision making. 
However, our current knowledge of neural mechanisms underlying social decision making 
is still limited. Further research is necessary to better understand this interesting and 
complex human behaviour.  
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Chapter I 
 
STARTING POINTS FOR DECISION MAKING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Decision Making  
 Almost everything that a human being does involves decisions. Therefore, to 
theorise about decisions is almost the same as to theorise about human activity. Modern 
theories about human activity have developed since the middle of the 20th century through 
contributions from several academic disciplines. Nowadays, a specific new academic 
subject called Decision Theory (DT) exists that studies decision processing, but the subject 
of DT still remains a not very unified one. There are many different ways to theorise about 
decisions, and therefore also many different research traditions. Economists, statisticians, 
psychologists, political and social scientists and philosopher are all contributing to a better 
understanding of decision making, and recently neuroscientists have been added to this 
long list; with the specific purpose of understanding the brain mechanisms underlying 
decisions.  
 
Decision theorists place significant effort in defining how we should decide in 
order to be rational, especially when there is uncertainty and lack of information.  If a 
general wants to win a war, the decision theorist tries to tell him how to achieve this goal 
in the most rational way. In this sense, a decision is a goal-directed behaviour in the 
presence of options (Hansson, 1994). Alternatives are typically courses of action that are 
open to the decision-maker at the time of the decision.  The set of alternatives can be more 
or less well-defined. In some decision problems, it is open in the sense that new 
alternatives can be invented or discovered by the decision-maker.  
The question of whether the general should try to win the war at all is not regarded 
as a decision-theoretical issue. The focus of decision theory is on the norms for a rational 
	   9	  
decision to achieve whatever goals. The motivations/reasons to achieve the goal do not 
interest DT.  DT approaches all decisions as rational processes as constituted by two 
essential dimensions: choice, the evaluation of options and selection of actions; and 
judgement, information processing and probability estimation. To portray the matter fully 
accurately, it must be noted that DT encompasses a large number of models describing 
decision making process but the majority contain these two components (Hansson, 1994).  
 
Economists added to the DT approach a general and unified goal: maximisation of 
utility (Sanfey, 2006). Maximisation of utility means always selecting the options with the 
highest economic benefits and the lowest costs. This approach dominated the research in 
decision making for the entire XXth century, banning decision making processing in 
unrealistic rational/mathematical dimensions and forgetting the role of emotions, contexts, 
moral motivations, values etc. The lack of realism evident in rational choice theory was 
first demonstrated by Kahnema & Tversky and their colleagues' work (1979, 2000), when 
they showed that choices under experimental conditions differ strongly from what rational 
choice theory suggests: maximisation of utility (further details in paragraph 2.1).  
However the partial approach of economics and DT, gave to the actual research in 
neuroscience two important staring points: i) the existence of a finite number of processes 
regarding decision making and ii) a unified goal - motivating system, applicable to all 
kinds of decision (Sanfey et al 2006).  Introducing these assumptions into a psychological 
approach, we can define “deciding” as goal-directed behaviour in the presence of options, 
with the goal of achieving the highest benefits/rewards and lowest costs.  
 
Before explaining further the concept of reward, I will make a short digression on 
the definition of decision making.  In the philosophy of mind, the standard conception of 
decision making equates deciding and forming an intention before an action (Davidson, 
1980). This intention can be equivalent to, inferred from or accompanied by desires and 
beliefs. Even if this definition seems more exhaustive, words like desire, beliefs, intention 
seem too far away from a possible and easy neuronal translation. On the contrary the 
abstract and simplified formalised definition from DT and economy seems more suitable 
for neuroscientists studying decision making. Neuroscience explains decision-making as 
the product of brain processes involved in the representation, anticipation, evaluation, and 
selection of choice opportunities. It breaks down the whole process of a decision into 
mechanistic components.  
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The general goal for one’s choice is the achievement of the highest 
benefits/rewards and lowest costs. Achieving the highest reward and avoiding costs seems 
to motivate our choice. The concept of motivations has undergone  several changes (for a 
review see Berridge, 2004 and Anselme, 2010).  Until now reward has been perceived as a 
motivational phenomena of its own, involving its own active brain mechanisms (Berrige 
2003, 2004). Reward means a very basic bio-psychological phenomenon, and most 
research on reward has involved animals, and used basic rewards such as food and water. 
However this concept of reward is used also for more complex and abstract rewards such 
as: social, economic and moral. The unified incentive motivational model is proposed as a 
complex neuronal system for appetitive ‘‘desire”, which mediates a coherent organismic 
urge to explore the environment and seek resources in response to bodily needs and 
external incentives (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Panksepp 2005). It has been developed 
into a dopamine-centered ‘‘wanting’’ or ‘‘incentive salience’’ model by Berridge and 
Robinson (2003). Specific brain activations have suggested the existence of two separate 
components of reward: the Liking and Wanting dimensions (Berridge, 2003). The Liking 
dimension of reward concerns essentially hedonic-impact which evokes subjective feelings 
of pleasure and contributes to positive emotions. The Wanting dimension of reward is a 
motivational dimension, which concerns the effort that a subject wants to invest in order to 
obtain a certain reward. Together with Liking and Wanting dimensions, reward is also 
considered a positive reinforcer because it increases the frequency and intensity of 
behaviour that leads to the acquisition of goal objects (Montague & King-Casas, 2007), as 
described in classical and instrumental conditioning procedures.  
 
Investigating decision making processing inevitably requires one to understand how 
reward perception could drive our choice and how reward shapes our criteria to perceive 
and select the best option. Neuroscientists, whether employing electrophysiological studies 
in animals to fMRI studies in humans, are actively investigating the brain’s circuits of 
rewards. The first step in this research has been to clarify the differences between ‘reward’ 
and ‘value’. While reward refers to the immediate advantage accrued from the outcome of 
a decision/action (e.g., food, sex, or water), the value of a choice represents an anticipated 
estimate about how much reward (or punishment) will result from a decision, both now 
and into the future (Rangel et al, 2008). Thus, value incorporates both immediate and long-
term rewards expected from the decision. Reward is more like immediate feedback, 
whereas value is more like a judgment about what to expect. Furthermore, the value of an 
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option is a sort of abstract measure, a kind of ‘‘common currency’’ for all choices. Using 
this abstract “representation of value”, humans can in fact compare apples to oranges when 
they buy fruit. This ‘‘common currency” of the judgment of value is particularly important 
because it supports one fundamental assumption that is made both in economy and in 
psychology: the existence of unique reasoning systems applicable to a wide range of 
problems.  
 
 1.2 Reward: perception and detection  
 Although there are no specialized peripheral receptors for rewards, neurons in 
several brain structures seem to be particularly sensitive to reward. Prominent examples 
are the dopamine neurons in the pars compacta of substantia nigra and in the ventral 
tegmental area. In various behavioural situations, including classical and instrumental 
conditioning in monkey, most dopamine neurons show short, phasic activation in a rather 
homogeneous fashion after the presentation of liquid and solid rewards, and visual or 
auditory stimuli that predict reward (Shultz, 1986; Schultz & Romo, 1990). These phasic 
neural responses are common (70–80% of neurons) in medial tegmental regions that 
project to the nucleus accumbens and frontal cortex, but are also found in intermediate and 
lateral sectors that project to the caudate and putamen (Ljungberg, 1992). These same 
dopamine neurons are also activated by novel or intense stimuli that have attentional and 
rewarding properties (Ljungberg, 1992; Horvitz, 2000).  
 
 Neurons that respond to the delivery of rewards are also found in brain structures 
other than the dopamine system described above. These include the striatum (caudate 
nucleus, putamen, ventral striatum including the nucleus accumbens) (Shidara et al., 
1998;), subthalamic nucleus, pars reticulata of the substantia nigra (Schultz, 1986), 
dorsolateral and orbital prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and lateral 
hypothalamus (Schultz, 2000). Some reward detecting neurons can determine the 
magnitude of rewards (amygdala) or distinguish between rewards and punishers, 
orbitofrontal cortex (Schultz, 2000).  
 
 In animal studies, food is generally used as a positive reinforcer. Caudal regions of 
the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) codes physical attributes of rewarding stimuli, in particular 
the taste and smell of food (Rolls, 1999, 2000). However, it has been demonstrated that 
OFC responses to taste and smell depend on the reward value of the stimulus. Specifically 
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OFC neurons fire more strongly to tastes and smells in hungry animals than in animals that 
are satiated (Critchley & Rolls, 1996). These data suggest that the orbitofrontal neurons 
responding to taste and smell do not simply code sensory properties, but code also the 
current incentive value of stimuli. The existence of unique brain circuits able to attribute an 
abstract value to different kinds of options and able to compare them with each other 
brings neuroscience near to one of the fundamental assumptions evident in the classic 
economic model: the existence of a unique reasoning system with a consistent and stable 
set of preferences.  
 
 1.3  From reward to value 
 A well-learned reward-predicting stimulus evokes a state of expectation in the 
subject. The neuronal correlate of this expectation of reward may be the sustained neuronal 
activity that follows the presentation of a reward predicting stimulus and persists for 
several seconds until the reward is delivered. This activity seems to reflect access to 
neuronal representations of reward that were established through previous experience 
(Schultz, 2000). Mechanisms regarding the expectation of reward are studied by classic 
conditioning experiments, in which a cue stimulus is followed by a reward or a 
punishment. Studies involving animals have shownthat the activation of areas that receive 
dopaminergic projection (striatum and OFC) is modulated not only by reward but also by 
the expectation of reward. Reward-expectation neurons are found in monkey and rat 
striatum orbitofrontal cortex, and amygdala (Shultz, 2000). These neurons discriminate 
between trials with reward and trials without and they are active just before the reward 
(Hollerman, 1998). 
 Another important aspect is evident in that this expectation signal changes 
systematically with experience. Neurons in the striatum and OFC initially show reward-
expectation activity during all trials with novel stimuli. With experience, this activity is 
progressively restricted to rewarded rather than unrewarded trials (Tremblay & Schultz, 
2000 a,b). Another important aspect of these reward-expectation neurons is sensitive to the 
relative value context. In an elegant experiment, Tremblay and Schultz (2000) 
demonstrated that neuronal firing to the same stimuli depended on the relative value 
context in which they were experienced. Animals were taught to associate three visual cues 
with raisins, apple, and cereal. When the ‘‘apple’’ cue was presented in conjunction with 
the ‘‘raisin’’ cue, it was relatively less preferred by the monkey; when paired with the 
‘‘cereal’’ cue, it was relatively more preferred. Orbitofrontal firing to the apple cue 
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depended on the context, being greater in the apple–cereal pairing (where it was associated 
with the preferred food), than in the apple–raisin pairing (where it was associated with the 
less preferred food). These findings, suggest that OFC neurons code the relative value of 
reward, rather than simply reward itself. This can be interpreted as a role for the OFC in 
representing motivational or incentive values of rewarding stimuli (Baxter et al., 2000; 
Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Watanabe, 1996). 
 
 One set of studies has documented responses in OFC related to values of different 
rewards. Padoa-Schioppa and Assad (2006) recorded from area 13 of the OFC while 
monkeys chose between pairs of juices. The amount of each type of juice offered to the 
animals varied from trial to trial, and the types of juices offered changed across sessions. 
Based on each monkey’s actual choices, they calculated a subjective value for each juice 
reward, based on type and quantity of juice, which could explain these choices as resulting 
from a common value scale. They then searched for neurons that showed evidence of this 
hypothesized common scale for subjective value. They found three dominant patterns of 
responding, which accounted for 80% of the neuronal responses in OFC. First and most 
importantly they identified offer value neurons, cells with firing rates that were linearly 
correlated with the subjective value of one of the offered rewards, as computed from 
behaviour. Second, they observed chosen value neurons, which tracked the subjective 
value of the chosen reward in a single common currency that was independent of type of 
juice. Finally, they observed taste neurons, which showed a categorical response when a 
particular juice was chosen. 
 Another set of studies has documented similar responses for subjective values of 
choice options in the striatum and in putamen. Lau and Glimcher (2008) recorded from the 
caudate nucleus while monkeys dynamically adjusted the proportion of their responses to 
each target to match the relative magnitudes of the rewards earned for looking at those 
targets. They found three kinds of task-related responses that were closely related to the 
orbitofrontal signals of Padoa Schioppa and Assad (2006, 2008): action value neurons, 
which tracked the value of one of the actions, independent of whether it was chosen; 
chosen value neurons, which tracked the value of a chosen action; and choice neurons, 
which produced a categorical response when a particular action was taken. Action value 
responses occurred primarily early in the trial, at the time of the monkey’s choice, while 
chosen value responses occurred later in the trial, near the time of reward receipt. 
Samejima and colleagues (2005) recorded from putamen while monkeys performed a 
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manual choice task, turning a lever leftward or rightward to obtain rewards. Across 
different blocks, the probability that each turn would be rewarded with a large (as opposed 
to a small) magnitude of juice was changed. Recording from the putamen, they found that 
one-third of all modulated neurons tracked action value. Thus, the responses in the caudate 
and putamen in these two studies mirror those found in orbitofrontal cortex, except that 
neural responses were anchored to the actions produced by the animals rather than to a 
more abstract goods-based framework as observed in orbitofrontal cortex. 
 
 1.4  Learning value 
 Solid evidence now indicates that dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain encode a 
teaching signal that can be used to learn the subjective value of actions (Montague & King-
Casas, 2007). How does this subjective value signal arise? One of the most critical sources 
of value information is undoubtedly past experience. We learn from the past experience to 
attribute a value and then we use this subjective value during the decision making process. 
Following reinforcement learning theories, subjective values are learned through iterative 
updating based on experience. The theories rest on the idea that each time a subject 
experiences the outcome of her choice, an updated value estimate is calculated from the 
old value estimate. The difference between the experienced outcome of an action and the 
outcome that was forecast is revealed as a signal of an error: reward prediction error. 
Pioneering studies of Schultz and colleagues (1997) provided the initial evidence that 
dopaminergic neurons encode a reward prediction error signal. They demonstrated that, 
during conditioning tasks, dopaminergic neurons (1) responded to the receipt of 
unexpected rewards, (2) responded to the first reliable predictor of reward after 
conditioning, (3) did not respond to the receipt of fully predicted rewards, and (4) showed 
a decrease in firing when a predicted reward was omitted. This error signal is scaled by a 
learning rate, which determines the weight given to recent versus remote experience. In 
simple terms, if a reward occurs unpredictably after a given action then the prediction error 
is positive, and learning about the consequences of the action that produced the reward 
occurs. However, once the consequences of that action have been learned (so that the 
reward that follows subsequent repetition of the action is now predicted), the prediction 
error falls to zero and no new information about the consequences of the action is learned. 
By contrast, if the expected reward is not received after repeating a learned action then the 
prediction error falls to a negative value and the behaviour is extinguished. 
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To summarise, the starting point of our decision begins from a basic function such 
as: i) perceive and detect a signal of reward, ii) create a subjective value, iii) detect 
contextual signal anticipating reward and iv) update the expectation of reward with the 
actual reward signal.   
 Subsequent paragraphs will show how reward’s signal and subjective value is not 
only related to basic needs like, food, water and sex, but is also related to more social 
concepts at the root of our life such as money, equality, fairness, responsibility, etc.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
DIFFERENT DECISIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter I concepts such as value and reward were introduced that are at the basis of all 
kinds of decisions. This chapter introduces concepts related to specific kinds of decisions: 
economic decisions under uncertainty, and social and moral decisions. In all these types of 
decisions, emotions seem to play a significant role. Therefore, in the last part of the chapter 
the concept of emotion and its components is introduced.  
 
 
 2.1 Economic decision under uncertainty 
 Decision making is the process of selecting an action from a set of available 
options. From this general definition, a rational decision according to the classic economic 
model means selecting the action with the highest reward and lowest cost (e.g., highest 
utility). However, it is not always possible to easily discriminate which option has the 
highest reward, especially in uncertain environment where it is not possible foresee future 
events and consequences of one’s choice. Most of our decisions in everyday life involve 
risk and are supported only by probabilistic knowledge. As reported in the first chapter, 
economy and psychology are trying to understand what guides our decisions by starting 
from two basic assumptions: (i) the existence of a general and unique reasoning system (ii)  
a consistent and stable set of preferences. On the base of this finite consistent stable set of 
preferences, most of the effort of economists has been to describe the mathematical 
function of our choice heuristic. In this prospective, a fundamental preference of our 
choice is the selection of an action with the highest expected utility (EU). Bernoulli’s 
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Expected Utility (EU) theory assumes that people assign subjective values to consequences 
and weigh them according to their probabilities (Bernoulli, 1738). This means that subjects 
in uncertain contexts do not choose the option with the highest absolute value, but they 
choose the option with the more likely value (von Neuman & Morgestern 1944). Subjects 
attribute a value (x) to each of the options. This value is associated with the probability (p) 
with which it  can be obtained (Bernoulli, 1738). Following this definition, the EU is the 
product between the option value and the probability to get this value: 
 
EU = U(x)*p. 
 
 Even if this formalization summarizes well the process of attributing value and how 
this is strongly dependent on probability or more generally on learning, the EU function 
does not fully describe real choice, and several sets of   behavioural data contradict the EU 
theory. Well known examples in this direction are the Framing Effect (Tversky & 
Kahneman (1981) and the Allais’s paradox (1953). The framing effect1 shows how the 
format rather than the content of two identical options can alter people’s decisions. 
Specifically, individuals have a tendency to show inconsistent choices, depending on 
whether the question is framed to concentrate on losses or gains (Plous, 1993). The Allais 
paradox2 shows that the significant majority of real decision makers order uncertain 
prospects in a way that is inconsistent with the postulate that choices are independent of 
irrelevant alternatives. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Framing effect. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) asked to choose between a certain (i.e. sure) or a probabilistic (i.e. 
risky) option to save lives (positive frame) or minimize deaths (negative frame). 
Imagine that the United States is preparing for an outbreak of an unusual Asian disease that is expected to kill 600 
people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Scientific estimates of the consequences of 
the programs are as follows. Positive frame: If Program A is adopted, exactly 200 people will be saved. If Program B is 
adopted, there is a 1 in 3 probability that all 600 people will be saved and a 2 in 3 probability that no people will be 
saved. Negative frame: If Program C is adopted, exactly 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted, there is a 1 in 3 
probability that nobody will die and a 2 in 3 probability that all 600 will die. Most	  people	  chose	  options	  A	  and	  D,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  terms	  of	  consequences,	  these	  choices	  are	  contradictory	  (A	  is	  equivalent	  to	  C,	  as	  B	  is	  to	  D).	  People	  appear	  to	  exhibit	  a	  general	  tendency	  to	  be	  risk	  seeking	  when	  confronted	  with	  negatively	  framed	  problems	  and	  risk	  averse	  when	  presented	  with	  positively	  framed	  problems.	  	  2Allais	  paradox.	  Consider	  this	  choice	  among	  two	  lotteries:	  A)Lottery	  L1	  promises	  a	  sure	  win	  of	  €100;	  B)	  lottery	  L2	  is	  
a	  10%	  chance	  to	  win	  500€,	  89%	  to	  win	  100€	  and	  1%	  to	  win	  0€.	  Second	  choice	   is	  between:	  C)	  Lottery	  L3	  is	  a	  11%	  
chance	  to	  win	  100€	  and	  89%	  chance	  to	  win	  0€	  and	  D)	  Lottery	  L4	  is	  a	  10%	  chance	  to	  win	  500€	  and	  90%	  chance	  to	  
win	  0€.	  Following	  the	  EU	  theory	  subjects	  should	  prefer	  A	  to	  B	  and	  C	  to	  D.	  Mathematically	   in	  the	  first	  choice	  U(100)*1	  >	  U(500)*0.10+	   U(100)*0.89+	   U(0)*0.01	   whereas	   in	   the	   second	   choice	   	   U(100)*0.11+U(0)*0.89>	  U(500)*10+U(0)*0.90.	   Behavioral	   data	   showed	   that	   most	   subject	   prefer	   A	   to	   B	   but	   D	   to	   C,	   contradicting	   the	  assumption	  of	  EU.	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 Other theories tried to develop and improve the EU theory, taking in consideration 
the real behaviour of subjects (e.g. prospect theory; Kahneman & Tvresky, 1979), but only 
recently has the new cooperation between different disciplines (psychology, economy, 
sociology) and more attention on behavioural and neuronal data, allowed a better 
understanding of decision making processes. From this prospective, new elements such as 
emotion and social values are showing their role in explaining our choice.  
 
 A nice example of economic decision, quite far away from a classical definition of 
rational decision, is the ‘endowment effect’ concerning the fact that people place a higher 
value on objects they own than objects that they do not. Lerner and colleagues (2004) 
investigated the impact of specific emotions on the ‘endowment effect’. Participants before 
the real task watched a film clip with a neutral, disgust or sadness content. Half the 
participants were endowed with an object and then given the opportunity to sell it back at a 
range of prices (sell condition); the other half were shown, but not given, the object and 
then asked whether they would prefer to receive the object or to receive various cash 
amounts (choice condition). Results showed that the sadness induction reduces selling 
prices but increases choice prices, and disgust reduces both selling and choice prices. 
Interestingly, these data are in accord with the experience of depression of compulsive 
shoppers. Probably in these subjects the choice price is the normal or greater motivating 
purchase, whereas the selling price is greatly underestimated in inducing depressive state.  
 
 In expected utility theory, a decision maker selects an action by maximizing the 
sum of utilities for various outcomes weighted by their probabilities. Unfortunately, this 
theory was too simplistic to account for the pattern of choice behaviour that people 
displayed in reality. Furthermore, economists and psychologists have long recognized that 
a variety of contextual factors influence the utility of a physical stimulus (Kahneman et al, 
1979), and that emotions play an important role in decision making (Bechara, 2005).  
 
 
  2.2  Social Decision 
 The nature of the decision making process changes when individuals begin to 
interact in a social setting, making the outcome of a decision also dependent on the 
decisions of others. Social decision making is one of the most complex animal behaviors. 
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It often requires subjects to recognize the intentions of other subjects correctly, and to 
adjust behavioural strategies rapidly. In addition, humans can cooperate or compete with 
one another, and various contextual factors influence the extent to which humans are 
willing to sacrifice their personal gains to increase or decrease the well-being of others. 
The basis of social decision making can be investigated quantitatively by applying Game 
Theory. Game theory aims to help us understand situations in which decision-makers 
interact. Game Theory (von Neuman & Mongester, 1944) incorporates several models in 
explaining the choice of subjects interacting with other decision makers in a specific 
situation called the ‘game’. A game is a specific context of interaction with precise roles, 
rules, and fixed time of actions between players. There are two central assumptions in 
(classical) rational game theory: (i) players are self-interested and (ii) reach an 
“equilibrium” in which everyone is choosing (or planning) strategies that yield the best 
outcome, anticipating that others are doing the same (Nash equilibrium, 1950). The first 
assumption pertains to self-regarding actors that in a social situation want only to 
maximize their own payoff. A self-regarding actor thus cares about the choice and payoffs 
of other individuals only insofar as these influence his own payoff. One reason for the 
prevalence of the self-interest hypothesis in economics is that it has served the profession 
quite well because self-interest is without doubt one important motivational force, and 
some people indeed display very self-interested behaviours. In some domains, such as 
competitive experimental markets, models based on the self-interest hypothesis even make 
very accurate quantitative predictions (Smith, 1982). However, in strategic interactions, 
where individuals’ actions typically have a direct impact on other individuals’ payoffs, the 
self-interest hypothesis often fails to predict correctly players’ behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 
2002; Camerer & Fehr, 2006). The experimentally observed failures of the self-interest 
model gave rise to the development of alternative models where the social component of 
interactions is also taken in consideration. A clear example in this sense is the game called 
Ultimatum Game (Güth et al., 1982). 
 
 The ultimatum game is a social situation between two anonymous individuals: one 
player, the proposer, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, dividing some amount of money, say 
€10, between herself and another person. If the second person, the responder, accepts the 
division, then both people earn the specified amounts. If however the responder rejects it, 
they both get nothing. Following the rational interpretation, the responder interested only 
in material gains (i.e. money) should accept any positive offer (1€ is better than nothing), 
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and the proposer, anticipating this, will offer the smallest offer that is possible. 
Nevertheless, evidence (see review Camerer, 2003, Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Camerer & 
Fehr, 2006): suggests that not only approximately 50% of the offers that fall below 30% of 
the initial endowment are rejected by responder but also the proposer usually proposes a   
fair offer around 50% of the initial amount.  This evidence is generally interpreted by 
saying that people are not driven exclusively by self-regarding preferences based on 
material gains, but also by other-regarding preferences guided by fairness and equality 
motives (Fehr & Gatcher, 2002; Bowles, 2006). A fair decision is the decision, from the 
proposer’s point of view, to offer around 50% of one’s own initial amount. Equal division 
of the initial amount between proposer and responder is what the responder wants (equity). 
If the responder receives an unfair offer (for example £1), then he can reject the proposed 
allocation (Gu ̈th et al, 1982). If the responder rejects it, both players receive nothing. 
Rejections are usually taken as evidence of willingness to punish (Rabin, 1993) those who 
have behaved unfairly (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). The amount a responder loses by rejecting 
a proposed allocation serves as a measure of the strength of these motives (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). Economists have largely used the concept of fairness, considering fairness 
as a fundamental normative category of social decision without, however, considering the 
psychological nature of this category. 
 
 A possible interpretation in psychological terms is that in cases of low offers (say 
1€ or 2€ out of the 10€ available), the responder faces a conflict between accepting the 
money, due to its expected reward value, and rejecting it because of both anger and 
indignation due to the perceived unfairness of the allocation (Elster, 1998). Proposers must 
possess a reasonably accurate prior model of what the responder is likely to reject, and the 
responders must be willing to reinforce such models by enforcing substantial rejection 
levels, thus ensuring fair (higher) offers from proposers.  
 
 Another example of social behaviour is investigated by the prisoner’s dilemma. The 
Prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is used to study “ social dilemmas ” that arise when the 
welfare of a group conflicts with the narrow self-interest of each individual group member. 
For example, in a typical two-player PD, each player can choose either to “ cooperate ” or 
“ defect. ” Payoffs are symmetric, and chosen so that the sum of the payoffs is greatest 
when both choose “cooperate ” and least when both players choose “ defect. ” However, 
each player earns the most if he chooses to “defect ” when the other cooperates. Thus, the 
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perfect Nash Equilibrium of this environment is for both players to defect. In this game, 
two players at the same time can each choose between cooperation and defection. If this 
game is played only once and the players care only about their own payoffs, both players 
should defect, which corresponds to the Nash equilibrium for this game. In reality and in 
laboratory experiments (see, for example, Davis and Holt, 1993; Ledyard, 1995), both of 
these assumptions are frequently violated. Humans often cooperate in prisoner’s dilemma 
games, even when the game is one shot. The key finding was that, in aggregate, 
cooperation occurs about half of the time in PD games (McCabe, 2001). Therefore, for 
humans, decision making in social contexts may not be entirely driven by self-interest, but 
at least partially by preferences regarding the well-being of other individuals or society in 
general (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003). Interestingly, cooperation and altruistic behaviors 
abound in human societies but seem to occur also in non-human primates (Hauser et al., 
2003), suggesting a basic mechanism supporting social behaviour. They proposed an 
example of altruistic food giving among unrelated individuals in cotton-top tamarins 
(Saguinus oedipus). This study showed altruistic food giving among genetically unrelated 
individuals that is extremely rare in nature. Authors provided evidence that tamarins are 
more likely to give food to a conspecific who unilaterally gives food back, as opposed to a 
conspecific who unilaterally refrains from giving food; suggesting that food giving may be 
based on others’ contingent behaviour. Moreover authors showed that tamarins distinguish 
between altruistic food giving as opposed to by-products of selfishness or simple 
reinforcement contingencies; individuals are more likely to give food to an individual who 
has altruistically given food in the past than to individuals who give food as a result of 
selfish attempts to procure their own food. These results suggest that human cooperation 
may have evolved from psychologically ancient and primitive mechanisms, present in 
closely and related animals (see Millinski 1987; Hauser 2000). 
 
 Evidence for altruistic social preference in humans are also investigated in other 
experimental games, such as the Dictator Game (DG), and the Trust Game (TG) (Fehr & 
Camerer, 2007). In the DG, a dictator receives a fixed amount of money and donates a part 
of it to the recipient. This ends the game, so there is no opportunity for the recipient to 
react. Any amount of donation reduces the payoff to the dictator, so the amount provides a 
measure of altruism. During dictator games, people tend to donate on average about 25% 
of their money (Camerer, 2003). It could be that not only inequity aversion drives the 
dictator game, but also altruism, which is an important aspect of our social life. 
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Anonymous donation to charitable organizations is an outstanding example of this unique 
aspect of human altruism, which relies on our ability to directly link motivational 
significance to abstract moral beliefs and societal causes.  
 
 In this above paragraph, trust is not described because is the topic of two 
experimental studies presented in the experimental part where trust relation and 
cooperation are covered fully.  
 
 
 
 2.3 Moral Decision 
 The last kind of decision introduced in this chapter regards decision with moral 
meaning. Recent interest in social cognitive neuroscience has led to a growing body of 
research aimed at elucidating the neural and cognitive mechanisms that underlie human 
moral behavior (Moll et al., 2005; Beer & Ochsner, 2006; Lieberman, 2007). Moral 
behavior refers to what individuals should do based on principles and judgments (i.e. moral 
values) shared with other members of their social environment (Ciaramelli et al., 2007). 
The basic assumption underlying a moral behavior is that individuals choose and control 
their own actions. Further, they are aware of what they are doing as they do it, and can 
normally predict the consequences of their actions, at least the proximate consequences. 
Therefore, their conscious knowledge of what they are doing should allow them to choose 
between right and wrong actions. Right and wrong pertain to the sets of customs and 
values that are embraced by a cultural group to guide social conduct (Moll et al., 2005). 
Moral decisions first involve a concept of agency that in moral terms becomes: 
responsibility. In most of legal tradition, indeed, criminal conviction depends on both a 
harmful consequence and the intent to arm, where the intention to assume responsibility is 
a key point. 
 
In a person able to control his/her behaviour and aware of what he/she is doing, 
what does support his/her moral behaviour? For the next 15 years during the “cognitive 
revolution” (1960-1980s), the Kolberg’s (1976) approach dominated moral psychology. In 
his point of view (close to Kant’s position), moral decision was focused only on conscious 
verbal reasoning. In the same time a long tradition from Hume (1739, 1984) to more recent 
“affective revolution” of 1980s (Haidt 2001, 2007) supported the idea that an inextricable 
relation of actions as the object of moral sentiments exist. Recent investigation in 
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neuroscience attempted to solve this dichotomy by showing how our brain is able to 
integrate both cognitive and emotional drives in moral decision.  
 
 When we are agents of social actions conforming to our values, we may feel pride, 
whereas when another person is perceived as the agent, we may feel gratitude. On the 
negative side, when we act counter to our values, we may feel guilt, and when another 
person acts in the same way towards us, we feel indignation or anger instead (Moll et al., 
2007). Furthermore, the anticipation of these moral sentiments in particular social 
situations often guides our behavior (Tangney et al., 2007).  Areas of the brain supporting 
moral behaviour are several: moral phenomena could emerge from the integration of 
contextual social knowledge, represented as event knowledge in the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC); from social semantic knowledge, stored in the anterior and posterior temporal 
cortex; and from motivational and basic emotional states, which depend on cortical-limbic 
circuits. In particular, two opposite components could be at the basis of our moral 
behaviour: a cold and cognitive component that is mostly cortical and related to control 
and functions, and a hot and emotive component that is subcortical, related to emotive and 
reward function (Greene et al., 2001; Haidt, 2007; Moll et al. 2007).  
 A classic method to investigate moral behaviour is to request subjects to solve 
complex moral situations that incorporate dilemmas. Famous examples of such situations 
are the footbridge dilemma and the trolley dilemma (Thomson, 1986). The footbridge 
dilemma is defined as a personal dilemma because it implies  i) a clear notion of agency, 
and an action that ii) causes serious bodily harm to iii) a victim vividly represented as an 
individual. The trolley dilemma is defined as an impersonal dilemma because it fails to 
meet one of these criteria. In both dilemmas there is a trolley which is about to run over 
and kill five people. In the trolley dilemma one can save them by hitting a switch that will 
divert the track onto another track where there is only a person. In the footbridge dilemma 
one can save the five people by pushing a large man off the bridge above the trolley path, 
killing him but stopping the trolley. A cold economic solution suggests a  sacrifice of one 
life to save 5 in both dilemmas, but most people approve of sacrificing the life of one 
person only in the trolley dilemma but not in the footbridge dilemma (Greene 2001, 2004). 
This apparent contradiction was illuminated recently by neuroimaging and 
neuropsychological study (Greene et al. 2001, 2004; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 
2007). The action in the footbridge dilemma could elicit a stronger negative emotional 
response involving emotive areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate 
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area and anterior insula. This emotive activation forces subjects to avoid sacrificing the 
large man. In contrast the trolley dilemma recruits more areas associated with problem 
solving and deliberative reasoning including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and 
inferior parietal lobe. This cognitive, rather than the emotional approach, induces subjects 
to take the more rational or utilitarian position of shifting the trolley direction in order to 
save 5 people but killing one. Neuropsychological data confirm this dual process theory 
(emotion vs cognition). Patients with lesion of the vmPFC usually present high levels of 
aggressiveness, lack of concern for social and moral rules and irresponsibility (Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1985; Stuss et al., 1992; Damasio, 1994; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). These 
patients, facing the same moral task concerning person and impersonal dilemma, show a 
greater number of utilitarian choices in personal dilemma than for healthy controls 
(Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007). The data shows how lesion of vmPFC could 
reduce the influence of emotion on moral reasoning but leave intact the cognitive/rational 
solution. However none of the existing studies has systematically measured subjects-
emotional responses emerging during (and, presumably, having an impact on) evaluation 
of moral dilemmas. 
 It is clear that no single moral circuit exists in the brain, but our moral behaviour is 
dependent on a combination of several circuits with different functions. For example, 
orbitofrontal areas appear to be primarily involved in on-line representation of reward and 
punishment value (Bechara, 1995). The contribution of this area is not necessarily moral 
but the regulator function in which affective information guides approach and avoidance 
behaviour in both social and non social context. Greene tested this dual process theory 
while controlling for the effect of cognitive load on moral judgment Greene (2008). In 
contrast, Valdesolo (2006) tested the influence of the induced mood on moral judgment. In 
Greene’s study only personal moral dilemmas were used and the reaction time (RT) for 
utilitarian and non-utilitarian responses were compared. Data showed that cognitive load 
increases RT only for utilitarian judgment but not for non-utilitarian judgments. This data 
confirm that utilitarian solution in personal dilemma engages a cognitive control function.  
 
 2.4  Emotion-based decision 
  
 2.4.1 Components of emotion 
 
All the kinds of decisions described above suggest that emotions have some role in 
driving our choices. In the following paragraph the concept of emotion and its components 
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are introduced.  
 
Although the term emotion is commonly used to capture all affective experience, in 
neuroscience the term emotion is proposed to reflect the discrete response to an external or 
internal event that entails a range of synchronized features, including subjective 
experience, expression, bodily response, and action tendencies (Phelps, 2009). This 
definition reduces the emotion at discrete responses offering a real pragmatic point of view 
in which emotion can be measured and manipulated.  
 
One of the features of emotion is subjective experience. One of the primary sources 
of confusion in emotion research is the relation between emotion and feeling (Damasio, 
1999). The subjective experience of emotion, called feeling, is just one of the features that 
affective scientists consider a component of emotion. However most emotion researchers 
today acknowledge that there are several components of emotion that do not necessarily 
depend on feeling (LeDoux, 1996). For research in non-human animals this distinction is 
critical, since subjective experience is not accessible in other species, but other types of 
emotional responses, such as physiological changes, are easily assessed and have 
characteristic patterns across species.  
 
One of these physiological changes is expression; it refers here to motor responses 
in the face, voice or body that convey the emotion to others in a social environment. The 
primary function of expression is the communication of emotion. The expression of 
emotion has most often been studied in the characteristic motor response of the face when 
a person is experiencing an emotion.  
 
Another physiological change regards the bodily responses. One of the unique 
characteristics of emotion is the patterned behavioural, hormonal, and autonomic response 
that follows the perception of an emotion eliciting event. In contrast to emotional 
expressions, such as face expression in which a primary function might be the 
communication of emotion, bodily reactions are thought to be adaptive in preparing the 
organism to respond (Sinker et al, 2009; De Gelder, 2009). The characteristic patterns of 
expression and bodily response of emotion provide a powerful means to assess emotional 
reactions using psychophysiological techniques that are non-intrusive and do not depend 
on subjective experience or verbal report. 
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In contrast to bodily responses, in which any behavioural motor actions that occur 
may be best characterized as automatic, reflexive reactions, emotion also elicits a tendency 
towards action that does not have a predictable motor pattern and is expressed as 
instrumental responses. These action tendencies motivate the organism towards a particular 
class of actions. For example, to move away from and avoid a stimulus that predicts 
potential punishment or a tendency to approach a stimulus that is rewarding is an 
instrumental response to an emotion-eliciting event. This component clearly suggests a 
more complex role for emotion in action selection than a simple reaction.  
An additional important component of emotion is the evaluation and appraisal of an 
event. The primary function of emotion is to highlight the significance or importance of 
events so that these events receive priority in further processing. The evaluation of the 
relevance or significance of event can occur rapidly, without conscious awareness or 
cognitive interpretation (Zajonc, 1984; LeDoux, 1996). More often than not, we are aware 
of the emotional significance of an event. This awareness and the cognitive interpretation 
of the meaning of the event can initiate and alter an emotional response (Lazarus, 1984). 
 
 
2.4.2 Details on autonomic response component of emotion 
  
 Autonomic activity corresponds to the physiological expressions, mostly 
electrical and hormonal, under the control of the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and 
represents the neural activity related to the brain and body regulation. Historically, the use 
of the term “autonomic” implied that the given part of the nervous system was functionally 
independent of any voluntary nervous or cognitive control. ANS controls visceral targets 
such as cardiovascular tissues (heart, blood vessels), smooth muscles (most visceral 
organs), glands (endocrine and exocrine) and sensory systems (eyes, skin); having specific 
roles in physiological and behavioural adaptation. Autonomic control mainly regulates the 
internal environment in order to maintain the body homeostasis. However, the role of 
autonomic activity cannot be reduced to maintain brain or body immediate homeostasis; it 
provides support to complex behaviours, such as emotional reactions. In that sense, 
autonomic activity is reactive to a stimulus but also contains an anticipatory dimension. 
Peripheral electrical measures that have been used successfully as indicators of mind 
expressions are: pupillometry, electrodermal activity, cardiovascular resposes (heart rate 
variability, blood pressure, peripheral blood flow). Pupillary responses have been 
correlated with emotional processing, cognitive load or degrees of alertness, and task-
evoked changes in pupil size can be observed within the first several hundred milliseconds 
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after the stimulus presentation (Beatty, 1986). Electrodermal and cardiovascular responses 
are acknowledged to index respectively the activation level and the valence of emotional 
stimuli (Bradley and Lang, 2000; Solbakk et al., 2005). Various aspects of cardiovascular 
functioning (heart rate variability, blood pressure, peripheral blood flow) can also be 
correlated with emotions (Lang et al., 1993), passive and active attention (Öhman et al., 
2000), or motor processes (Sequeira and Ba- M'Hamed, 1999). For instance, heart rate 
acceleration often accompanies perception of unpleasant compared with pleasant pictures 
(Solbakk et al., 2005) and heart rate deceleration can be observed during detection tasks 
(Lacey and Lacey, 1978). 
  
 A particularly important autonomic activity in studies of emotion is the skin 
conductance, defined by Sequeira and colleagues (2009) as 'a window on the arousal 
dimension of emotion'. Skin conductance variations depend on the quantity of sweat 
secreted by eccrine sweat glands. Such secretion is under the control of sympathetic 
innervation which transmits influences from the central nervous system to the eccrine 
glands. Sweating variations are sensitive markers of events having a particular 
signification for individuals, usually related to emotional, novelty or attentional fields 
(Sequeira et al, 2009). Skin conductance is a good indicator of reticular activation and 
therefore seems to reflect the energetic dimension of behaviour and particularly of 
emotion. Indeed, the amplitude of electrodermal responses increased linearly as ratings of 
arousal increased, regardless of emotional valence (Bradley and Lang, 2000). This effect is 
observed when emotional pictures (Winton et al., 1984) or emotional words (Manning et 
al, 1974) are used.  
 
 2.4.3 Details on endocrine response component of emotion 
Life history construction is mediated through a suite of neuro-endocrine 
mechanisms that regulate resource partitioning among competing acute and life course 
goals and demands. Stress responses illustrate this point. Perceived threat or challenge 
triggers dual signals from brain to body transmitted via endocrine and neural pathways 
(Boyce and Ellis, 2005). One route involves the hypothalamo-pituitary-adrenocortical 
(HPA) pathway that triggers cortisol release, while the other involves autonomic nervous 
system activation that triggers both ‘‘fight or flight’’ organ responses and direct 
sympathetic neural release of catecholamines in the adrenal medulla (SAM). Each 
component of the suite of coordinated central and peripheral responses has deep 
evolutionary roots grounded in common survival demands (Porges, 1995) that shift 
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priorities to immediate survival (accelerated heart rate, attentional focusing, elevated 
glucose), and away from deferrable activity (immunity and repair, digestion, growth, and 
reproduction). Fear-related behavioral responses are orchestrated by diverse neurochemical 
signals; one set of these signals involves the regulation of corticotrophin-releasing 
hormone (CRH) by glucocorticoids in various regions of the brain. Several clinical 
observations have linked alteration of CRH and cortisol levels to anxious and/or fearful 
depression (e.g. Gold et al 2002; Nemeroff et al 2004). Other chemical signals in the brain, 
such as 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT) and noradrenaline, are important in fear and its 
pathologies (Gold et al 2002; Nemeroff et al 2004). 
 
Positive social interactions and emotions are associated with a unified pattern of 
physiological events. Suckling or breastfeeding, aspects of maternal behaviour, represent 
examples of positive social interactionwhich have been explored in depth from a 
physiological and neuroendocrine point of view.  Lactating rats have a decreased 
sympathetic nervous tone, manifest a lowered blood pressure when compared with non-
lactating rats. They also have an enhanced vagal nerve tone, resulting, for instance,  in an 
increased release of insulin and of other gastrointestinal hormones. Together, these results 
document the fact that a shift in autonomic nervous tone—from sympathetic to 
parasympathetic, vagal nerve dominance has occurred. Furthermore, lactating rats are less 
responsive to certain stressful stimuli than are non-lactating animals (Uvna¨s-Moberg, 
1996; Uvna¨s-Moberg and Eriksson, 1996). A key hormone and neurotransmittor in 
breastfeeding is the Oxytocin. Oxytocin has emerged as a core component of the 
mechanisms mediating the health benefits and anti-stress effects of positive social 
interactions.  It has been shown that oxytocin treatments increase social contact in several 
animal species (Carter et al., 1995; Witt et al., 1992). In addition, in monogamous voles, 
oxytocin is essential for selective social behaviours and the formation of pair bond 
(Williams et al., 1994). 
 
2.4.4 Basic emotions 
In his seminal work The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animal, Charles 
Darwin (1872/2002) proposed that there are a limited number of basic, universal human 
emotions. More recently, Paul Ekman and his colleagues studied the facial expression of 
emotion and suggested that there are six basic emotional expressions: happy, sad, fear, 
anger, disgust, and surprise (Ekman & Friesen, 1971). Each of these expressions is 
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characterized by a unique subset of facial muscle movements. The ability to convey these 
emotional expressions appears to be innate. Studies examining the vocal expression of the 
emotion also provide some evidence for basic emotions (Johnstone & Scherer, 2000). 
Despite years of significant effort, there is relatively little evidence to suggest that these 
basic emotions are reflected in corresponding, unique patterns of autonomic responding 
(Cacioppo et al, 2000). In research on emotion, these basic facial expressions have proved 
useful in both assessing emotion perception and evoking corresponding emotional 
responses in others. However, it is important to acknowledge that these six basic emotions 
do not capture the full range of human emotional experience. There are several more 
complex emotions, such as guilt and love, which are less clearly linked to specific facial or 
vocal displays. Social or moral emotions, such as pride, guilt, shame, or embarrassment, 
differ from the basic emotions in their external triggers (Haidt, 2003), and both the 
perception and expression of social emotions differ culturally between individualistic and 
collectivistic nations (Eid & Diener, 2001). Emotions form the omnipresent background for 
behaviour and attitudes, and they serve a critical role in social interaction (Forgas, 2003). 
Damasio (1999) proposes also another kind of emotion called: a class of background 
emotions such as well-being or malaise, calm or tension, fatigue or energy, anticipation or 
dread. In the background emotions, the inducer is normally internal and the focus of 
response is mainly the "internal milieu" of the body. 
 
 
2.4.5 Nature of emotions 
 
In the late eighteenth century, William James and Carl Lange suggested with the 
now famous James-Lange theory that changes in bodily responses are a necessary 
condition for emotional experience to arise (James, 1894).  They argued that emotions 
could not be experienced in the absence of these bodily feelings. This theory still remains a 
milestone in the theory of emotion. From this theory, Damasio (1999) developed his own 
theory defining emotions as patterns of chemical and neural responses, the function of 
which is to assist the organism in maintaining life by prompting adaptive behaviours. 
Emotions are due to the activation of a set of brain structures, most of which also monitor 
and regulate bodily states around optimal physiological values, in processes known as 
homeostasis or homeodynamics. Emotions are biologically determined, stereotypical, and 
automatic, although it is acknowledged that both culture and individual development may 
influence the set of inducers and can inhibit or modify overt expressions.  
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This approach is actually the most used in neuroscience, and especially in the study of 
decision making. However the approach proposed by Davidson and colleagues (1990) 
based on the distinction between approach/withdrawal is also relevant. This approach 
classifies different emotions according to motivation. One of the primary functions of 
emotion is to motivate action, and different emotional states lead to different goals for 
action. Some emotional states, such as happiness, surprise, and anger, are referred to as 
approach emotions – that is, they evoke a motive or goal to approach a situation. Other 
emotional states, such as sadness, disgust, or fear, are withdrawal emotions, in that there is 
a natural tendency is to withdraw from situations linked to these emotions. Interestingly 
this approach does not consider emotion as a simple reaction, but considers also that 
emotions are able to motivate our choice. 
 
 
2.5. Emotion and decision making 
 
Although emotions have been considered as important variables affecting 
decisions, the role of emotion in decision making has rarely been coupled with the detailed 
investigation of the range of components, factors, and measures that have characterized the 
psychological study of emotion and affect. There are surprisingly few studies on social and 
economic decision making that have explicitly manipulated or measured emotion or affect 
variables. In many studies and theories, especially in neuroeconomics, emotion is inferred, 
but not directly altered or assessed. The aim of the experimental part of this research work 
is to increase the data available about the role of emotions in decision making, proposing 
several tasks where I attempted to manipulate and measure emotions in order to understand 
how this can affect the social and moral decision making process. 
 
The distinction between emotion and cognition has been prominent since early 
philosophical writings, and this simple dichotomy continues to influence folk 
psychological theories and scientific thought, including economic and moral research on 
decision making (Damasio, 1994). In neuroscience, this dual systems approach has gained 
prominence in studies attempting to characterize the impact of emotion on decision making 
(e.g., Cohen, 2005; Shiv,  2005; Damasio, 1994; Greene, 2007). This is also the 
prospective assumed in this research work. This point of view has suggested the existence 
of two different systems for the decision making process: a deliberative system and an 
affective system. The deliberative one is a complex, reflective and slow system 
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(Lowenstein, 2004) corresponding roughly to expected utility theory or more in general to 
the rational paradigm. The affective system cares primarily of short-term outcomes; it is 
simple, reactive and fast (Lowenstein, 2004; Greene, 2007). 
   
 Even if the emotion-cognition dichotomy theory seems the more common and 
better supported theory in current research on decision making, the relation between 
emotion and cognition in cognitive neuroscience cannot be considered in relation to the 
impact of emotion or affect on cognition without further specifying and assessing the 
specific emotion or affective process engaged (Phelps, 2006). Specifically, it seems 
necessary to further investigate the relationship between the concepts of value, emotion 
and choice in order to better understand how emotion and cognition interact in decision-
making. 
 
 2.5.1 Emotions and decision two systems in the brain. 
 Following the dichotomy theory, emotive process are localized in limbic and 
paralimibic structure such as striatum and amygdala and in cortical structure such insula 
and OFC. The activation of these areas are linked to stimuli with specific value (reward or 
punishment), and give fast and automatic responses to the stimuli (such as threat). The 
cognitive and deliberative processes take place in the cortical area; specifically in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the parietal cortex. These areas are involved in 
several different functions such as working memory, abstract reasoning and problem 
solving (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  The interaction between two systems gives the possibility 
of a flexible and rapid solution to complex problems and consents goal directed behaviour, 
with the capacity to solve conflict between different stimuli (McClure et al, 2007). There is 
an influential series of neuropsychological studies by Damasio, Bechara, and colleagues 
(Bechara et al., 1997; Damasio, 1994; Bechara, 2005) investigating the interaction between 
these two systems, and, in particular, how the intuitive/emotive process can support and 
help the rational one in a probabilistic context.  In the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), subjects 
are presented with a choice of four decks of cards, face down. On each trial, they are 
required to choose a card from one of the four decks. When they turn the card over, either 
a financial reward or a penalty is revealed. At the outset of the experiment, subjects are 
told nothing about the contingencies pertaining to the individual decks. In fact, two of the 
four decks are ‘‘high risk’’ while the other two are ‘‘low risk.’’ The high risk decks offer a 
prospect of immediate large rewards but carry a cost of even larger long term penalties. 
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Over the duration of the task, choosing predominantly from these two decks results in 
subjects losing money. The low risk decks offer smaller immediate rewards but even 
smaller long term penalties. Over the duration of the task, choosing from these decks 
results in subjects steadily accumulating money. This task was designed to model real life 
decision making situations where subjects must weigh the potential benefits and possible 
risks associated with choosing particular courses of action. When healthy subjects perform 
this task, they gradually learn the contingencies over the first 20, 30 trials and then choose 
the low risk decks on most subsequent trials. During the experiment, skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) were monitored, both before and after decisions. Healthy participants 
showed an increase of SCR, occurring in the 5-s window before selecting a card, when 
they pondered risky decisions, and began to prefer the good decks before having adequate 
conscious knowledge of the situation. The SCRs could be considered as a physiological 
index of emotional arousal.  Such arousal is related to the sympathetic division of the 
autonomic nervous system (Boucsein, 1992), and is widely used as a sensitive and 
objective measure of emotional processing and attention (see Dawson, Soulières, 
Gernsbacher, & Mottron, 2007 for a recent review). The vmPFC seems to be the critical 
area implicated in the generation and feedback representation of bodily states of arousal 
(Damasio, 1994; Tranel & Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 1999; see 
also Nagai et al., 2004). Patients with ventral frontal lesions, involving part of the OFC, 
show pronounced deficits on this task (Damasio, 1994; Bechara, 2005). Instead of tending 
to choose the low risk decks after learning the contingencies, patients continue to opt for 
the high risk decks on the majority of the trials. Interestingly these patients failed to 
generate anticipatory SCRs observed in healthy subjects. The contrast between defective 
emotion on the one hand and preserved intellect on the other hand in vmPFC patients 
suggested to Bechara and colleagues that, somehow, disturbed emotional signalling could 
explain the decision deficits in this neurological population. 
  
 This study is particularly interesting because the task provided the first laboratory 
diagnostic procedure for patients with ventromedial prefrontal damage – a rather useful 
advance, given that these patients generally passed all other neuropsychologic tests and 
only exhibited their defects in everyday life outside the laboratory. The task was also 
instrumental in showing a persuasive correlation between indices of emotional change 
(skin conductance responses) and the advantageous or disadvantageous playing of the card 
game (Bechara et al., 1997).  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
BRAIN CIRCUITS OF DECISIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first paragraph of this chapter, I summarized current knowledge and propose a 
model that is able to describe optimal economic decision making. The model proposed 
follows mainly the components suggested in the Back-pocket Model proposed by 
Glimcher (2009). The Two-Stage model, described in paragraph 2.1, suggests that medial 
frontal cortex has a relevant role at the stage of attribution of value to the options available 
in order to choose the most valuable among them. Paragraphs, 3.2 and 3.3 expose in detail 
the role of this area in decision making, and in particular the possible involvement of 
emotions in decision making through the involvement of medial prefrontal and 
orbitofrontal cortex 
 
Although neuroscientists and economists are trying to describe a common and unique 
model for decisions, actual knowledge is far away from allowing an exhaustive description 
of this model. However, recent studies (see paragraph below) have begun to suggest that 
some specific components of decision making could be distinguished both 
neurochemically and anatomically.  
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3.1 A common model for economic decision making: Two-Stage model 
 
 As introduced in chapter I, the basic mechanism for producing decisions involves two 
stages: evaluation and choice. The first of these stages is concerned with the evaluation of 
all goods and actions; the second is concerned with choosing amongst the goods or actions 
presented in a given choice set. At a very basic level, one can think of the evaluation 
mechanism as being associated with learning and representing the values of objects and 
actions. Comparisons between different kinds of options (either goods or actions) rely on 
this abstract measure of subjective value, a kind of ‘‘common currency’’ for choice. There 
is now growing evidence (Kable &, Glimcher, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 
Lau and Glimcher, 2008) that subjective value representations do in fact play a role at the 
neural algorithmic level, and that these representations are encoded primarily in medial 
prefrontal cortex and striatum.  Medial prefrontal cortex (specifically the ventomedial 
aspect) and striatum encode the subjective value of different goods or actions during 
decision making in a way that could guide choice. But how do these subjective value 
signals arise? A critical source of value information is past experience. Dopaminergic 
neurons in the midbrain encode a teaching signal that can be used to learn the subjective 
value of actions (Niv and Montague, 2009). Indeed, these kinds of signals can be shown to 
be sufficient for learning the values of different actions from experience. Since these same 
dopaminergic neurons project primarily to prefrontal and striatal regions (Haber, 2003), it 
seems likely that these neurons play a critical role in subjective value learning. Subjective 
values are learned through iterative updating based on experience. The theories rest on the 
idea that each time a subject experiences the outcome of her choice, an updated value 
estimate is calculated from the old value estimate and a reward prediction error, the 
difference between the experienced outcome of an action and the outcome that was 
forecast. This reward prediction error is scaled by a learning rate, which determines the 
weight given to recent versus remote experience (Schultz et al, 1997). 
 
 Learning and encoding subjective value in a common currency is not sufficient for 
decision making; one action still needs to be chosen from among the set of alternatives and 
passed to the motor system for implementation. What is the process by which a highly 
valued option in a choice set is selected and implemented? Unlike evaluation, which has 
been extensively studied in both humans and other animals, choice has been the subject of 
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study principally in awake-behaving monkeys in neuroscience. This may reflect the fact 
that the temporal dynamics of choice make it difficult to study with fMRI. The knowledge 
for these last components of the decision process are limited and strongly dependent on the 
experimental tasks, as for the example the model of decision making based on the 
saccadic-control system in monkeys (Andersen and Buneo, 2002; Glimcher, 2003). 
Findings  (review, Kable et al., 2009) suggest that the areas for choosing, based on values, 
are the Lateral Prefontal Cortex and Parietal Cortex. These areas could be responsible for 
the selection and implementation of choices from among any set of available options. 
 
 At a theoretical level, the process of choice must involve a mechanism for comparing 
two or more options and identifying the most valuable of those options. This is also true 
for the action involving the choice; moreover the system that performed such a comparison 
must be able to represent the values of each option before a choice is made. Basso and 
Wurtz, (1998) established that activity at the two candidate movement sites, during the 
period before the burst, was graded. If the probability that a movement (a saccade) would 
yield a reward was increased, firing rates associated with that saccade increased; and if the 
probability that a saccade would yield a reward was decreased, then the firing rate was 
decreased. Platt and Glimcher (1999) found that firing rates in area LIP before the 
collicular burst occurred were a nearly linear function of both magnitude and probability of 
reward. Other studies (Dorris and Glimcher, 2004; Janssen and Shadlen, 2005; Kim et al., 
2008) showed that various manipulations that increase (or decrease) the subjective value of 
a given saccade also increase (or decrease) the firing rate of neurons within the frontal-
parietal maps associated with that saccade. The fronto-parietal map encodes the subjective 
value of a particular saccade relative to the values of all other saccades under 
consideration. This suggests that whereas the orbitofrontal and striatal neurons appear to 
encode absolute (and hence transitive) subjective values, parietal neurons, presumably 
using a normalization mechanism, rescale the absolute values so as to maximize the 
differences between the available options before choice is attempted.  
 
 There are obviously many open questions about the details of this mechanism, as well 
as many vigorous debates that go beyond the general outline presented. With regard to 
evaluation, some important open questions, especially for this research work, concern how 
the function of medial prefrontal cortex and striatum might differ and the role of medial 
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prefrontal specifically the orbito and ventromedial one, in peculiar human decision such as 
social and moral decisions.  
 
 3.2 Neuronal basis of social decision making  
 
 The basic building blocks of decision making (see the two stage model above) that 
underlie the process of learning and evaluation also play important roles for decision 
making in social contexts. However, interactions among multiple decision makers in a 
social group display some new features. In social context is still true that the ‘rational’ 
view suggests that human seek to maximize their self-interest according to the information 
available, but at the same time social interactions open the possibility of competition and 
cooperation. Humans and animals indeed act not only to maximize their own self-interest, 
but sometimes also to increase or decrease the well-beings of others around them. These 
unique aspects of social decision making are reflected in the activity of brain areas 
involved in learning and evaluation. As anticipated in chapter II, a good starting point for 
studies of social decision making is game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). 
 
 Socially interactive decision making tends to be dynamic and the process of 
discovering an optimal strategy can be further complicated by the fact that decision makers 
often act according to their other-regarding preferences. Nevertheless, the basic neural 
processes involved in outcome evaluation and reinforcement learning might be generally 
applicable, regardless of whether the outcome of choice is determined socially or not. One 
of the areas that plays a key role in socially interactive decision making is the striatum. 
During decision making without any social interactions, activity in the striatum is 
influenced by both real and fictive reward prediction errors (O’Doherty, 2003; Lohrenz, 
2007). Reward prediction errors during social decision making also lead to activity 
changes in the striatum. For example, during the prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperation 
results in a positive BOLD response in the ventral striatum, when this was reciprocated by 
the partner, but produces a negative BOLD response in the same areas when the 
cooperation was not reciprocated (Rilling et al, 2002; Rilling et al 2007). In addition, the 
caudate nucleus of who receive money from an investor (the trustee) in repeated trust 
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game3 displays activity correlated with the reputation of the investor (King-Casas et al, 
2005).  
 
 Other data related to the brain activation during social decisions come from a study 
conducted during the ultimatum game (see description of the game in chapter II). A 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study (Sanfey et al., 2003) examined unfair 
behavior in the ultimatum game (UG) and found that anterior insula exhibits greater 
activation for unfairness offers. The activation of this area predicted the player’s decision 
to either accept or reject the offer, with rejections associated with significantly higher 
activation than acceptances. The presence of anterior insula activations in rejection of 
unfair offers is particularly interesting because this brain region is also responsive to 
physically painful (Derbyshire et al., 1997) and disgusting stimuli (Calder et al., 2001). An 
unfair offer generates the same activation as physical pain related to the emotion of 
disgust; physical disgust plays a similar role in the unfair offer to moral disgust. Despite 
the differences between contexts, brain activation and emotional reaction are essentially 
the same. Anterior insula and associated emotion-processing areas may play a role in 
marking a social interaction as aversive signal discouraging social availability. Separate 
measures of emotional arousal provide support for this hypothesis. In a study measuring 
skin-conductance responses as an autonomic index of affective state (van ’t Wout, 2006), 
the author found higher skin conductance activity for unfair offers than for fair ones, and, 
in a like finding with insular activation, the SCR discriminates between acceptances and 
rejections of these offers. The influence of emotions on social decisions is not only an 
ongoing process but can have also an initial motivational function, preceding the actual 
decision. Moretti & di Pellegrino (in press) primed subjects by pictures with disgusting or 
neutral contents before several shots of ultimatum game. Subjects primed with disgusting 
pictures rejected unfair offers more frequently than subjects primed with neutral stimuli. 
These data support the hypothesis of the involvement of emotions in social decision 
making.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  The	  game	  starts	  when	  both	  players	  receive	  an	   initial	  endowment	   for	  example:	  €9.	  The	   first	  mover	  (investor)	   has	   to	   decide	   how	  much	   she	   wants	   transfer	   to	   the	   trustee.	   Any	   amount	   invested	   by	   the	  investor	  is	  tripled	  by	  the	  experimenter	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  trustee.	  When	  the	  trustee	  receives	  the	  amount	  he	   decides	   whether	   he	   wants	   return	   any	   to	   the	   investor.	   The	   amount	   of	   money	   that	   the	   investor	  decides	  to	  send	  to	  the	  trustee	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  trust,	  whereas	  the	  amount	  that	  the	  trustee	  sends	  back	  to	  the	  investor	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  reciprocity.	  	  A	  complete	  description	  of	  trust	  game	  is	  provided	  in	  Study	  I.	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 In a study reported by de-Quervain and colleagues (2004) the investor has the 
possibility to punish a trustee who betrays the trust received. Authors observed that 
subjects punish the betrayer even if this implies an economic cost to themselves (de-
Quervain et al, 2004). Such punishment may have some hedonic value for the investors, 
since activity in the caudate nucleus of the investor was correlated with the magnitude of 
punishment and increased only when this punishment was effective. Because the caudate 
nucleus has been associated with experience of gain and pleasure, activation of this 
nucleus before punishing selfish others reveals the motivation (hedonic) role of emotion in 
the decision to punish someone. 
  
 These findings suggest the possibility that the striatal response to the reward received 
by others might change depending on whether a particular social interaction is perceived as 
competition or cooperation. Indeed, during a board game in which subjects were required 
to interact with each other competitively or cooperatively, a number of brain areas were 
activated differentially depending on the nature of interaction (Decety et al, 2004).  For 
example, compared to competition, cooperation resulted in stronger activation in the 
anterior frontal cortex and medial orbitofrontal cortex. However, whether and how these 
cortical areas influence the striatal activity related to social preference is currently not 
known. 
 
 The last aspect for a description of social decision making mechanism regards the fact 
that social decisions requires a theory of mind, namely, the ability to predict the actions of 
other players based on their knowledge and intentions (Gallagher, 2003). Many 
neuroimaging studies on experimental games have found that social interactions with 
human players produce stronger activations in several brain areas, often in the anterior 
paracingulate cortex, compared to similar interactions with computer players (McCabe, et 
al 2001; Rilling et al 2004). There is some data in this sense related to the decision making 
process using game theory tasks. However using the trust game, a recent study has 
identified a unique role for the cingulate cortex in representing the information about the 
agent responsible for a particular outcome (Tomlin et al, 2006). 
 
 Our current knowledge of neural mechanisms for social decision making is still 
limited. Social decisions, in comparison to basic decisions such as which food to eat, imply 
additional features:  the ability to predict the actions and emotional reaction of others, the 
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basic and complex emotions related to the social interaction, and moral and social rules 
intrinsic to social relations. All these aspects complicate the not fully completed basic 
model of decision making.  
  
 In the experimental part of this work, I will try to better understand the role of 
emotions in social decision making. With regard to the evaluation stage, it is still not 
completely clear how emotions could be enrolled in the evaluation process and, more in 
general, in the attribution of value during a social relation. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
seems be a key area in this sense. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) seems to have an 
important role in the generation of subjective value especially in contexts that concern 
abstract goods such as the social and moral meaning of human relations. Before 
introducing a summary of studies regarding the activation of OFC in social decision 
making, the next paragraph will explain the anatomical correlate of OFC. 
 
3.3  “The mysterious orbitofrontal cortex ”  
 The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), located above the orbits of the eyes, is a part of the 
prefrontal cortex, often is defined topographically as the cortex on ventral surface of the 
frontal lobe. The OFC has more clear anatomical definition in primate involving area 14 
medially, area 13/25 caudally, areas 11 and 12 around the inferior convexity and the 
ventral part of area 10, toward the frontal pole (see figure 3.1 lower part). However these 
areas do not have a perfect homologue in human brain and for this reason there is still a 
deep debate between authors on the anatomical definition of OFC. We report here the 
anatomical localization proposed by Price (2007) (see figure 3.1 upper part), including the 
lateral surface area 47/12 (incorporating the human equivalent of the primate area 13), the 
most caudal region of the medial OFC, area 25, extending to area 10 toward the frontal 
pole. Area 11 extends both medially and laterally on the ventral surface.  
The OFC is densely interconnected with many other brain regions, suggesting it may 
subserve multiple functional roles. The orbital network is special in that: it receives input 
from the cortical areas associated with most of the sensory systems, including olfaction, 
taste/visceral afferents, somatic sensation, and vision (Price, 2007). In addition to the 
sensory inputs, the orbital network has specific connections with the thalamus and the 
striatum, and, furthermore, is connected with a number of limbic structures, some of which 
are assigned a key role in emotional processes: including the amygdala, hippocampus, 
entorhinal cortex, and parahippo-campal gyrus (Price, 2007).  
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 3.4  Putative functions of orbitofrontal cortex  
 The OFC has multiple functional roles, and its activation was observed in numerous 
and completely different tasks. The OFC seems critically involved in reward processing, 
however its role appears to be a complex one, mediating the interaction between reinforce 
value, predictability and behavioral choice. First OFC responses have been associated with 
a variety of rewarding stimuli in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies. 
Pleasant tastes (Berns et al., 2001; De Araujo et al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2000; Small et 
al., 2001) and smells (Gottfried et al., 2003; Rolls et al., 2003) associated with food reward 
have been shown to elicit responses in the OFC. Sexual stimuli (in the form of erotic film 
clips) also activate the OFC (Arnow et al., 2002), as do drug stimuli in drug abusers 
(London et al., 2000). These OFC responses to primary reinforces confirm findings from 
experimental animals that the OFC interacts with the brain reward circuitry. The capacity 
to detect a reward by OFC is not only for concrete reward (such as: food, water, sex, drug) 
but also for more abstract reward such as money and social value. O’Doherty and 
colleagues (2001) showed that medial OFC response in an fMRI study was correlated with 
the amount of abstract (‘‘play’’) money won on a probabilistic decision making task, while 
lateral OFC response correlated with the amount of money lost.  
 
 Neuroimaging data confirm the findings of animal studies (see chapter I) that the 
incentive values of reinforcers are coded in the OFC. Regions of the human OFC respond 
differentially to varying reward value, and showed to be sensitive to reward anticipation. In 
another fMRI study O’Doherty and colleagues (2002) presented subjects with visual cues 
that they had learned to associate with pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral tastes. Cue-related 
OFC response was enhanced to the cue predicting a pleasant taste reward. Kirsch et al. 
(2003) demonstrated a similar effect for monetary reinforcers. Rather more complex tasks 
have also been used to demonstrate anticipatory OFC responses to reward. Breiter et al. 
(2001) developed a complex task using ‘‘spinners’’ of fortune depicting various reward 
probabilities and values. The OFC was one of a number of regions that responded to both 
the expectation and the experience of rewards. Other imaging studies have further 
suggested that anticipatory responses of OFC are dependent on the degree of uncertainty; 
one observes  an increasing anticipatory activation in posterior–lateral OFC response with 
increasing uncertainty (Critchley et al., 2001). The OFC is a key brain area to translate 
knowledge of reinforcement contingencies into appropriate behavioral choices. Patients 
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with OFC damage, even if they can understand the contingencies of the task, fail to 
translate this knowledge into advantageous decision making (see gambling task in chapter 
II). This suggests that OFC is involved in specific decision making aspects of 
reinforcement processing tasks. Disinherited and socially inappropriate behaviors can often 
be sequelae of OFC damage in humans. The impulsivity and disinhibition that characterize 
real-life behavior of patients have also been observed in experimental cognitive paradigms 
(Berlin et al. 2004). Like animals with OFC lesions, patients with damage to this region 
display perseverative impairments on a reversal learning task (Rolls et al., 1994). Such 
perseverative response was highly correlated with scores on a questionnaire concerning 
disinhibited behaviors in everyday life. The authors argued that a difficulty in modifying 
responses in the face of negative information might underpin the behavioral problems of 
these patients. It has subsequently been demonstrated (Hornak et al., 2004) that the 
perseverative impairments seen in OFC patients are not due to a simple failure to inhibit 
motor responses, but a failure to reverse associations between stimuli and reinforcers. 
Thus, these authors propose that the inhibitory control problem observed in these patients 
is specific to reinforced contexts. 
 
 Behavioral selection and decision making not only involve the ability to relate 
different courses of action to potential reinforcing outcomes, but also the ability to change 
one’s course of action as motivational contingencies change. This is particularly true in 
complex contexts that change in relation to abstract social and moral values, often in 
opposition to more salient and immediate material values. An abstract value could drive 
our decision and behaviour, but also more simple social stimuli such as emotional 
expression of face can induce a sudden change of decision or behavior. Children are 
particularly accurate in understanding from their parents’ facial expression if what they are 
doing is appropriate or not. In everyday life, indeed, negative facial expressions provide 
important reinforcing cues signalling the potential need for a change in behavior. Patients 
with OFC lesions show impairments in processing negative emotional expressions (face 
and voice) (Hornak et al., 1996). By contrast, such patients possess a normal ability to 
identify positive expressions (e.g. happiness). Processing negative expressions can be a 
socially and biologically important component of the inhibitory control system. 
Impairments in processing expressions in OFC patients could reflect dysfunction of a 
system responsible for changing behavior in response to these socially/emotional salient 
cues. These findings suggest that inhibitory deficits observed in patients with OFC damage 
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may in fact reflect a specific form of reinforcement-processing deficit, namely, impairment 
in inhibiting previously appropriate behavior in the light of changing motivational 
contingencies. Rolls (2004) argues that the OFC plays ‘‘a special role’’ in stimulus-
reinforcer learning, based on its ability to perform rapid reversals of associations. Gorno 
and Tempini (2001) reported enhanced OFC response to expressions of happiness relative 
to disgust as in the case laughing and smiling expressions (Iwase et al., 2002). Emotive 
expressions both positive and negative seem important reinforcing cues signalling the more 
appropriate behavior in a social context. In this sense OFC is involved in choosing 
responses and making decisions based on motivationally salient information. To do this 
effectively, the OFC must code the current incentive value of external reinforcing cues and 
be able to respond rapidly to changes in the environment. OFC must be able to process 
uncertainty anticipating the expected outcome, as well as be able to change response 
quickly in the face of unexpected negative outcome. Emotional processes seem to reliably 
engage a set of structures including reward-processing mechanisms and areas of the 
midbrain and cortex to which they project, such as vmPFC, orbitofrontal cortex, and 
anterior cingulate cortex, as well as other areas such as the amygdala and insula (Dalgleish, 
2004). Neuroscientific studies offer the potential to examine the causal relationship 
between an emotional reaction and a subsequent social decision, as well as to investigate 
whether areas specialized for the processing of basic emotions may be co-opted for more 
complex affective reactions.  
 
 Further evidence is necessary to understand how basic affective processes can be 
involved in more complex emotional social behavior. This is particularly true for positive 
social-emotional dispositions such as trust, altruism, cooperation and moral behavior. To 
my knowledge, no studies exist that have tried to manipulate emotions during positive 
social decisions, such as whether to trust someone or for moral decisions. The following 
studies are attempts to provide new data in relation to these matters.  
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STUDY I 
 
PREFRONTAL DAMAGE REDUCES BETRAYAL AVERSION IN 
ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1.1 Defining trust and reciprocity 
 Trust is ubiquitous in society and an essential ingredient of human exchange 
(Arrow, 1974); it lubricates social and economic transactions, and has been long 
recognized as a critical antecedent of cooperative behaviour (Ostrom & Walker, 2003). 
Trust can be defined as one’s willingness to place resources at the disposal of another party 
in situations in which there is uncertainty regarding the other party’s motive, intentions and 
actions (Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). An action that is trusting of another is 
one that creates the possibility of mutual benefit, if the other person is cooperative. Yet 
trusting behaviours also imply the risk of injury or loss to oneself if the other person 
defects. Overriding aversion to such risks is required for trust to emerge (Kosfeld et al., 
2005). In other words, trust is the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations about another’s behavior. In general, trust can exist between individuals, 
groups, and institutions, and can represent either a global belief in humanity or a situation-
specific and/or trustee-specific attitude (Butler, 1991). In this study the dyadic-level 
interpersonal trust is investigated.  
 
 From these definitions it is clear how trust has a double nature of being both 
desirable and risky (Roderick, 2001). On the one hand, trust is desirable because it creates 
a cooperative atmosphere that is opportune for the human being (Guth, 1982), avoiding the 
generation of negative emotional states such as fear and insecurity. Moreover, trust is 
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fundamental in building common and generally stable (but not certain) rules of relationship 
between people. This shared tenet reduces the cognitive and emotional effort connected 
with an ambiguous and unsecure environment. On the other hand, trust is risky because we 
cannot be sure that our trust will be repaid suitably: to trust someone always involves 
taking the risk of being betrayed.  This risk is due to a lack of full knowledge of others, as 
to their motives, their intentions, and their responses to endogenous as well as exogenous 
changes (Gambetta, 1988). Although theoretical work has identified a number of factors at 
the base of trust and what influences trust (Mayer et al., 1995), fundamental questions still 
remain about how trust actually operates.  
 
  Another concept related to trust regards the normal reaction that trust induces. In 
real life, in response to a friendly action, people usually are favourably disposed to repay 
back with a similarfriendly action, which is often called reciprocity. To trust someone can 
be considered a friendly action. The tendency to repay the favour of trust is a behavioural 
propensity to cooperate conditionally with other group members’ (Fehr & Fischbache, 
2003). Reciprocity behaviour is based on two important motivational drives: “reciprocal 
fairness” (Rabin, 1993; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) and “inequity aversion” (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999). A reciprocally fair subject is motivated by the desire to respond to kind 
acts with kindness and to hostile acts with hostility. An inequity-adverse subject is 
motivated by the desire to avoid inequity and to implement equitable outcomes (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2000).  
 
 1.2 Rational and emotional processes in Trust 
 A commonly held view suggests that trust is a result of rational calculation and 
higher cognitive processes (Coleman, 1990); however, in some other accounts trust is held 
to be founded on social-emotional processes (Hardin, 2002). Consistent with this latter 
account, behavioural studies suggest that incidental emotions significantly influence trust 
(Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005). Moreover, several neuroimaging studies have shown that 
tasks that require social evaluation (Winston et al., 2002; Somerville et al., 2006), or 
cooperation with another individual (McCabe et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2002; Rilling et 
al., 2002, 2004; Tomlin et al., 2006) activate brain regions known to process social 
emotions, including the anterior cingulate cortex and adjacent medial frontal cortex. 
Importantly, when subjects interact with partners they know to be just computers, these 
activations are not seen, suggesting that they reflect the interpersonal nature of the task 
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(McCabe et al., 2001; Rilling et al., 2004; Tomlin et al., 2006; van den Bos et al., 2007).  
Moreover, a recent study on trust offered the chance of gaining a deeper understanding of 
the neural mechanisms underlying cooperative behaviour using a specific neuropetide, 
Oxytocin (OT) plays a central role in the ability to form social attachment and affiliation. 
OT has been shown to increase the ability to infer the mental states of other (Domes et al., 
2007), and has a specific effect on trust decisions, increasing the willingness to take social 
risks. Interesting, OT does not increase the tendency to take risks in general, but rather 
increases only the tendency to taking social risks (Kosfeld et al., 2005). This finding 
suggests a possible role of OT in reducing social fears associated with betrayal (Kosfeld et 
al., 2005). In another recent study (Baumgarten et al, 2008), it has been shown that OT 
reduces subjects’ behavioural responses to breaches of trust. This result could suggest that 
OT changes the equilibrium between risky and desirable aspects of trust in favour of 
cooperation.  
 
 Only recently, a study by Krajbich and colleagues (2009) explored the behaviour of 
patients with lesions in the vmPFC in order to understand the role of this area in economic 
exchanges with other individuals. They required 6 vmPFC patients to take part in three 
games: the Ultimatum game, the trust game, both as investor and trustee, and the Dictator 
game. All three games were performed in one session, and by phone with the constant 
presence of the experimenter. During the tasks, the experimenter spoke with the ‘fictitious’ 
other person on the phone and described the subject’s decisions as well as asked for the 
other player’s decision (except for the dictator game). The aim of the work was not 
investigate the trust behaviour directly, but describe from patients’ choice a formal model 
of how, and to what degree, vmPFC lesions affect an individual’s social decision-making 
in general. In that study vmPFC patients, as compared to healthy subjects and non-frontal 
control patients, showed a significantly lower level of trustworthiness (e.g. reciprocity), 
whereas trust behaviour (money invested) remained unaltered. 
 
 There are three critical aspects regarding this first evidence about the involvement 
of vmpFC in decisions to trust a stranger. First the setting of the experiment was not 
realistic; the experimenter mediated all interactions. The experimenter’s presence could 
have increased the social desirability bias of participants, especially in controls groups, 
forcing them to reply in a manner that would be viewed favourably by the experimenter. 
On this hypothesis, the difference between vmPFC and controls could be related to the 
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different sensitivity to the social desirability bias and not to trust behaviour per se. The 
second aspect regards the presence of feedback; even if the trust choice was one shot, 
feedback information has a clear impact on the next choice (Berg, 1995). In a task with 
feedback it becomes difficult to understand if the choice is a reliable measure of trust or is 
the reaction to the previous feedback. The third point regards the lack of a control 
condition in trust measurement; ultimatum and dictator game provide different 
measurements of social behaviour and cannot be easily compared to the trust game. To 
understand if there is any difference in trust behaviour between subjects it is important to 
compare the participant’s choice in the trust game with choices made in a similar economic 
situation but without a social counterpart.  
 
 In conclusion, even if the Krajbich and colleagues (2009) study is the first to 
measure the trust behaviour in vmPFC lesioned subjects, their findings did not investigate 
the trust decision adequately, and their method has some important limitations.  
 
 
 1.3 Prefrontal damage reduces betrayal aversion in economic exchanges 
 In this study, we examined whether emotions, specifically social emotions 
subserved by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), affect people’s willingness to 
trust others. Several evidences suggest this possibility. First, the vmPFC is densely 
interconnected with basolateral amygdala, ventral striatum, and subcortical structures that 
control autonomic and visceral responses (Carmichael & Price, 1995; Haber et al., 2006), 
and is therefore ideally located for generating emotional responses, and guiding social 
interactions. Second, neuroimaging studies in humans have implicated the vmPFC in 
guiding behavioural choice under uncertainty (De Martino et al., 2006; Hsu et al., 2005), 
and have argued that this region is critical for balancing potential gains against losses to 
ensure optimal decision-making in social context (De Quervain et al., 2004). Finally, 
damage to the vmPFC in humans can be associated with strikingly poor judgement and 
decision-making (Eslinger & Damasio,1985; Bechara et al., 1994, 1997; Koenigs et al., 
2007), due to markedly reduced (Koenigs et al., 2007; Ciaramelli et al., 2007, Krajbich et 
al., 2009;) or poorly regulated (Koenigs & Tranel, 2007) social emotions.  
 
 To address whether the vmPFC plays a necessary role in the decision to trust a 
stranger, a sample of patients with adult-onset vmPFC lesions, as well as healthy control 
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subjects (HC) and patients with lesions outside the frontal lobe (non-FC patients), played 
the role of investor in a one-round trust game  (Berg et al., 1995). This game involves real 
monetary exchanges between two anonymous individuals, the investor and the trustee, who 
receive a sum of money from the experimenter (see figure 1.1 for a graphical example of 
trust game). The investor can keep all the money or decide to invest some amount, which 
is tripled by the experimenter and sent to the trustee. Next, the trustee decides how much 
of the tripled amount to return. Money sent by the investor is used to measure her trust, 
while money returned by the trustee is used to measure her reciprocity. The investor thus 
faces a motivational conflict between the prospect of increasing her payoffs, which 
motivates her to invest and cooperate, and the perceived probability of loss and betrayal, 
which drives her toward distrust.  
 
 Clearly, the decision to trust entails a risk (Rousseau et al., 1998). Uncertainty 
regarding whether the trustee intends to, and will, honour the investor’s trust is the source 
of risk. This raises an important concern over whether a person’s attitude toward risk in 
general influences trust (Eckel & Wilson, 2004; Karlan, 2005; Schecter, 2007). To control 
for between-group differences in risk attitudes, we therefore also implemented a risk game 
offering the same options and payoffs as the trust game, but in which a random device 
(e.g., a computer, see figure 1.2), not a human partner, determined the investor’s risk. The 
risk game constitutes a critical control condition because recent behavioural (Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser, 2004; Hong & Bohnet, 2007; Bohnet et al., 2008; Houser et al ., 2009) and 
neurobiological (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Baumgartner et al., 2008) evidence strongly 
indicates that the decision to trust is not only determined by risk aversion (i.e., the negative 
emotion associated with the possibility of losing objects or money) but also by betrayal 
aversion, that is, the fear to be betrayed by another in social exchange. These observations 
are consistent with theoretical models (Rabin, 1993; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Charness & 
Rabin, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) positing that, in addition to material outcome, 
people also value other agents’ intentions. Betrayal aversion plays no role in the risk game, 
since random devices are incapable of intentionality or awareness, and they cannot really 
betray our trust. Therefore, the contrast between the trust game the and risk game is ideal 
to assess whether vmPFC damage specifically affects trusting behaviour in social 
exchanges (rather than risk-taking behavior in general), because – except for the type of 
opponent partner (human vs. computerized partner) – everything else remains constant 
across these two games. 
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 Based on previous findings showing that activity in the vmPFC may be critical for 
making prediction and anticipating the unpleasant state of loss in decision-making 
(Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al.,1997), when the implications of another individual’ 
intentions must be taken into account before choosing (Rudebeck et al., 2008; Behrens et 
al., 2009), we hypothesized that investors in the vmPFC-lesioned group would show higher 
money transfers than those in the control groups, particularly in the trust game in which 
both social and non-social risks operate to inhibit trust. In other words, if negative emotion 
responses mediated by the vmPFC represent the proximate mechanisms behind betrayal 
aversion, then damage to this neural structure ought to result in diminished levels of 
betrayal aversion and, therefore, lead to more trusting behaviour. 
 
 Several researchers (Andreoni & Miller, 2002; Cox, 2004) have argued that 
measures of trust taken from the trust game do not discriminate between actions motivated 
by trust and actions motivated by altruism or generosity. To address this question, we 
measured the amount of money participants returned when they played the role of trustee 
in a separate session. If lesion to the vmPFC increases generosity rather than trusting 
behaviour, then one might hypothesize that a player will send more as investor and return 
more as trustee, thus appearing both more trusting and trustworthy.  
 
 Finally, we included a measure of the investor’s subjective expectation about the 
trustee’s back transfer at different investment levels. This was in order to control whether 
vmPFC patients trust more because they are more optimistic about the trustee’s 
trustworthiness (e.g., they show higher expected back transfers).  
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Figure 1.1. Graphical example of the trust game. The interaction is one shot and completely anonymous. The 
game starts when both player sreceive an initial endowment that in the picture is represented by €9. The first 
mover, the investor has to decide how much she wants transfer to the trustee. Any amount invested by the 
investor is tripled by the experimenter and sent to the trustee. In the example reported the investor sends €5, 
and the trustee receives €15. At this point the trustee decides whether he wants return to the investor. The 
amount of money that the investor decides to send to the trustee is a measure of trust, whereas the amount 
that the trustee sends back to the investor is a measure of reciprocity. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Graphical example of the risk game. In the risk game, the investor plays with a non-human 
counterpart (computer). The rules and the amounts of money are the same as those presented in the trust 
game.  The amount that the investor bets in this game is a measure of risk propensity.  
 
 
 
 
METHOD 
 Participants 
 Three groups of subjects participated in the study: (a) a group of patients with focal 
lesions involving the vmPFC (the vmPFC group, n = 10), (b) a control group of patients 
with damage sparing the frontal cortex (the non-FC group, n = 10), and (c) a control group 
of healthy subjects (the HC group, n = 10), who were matched on age, education and sex 
with the vmPFC group. Brain-damaged patients were recruited from the Centre for Studies 
and Research in Cognitive Neuroscience in Cesena and from Azienda Ospedaliera 
“Spedali Civili” in Brescia. They were selected on the basis of the location of their lesion 
evident on CT or MRI scans. 
 
 Table 1.1 shows demographic and clinical data, as well as the Mini-Mental Status 
Examination score (MMSE, Folstein, et al., 1983) There were no significant differences 
between vmPFC patients and comparison groups with regard to age, education, and 
clinical variables (p >.05 in all cases). In the vmPFC group, lesions principally involved 
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the vmPFC, which is defined as the medial one-third of the orbital surface and the ventral 
one-third of the medial surface of the frontal lobe, following the boundaries laid out by 
Stuss and Levine (2002). Lesion aetiology was haemorrhage due to ruptured aneurysm of 
the anterior communicating artery in 9 out of 10 vmPFC patients, and to traumatic brain 
injury in 1. The vmPFC damage was bilateral (although often asymmetrically so) in 6 
cases, right unilateral in 2 cases, and left unilateral in 2 cases. All vmPFC patients 
presented with clinical evidence of a decline in social interpersonal conduct, impaired 
decision-making and emotional functioning, but had generally intact intellectual abilities 
(see table 1.2). 
 
 The non-FC patients were selected on the basis of having damage that did not 
involve the mesial orbital/ventromedial prefrontal cortex and frontal pole, and also spared 
the amygdala in both hemispheres. In this group, lesions were unilateral in 9 patients (in 
the left hemisphere in 5 cases, and in the right hemisphere in 4 cases) and bilateral in 1 
patient, and were caused by ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke in 9 cases, and by traumatic 
brain injury in 1 cases. In the non-FC group, lesion sites included the lateral aspect of the 
temporal lobe in 6 patients, the lateral occipital area in 2 patients, and the occipito-parietal 
junction in the remaining 2 patients (see table 1.3 for more details). 
 All subject groups were administered a short neuropsychological battery including 
tests with potential sensitivity to frontal damage, as well as intelligence and memory tests 
(results are provided in table 1.2). The groups differed significantly only in their 
performance on the Stroop task, with vmPFC subjects making more errors than both non-
FC patients and healthy controls (Mann–Whitney U-test, p < .05). Patients were not 
receiving psychoactive drugs at the time of testing, and had no other diagnosis likely to 
affect cognition or interfere with participation in the study (e.g., significant psychiatric 
disease, alcohol misuse, history of cerebrovascular disease or focal neurological 
examination). Neuropsychological and experimental studies were all conducted in the 
chronic phase of recovery, more than a year post-onset. All lesions were acquired in 
adulthood. Patients gave informed consent to participate in the study according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and 
the Ethical Committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Bologna.  
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 Normal participants were healthy volunteers who were not taking psychoactive 
medication, and were free of current or past psychiatric or neurological illness as 
determined by history. Normal controls scored at least 28 out of 30 on the MMSE. 
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Lesion analysis 
 Lesion analysis was based on the most recent clinical computerized tomography 
(CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The location and extent of each lesion were 
mapped by using MRIcro software (Rorden & Brett, 2000). The lesions were manually 
drawn by a neurologist with experience in image analysis onto standard brain template 
from the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI), which is based on T1-weighted MRI 
scans, normalized to Talairach space. This scan is distributed with SPM99 and has become 
a popular template for normalization in functional brain imaging. For superimposing of the 
individual brain lesions, the same MRIcro software was used. Figure 1.3 shows the extent 
and overlap of the brain lesions in the brain-damaged patients. Brodmann's areas (BA) 
affected in vmPFC group were areas 10, 11, 12, 32 (subgenual portion), and 24, with 
region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 10 and 11. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 Location and overlap of brain lesions. The panel shows the lesions of the 10 patients with vmPFC 
damage projected on the same 7 axial slices and on the mesial view of the standard Montreal Neurological 
Institute brain. 
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Experimental design and procedures 
 Every participant in the experiment played the role of investor in two treatment 
conditions: a trust game and a risk game. In the trust game, the subject played a standard 
trust game and she knew her counterpart was human; we call this the human interaction 
treatment. In the risk game, the subject knew her counterpart was a computer making 
random decisions; we call this the computer interaction treatment. Trust and risk games 
were played in separate sessions with an interval of at least 1 week between them. Half of 
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the participants in each group played the trust game in the first session, and half the risk 
game in the first session.  
 
 In  the separate third session, all participants played also in the trustee’s role in a 
trust game, whereas in a fourth session participants completed the questionnaire and 
received the feedback of previous sessions. Our main interest was the comparison between 
trust and risk behaviour, and for this reason we balanced the order of the two games. On 
the contrary, the trustee role has a different meaning: it does not measure trust or risk, but 
reciprocity, the willingness to sacrifice one’s own economic gain to repay another’s 
friendly (e.g., trustful) action. Moreover, when subjects play in trustee role it is easy for 
them to calculate the income for the game, and thus it is not possible to separate the 
genuine level of reciprocity from a reaction due to an investor’s action. For these reasons 
the trustee role is always undertaken after the risk and trust game. The lack of feedback 
after each interaction in trust and risk game has the purpose of avoiding any influence from 
feedback in order to measure a general level of trust and risk. Finally, all interactions were 
one shot in order to avoid reputation and order effects. 
 
 All experiments took place in a quiet room in which an opaque, removable partition 
wall was used to create two separate settings. On either side of the wall, we placed a desk 
with a computer. Participants sat at one desk in front of the computer, while at the other 
desk sat either an actor who played in the role of the trustee (trust game), or no one (risk 
game). As a result, playing partners could be separated visually, thereby providing 
between-subject anonymity, without separating them audibly, thus lending our set-up 
credibility. Before each session, instructions about the nature and rules of the game were 
presented on the computer, and the experimenter verbalised them to ensure that 
participants understood them. In the instructions, it was emphasized that participants in the 
trust game would play the game anonymously and only once with each opponent player, 
and that they would receive the money earned in the game. Differently, in the risk game it 
was emphasized that participants would play with a computer counterpart. After reading 
the instructions, subjects were required to complete a quiz that required them to state the 
amount of money that each player would receive under various hypothetical 
circumstances. The game started once the subject successfully finished the quiz.  
 Subjects in the role of the investor received no feedback about their partner’s 
decision between the different interactions. At the end of each session, the experimenter 
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put the cash payoff earned by subject during the game into an opaque envelope that was 
sealed and signed by the participant. Earnings envelopes were kept by the experimenter 
between games. Subjects did not receive feedback about the outcome of any game until the 
end of the experiment in order to avoid income effects and the possibility that current 
decisions were influenced by an opponent’s previous decisions. All games were paid out at 
the end. 
 
 
 Human interaction treatment.  
 Participants acted as the investor in a series of 9 rounds of a trust game against 9 
different anonymous human partners via a computer interface. At the beginning of each 
round, the actor that played the role of the trustee entered the room and sat at her position. 
When both investor and trustee were ready, the interaction started. Each round was 
presented as text through a series of five screens (see Figure 1.4 for a schematic illustration 
of a typical round). A 6-s initial screen depicted a silhouette of a human figure and 
indicated the endowment (E) available for both players in the current round. There were 
three equiprobable initial E, €6, €9 and €12, presented in random order during the game. 
The second screen posed the question “How many Euros between 0 and E do you transfer 
to Participant B?” and remained visible until a response was given. Participants were given 
the opportunity to send any integer amount from zero to their entire endowment available, 
and were instructed to indicate their decision by pressing the numeric keys of the computer 
keyboard. Following the response, a screen indicating the investor’s transfer and the 
amount received by the trustee (three times the amount invested) was presented for 4 s. 
Then, a variable 5- to 15-s waiting screen informed the subject that the trustee (Participant 
B) was deciding how much of the tripled amount to send back. Subjects were informed 
that Participant B could choose the amount from any integer between zero and the tripled 
amount they had transferred to her/him. Finally, a screen signalled the end of the round. 
The trustee went out of the room and after a short break was replaced by another actor to 
begin the next round. When the trustee was out of the room, the investor was asked about 
her expectation in relation to the trustee’s back transfer. 
 
 Computer interaction treatment.  
 Participants were instructed that they would play 9 rounds of a risk game in which a 
random mechanism determined the outcome of the game. In the risk game, everything was 
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identical to the trust game, except that subjects played against a computerized partner. A 
silhouette of a computer was displayed in the initial screen to indicate the computer 
interaction. Participants were informed that, in each round, the computer would randomly 
choose the amount to transfer back from any number between zero and the tripled amount 
they have transferred to it (figure 1.6).  
 
 In a separate session, participants played 5 rounds of a trust game in the role of 
trustee against 5 different anonymous investors via a computer interface. The experimental 
setup was as before, except that participants were assigned the role of trustee (Participant 
B), and an endowment of €9 was available for both players in every round.  
 
 Each new round began with a 6-s initial screen that depicted a silhouette of a 
human figure and indicated that €9 was available for both players in the current round (see 
figure 1.5 for a schematic illustration of a typical round). Then, a variable 5- to 15-s 
waiting screen informed that the investor (Participant A) was deciding how much between 
€0 and €9 to transfer to the trustee (Participant B). Next, a screen indicating the investor’s 
transfer and the amount received by the trustee was presented for 4-s. The investor’s 
transfers, X, were predetermined and presented randomly, and included one transfer of 
each €0, €3, €5, €7 and €9, so that the trustee received €0, €9, €15, €21 and €27, 
respectively. Then, the question “How many Euros between 0 and 3X do you transfer back 
to Participant A?” appeared on the screen, and remained visible until a response was given. 
Participants were given the opportunity to send back any integer amount from zero to the 
tripled amount received, and were instructed to indicate their decision by pressing the 
numeric keys of the computer keyboard. Following the response, a screen signalled the end 
of the round. The trustee went out of the room and after a short break was replaced by 
another actor to begin the next round. 
 
 Note that participants in all groups faced exactly the same set of investors’ 
transfers. Thus, behavioural differences across these three groups cannot be attributed to 
differences in the distribution of investors’ transfers. 
 
 Questionnaires.  
 Approximately two weeks after the experiment, participants also completed three 
self-report questionnaires that assessed selected personality traits. The Barratt 
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Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) is a 30-item, self-report measure of impatience and trait 
impulsiveness (Patton et al., 1995). The Personal Norm of Reciprocity (PNR) scale is 27 
items questionnaire measuring three dimensions (9 items each) of reciprocity (i.e., the 
propensity to reward those who have behaved nicely and punish those who behaved 
badly): positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and beliefs in reciprocity (Perugini et al., 
2003). Finally, the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967) includes 25 component 
questions requiring subjects to express their trust expectations across a variety of social 
situations and with diverse social agents.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Schematic diagram of a single round of trust game where subjects played the investor’s role. In 
the example presented the subjects in investor’s role sends to the trustee €5. The original screens were in 
Italian.  
 
 
Figure 1.5 Schematic diagram of a single round of trust game where subjects played the trustee role. 
In the example presented the participant in trustee’s role sends back to the investor €5. The original 
screens were in Italian.  
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Figure 1.6 Schematic diagram of a single round of risk game where subjects played in the role of investor 
with a non-human counterpart (computer). In the example presented the subject in the investor’s role bets €5. 
The original screens were in Italian.  
 
 
Design Section 
 In the first analysis, a mixed design 4x3x2 ANOVA on all transfers amount was 
performed. Transfers amounts in this case concern the average transfer of each subject in 
each interactions/games: trust game, risk game, trustee role and expectation. In the 
ANOVA, the treatment (trust, risk, reciprocity and subjective expectation) is the within-
subjects factors and groups (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) and gender (male female) are between-
subjects factor. This analysis has as a main aim to observe if there is any gender, group 
effect and other preliminary indications. 
 
 Subsequent analysis concerned a more specific comparison between transfer 
amounts in trust and risk game. The transfer amounts are measured in three different 
groups (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) in two different conditions (treatment: human and 
computer) with three different kind of starting endowment available (€6, €9, €12). A 
mixed design 3x2x3 ANOVA on transfer amounts was performed with groups (vmPFC, 
non-FC, HC) as between-subjects factor, treatment  (human and computer) and endowment 
(€6, €9, €12) as within-subjects factors. When necessary, pairwise comparisons were 
conducted using the Fisher LSD test, which is considered the most powerful technique for 
post hoc tests involving three groups (Cardinal & Aitken, 2006). On the same data the non 
parametric analysis is performed.  
 
 Thirdly, analysis was conducted that concerns the subjective expectation: the 
participant’ responses to the experimenter’s question about her expectation regarding the 
trustee’s back transfer in the trust game. Subjective expectation was measured in three 
groups (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) with three different kinds of starting endowment available 
(€6, €9, €12) and was calculated on expected back transfers divided by the amount sent (a 
value > 1 indicates expected gain, whereas a value < 1 indicates expected loss from the 
exchange). A mixed design 3x3 ANOVA on subjective expectation is performed with 
group (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) as between-subjects factor and endowment (€6, €9, €12) as 
within-subjects factor 
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 Fourthly, analysis involved participants’ responses in the trustee role. This variable 
was measured in three different groups (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) in five different trials. A 
one-way ANOVA with group as between-subjects factor was performed. 
 
 Finally, analysis was conducted regarding the personality questionnaires; a 
nonparametric test (Kruskal-Wallis test) was used to compare the three groups  (vmPFC, 
non-FC, HC). PNR questionnaire is divided in three subscales each subscale is analyzed by 
a Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7 Investors’ average transfer as a function of initial endowment, separately for the trust and for the 
risk games. Error bars report standard deviation. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 A mixed design ANOVA is performed with group (vmPFC, non-FC, and HC) and 
Gender (Male, Female) as a between-subjects factors and kind of decisions as a within-
subjects factor (investors’ transfer with human, investor’s transfer with machine, trustee 
transfer, subjective expectations). The ANOVA shows no significant main group factor [F 
(2, 24) = 1.70, p = .20].  Moreover there is no significant gender main factor [F(1, 24) = 
1.15 p = .37]. On the contrary there is a significant main effect of Treatment, [F (3, 72) = 
175, p < .001], and, interestingly, a significant Treatment by Group interaction,[F (3, 72) = 
2.96, p = .01]. No other interactions are significant. The lack of a significant main group 
factor but a significant interaction between treatment and group strongly suggests that 
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there is not a generalized and constant difference in decisions between groups but a 
specific differenced related to particular decisions. The aim of the analysis that follows is 
to understand the difference and similarities between groups in the different roles and 
decisions.   
 
 The second analysis compared the level of trust and level of risk between groups. 
Figure 1.7 illustrates investors’ average transfer as a function of initial endowment, 
separately for the trust and risk game. We performed a mixed design ANOVA on transfer 
amounts with Group (vmPFC, non-FC, and HC) as a between-subjects factor, and 
Treatment (human, and computer) and Endowment (€6, €9, and €12) as within-subjects 
factors4. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Group, [F (2, 27) = 9.41, p < 
.001], revealing that investors in the vmPFC group had overall significantly higher transfer 
levels (€5.7 out of a mean endowment of €9) than had investors in the HC (€4.3) and non-
FC group (€4.2; both ps < .001 pairwise comparisons Fisher LSD test). There was also a 
significant main effect of Treatment, [F(1, 27) = 7.69, p < .01], indicating slightly higher 
transfers in the computer (€5) than in the human (€4.5) interaction, and a significant main 
effect of Endowment, [F(2, 54) = 108.07, p < .001], demonstrating that investors’ transfer 
was modulated by initial endowment available.  
 
 More critically, analysis showed a significant Treatment by Group interaction, [F 
(2, 27) = 4.04, p = .02], indicating that the between-group differences in amount sent 
depended on the human vs. computer interaction. Pairwise comparisons showed that when 
participants played against a human partner, the average transfer was significantly higher 
in the vmPFC group (€5.8) than in both non-FC (€3.7) and HC group (€3.9; both ps < .05) 
5, while transfers of the control groups did not differ (endowment €6: p= .10, endowment 
€9: p = .47; endowment €12 p = .35). When participants played against a computerized 
partner, only in trials with the smallest endowment there was a significant difference 
between vmPFC and other groups (non-FC p < .01, HC p = .03), whereas with greater 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4. The same ANOVA with the gender as a between subject factor showed no significant effect of gender 
factor (p = .12), and no other and significant interaction of gender factor with other factors: group*gender (p 
= .78); treatments*gender (p = .48); endowments*gender (p = .72); group*gender*treatments (p = .88); 
group*gender*endowments (p = .73); gender* endowments*treatments (p = .67); group*gender* 
endowments*treatments (p =.65). 
5. vmPFC vs non-FC: Trust Game, endowment €6: p= .02, endowment €9: p = .001; endowment €12 p = 
.005. VmPFC vs HC: Trust Game;  endowment  €6: p= .001, endowment €9: p = .01; endowment €12 p = 
.009. 
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amount (€9, €12) there was no significant difference (endowment €9, non-FC p = .68; HC 
p = .50; endowment €12 non-FC p = .20; HC p = .25, no difference between non-FC and 
HC all: endowment €6, p = .59; endowment €9 p = .79; endowment €12 p = .90.  
 
 In order to better understand the difference between the risk and trust games the 
average transfer was calculated from all initial endowments, then the same ANOVA 
described before with treatment (risk and trust game) as within-subjects factor and group 
(vmPFC, non-FC, and HC) as between-subjects factors was applied. Results about group 
and treatment factors were the same as shown in the previous ANOVA. The post hoc 
analysis (Fisher LSD test) revealed that there was no difference between risk and trust 
treatment for the vmPFC group (p = .48), whereas there was a significant difference 
between treatments both for nonFC (p = .02) and HC (p = .009) subjects. 
 
 A similar pattern of results was found when the data were analyzed using 
nonparametric methods. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed a significant difference amongst 
the 3 groups in the trust game (H = 12.8, df = 2, p < .002), but no difference in the risk 
game (H = 4.78, df = 2, p = .09). These data confirmed the non significant difference 
between controls and vmPFC in risk propensity, which was also confirmed by the 
Crawford’s modified t test (table 1.3) analysis. Out of 10 subjects in each group, 8 vmPFC 
patients showed mean transfer levels higher than 50% of initial endowment in the trust 
game, whereas only 3 non-FC patients and 4 healthy controls displayed such transfers in 
the trust game. Conversely, in the risk game, 9 vmPFC patients, 7 non-FC patients and 7 
healthy controls displayed mean transfers higher than 50% of initial amount.  
 
 Thus, results suggest that vmPFC damage leads to a substantial increase in transfer 
levels in the trust experiment but not in the risk experiment. Remarkably, following 
vmPFC damage, investors’ transfers were not modulated at all by the type of opponent 
player present in the environment (€5.82 and €5.53, for the trust and risk game, 
respectively, p = .48). In sharp contrast, both control participants were more reluctant to 
invest in the trust game (€3.71 and €3.88, for non-FC and HC group, respectively), in 
which interpersonal interactions determines the risk, than in the risk game (€4.69 and 
€4.74; p = .04, and p = .01, for non-FC and HC group, respectively), in which a non-social, 
random mechanism constitutes the risk. This latter result is highly consistent with previous 
literature in healthy subjects (see Bohnet et al., 2008; de Quervain et al., 2004; Aimone and 
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Houser, 2008, Houser et al., 2009) suggesting that the prospect of betrayal plays a role in 
trusting decisions well beyond aversion towards monetary loss.  
 
 Next, we performed an analysis to explore whether vmPFC patients differed from 
control groups in their subjective expectations about trustee back transfers in the trust 
game (figure 1.8). An ANOVA, with Group (vmPFC, non-FC, and HC) as a between-
subjects factor, and Endowment (€6, €9, and €12) as a within-subjects factor is performed. 
Results revealed a significant main effect of Endowment, F(2, 54) = 28.26, p < .001. More 
importantly, however, there was no main effect of Group (F < 1), nor any interaction 
between Group and Endowment (F < 1), revealing that the three groups of participants 
believed to obtain on average the same return for their money transferred as investor6. 
Thus, results suggest that damage to the vmPFC increases trusting behavior but does not 
significantly alter subjects’ beliefs about others’ trustworthiness.  
 
Figure 1.8 Subjective expectation value was conducted on expected back transfers divided by the amount 
sent (a value > 1 indicates expected gain, whereas a value < 1 indicates expected loss from the exchange). 
Error bars report standard deviation. 
 
 We next tested whether trustees’ repayments to their investor in the trust game 
differed across the three groups of participants (Figure 1.9). A one-way ANOVA on 
trustees’ average back transfers showed a marginally significant effect of Group, [F(2, 27) 
= 3.06, p = .06]. Pairwise comparisons revealed that vmPFC trustees made significantly 
lower back transfers than HC trustees (mean back transfer: €4.12 and €5.72, for the 
vmPFC and HC group, respectively, p =.02). The non-FC group (mean back transfer: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6The same ANOVA with the gender as a between subject factor showed no significant effect of gender factor 
(p = .21) and no significant interaction between gender, group and endowment: gender*endowment (p =.24);  
gender*group (p = .08); gender*group*endowment (p =.21). 
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€5.06) was not significantly different from the vmPFC (p = .16) or HC (p = .32) groups, 
possibly due to higher variance in performance observed in this group. Thus, results 
indicate that individuals with vmPFC damage do not show more trustworthy or altruistic 
behavior than control groups.  
 
 We further tested whether trustees’ repayments to their investor in the trust game 
differed across the gender. The one-way ANOVA on trustees’ average back transfers 
showed no general effect of Gender, [F (5, 24) =1.55, p = .21]. Investigating the gender 
effect on trustees’ repayments for each groups (one –way ANOVA), no significant effect 
was found: vmPFC, p = .98; nonFC, p = .77;  HC, p = .74. 
 
 
Figure 1.9 Mean trustees’ repayment to their investor in the trust game. Error bars report standard deviation. 
 
 In the next analysis we propose a comparison of a single-case’s score to scores 
obtained in a control sample7, as suggested using the classical methods of Crawford and 
Garthwaite (2007). Crawford’s modified t test (table 1.3) analysis showed that 6/10 
vmPFC patients choose significantly different amounts from controls in the trust game, 
whereas only 1/10 patients has significantly different behavior in the risk game. There was 
no difference in back transfers between patients and controls when they acted as trustees, 
or when they were questioned about their beliefs about likely back transfers.  
 
 All vmPFC patients had lesions involving BA 10 and 11, and the lesions were quite 
homogeneous; thus preventing the possibility of relating performance to specific area 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The control sample in this case regards both HC and nonFC patients.  
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lesioned in the vmPFC patients. Trying to link performance with a specific lesion was only 
possible in relation to the side of the vmPFC damage. Subjects with a left-sided lesion 
(only 2 patients) showed significant impairment both in the trust and in the risk games, 
whereas subjects with bilateral or right-sided lesion showed impairment only in the trust 
game. Left-sided damage is associated with more impulsive behavior (Goyer et al 1994), 
and thus could cause a general impairment in decision-making; however this was not 
supported by the self report questionnaire regarding impulsivity of these two patients.  
 
Personality questionnaires 
 Table 1.2 shows self-report measures of impulsivity, trust, and reciprocity for all 
three groups of subjects. There were no statistical differences across the three experimental 
groups on either Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = .83, 
df = 2, p = .65)8, or Interpersonal Trust Scale scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = 4.07, df = 2, 
p = .09)9. Likewise, we found no significant differences amongst the three groups in either 
positive reciprocity scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = 2.09, df = 2, p = .35), negative 
reciprocity scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = .83, df = 2, p = .65) or beliefs of reciprocity 
scores (Kruskal-Wallis test, H = .75, df = 2, p = .69) for the Personal Norm of Reciprocity 
(PNR) scale10.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 The present study was designed to understand whether emotions generated by the 
vmPFC play a role in the decision to trust a stranger. Like moral choice, trust involves a 
decision that incorporates a dilemma: if the investor trusts and her partner reciprocates, the 
investor can increases her payoffs. However, she is also subject to the risk that the trustee 
will abuse this trust. In the latter case, the investor is worse off than if she had not trusted 
at all and, furthermore, the trustee has an unfair payoff advantage relative to the investor. 
Substantial evidence exists to show that humans are averse to such risks (Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser, 2004: Holt & Laury, 2002; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Investors have to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For each groups no statistical differences across gender: vmPFC p=.38; nonFC p = .82; HC p = .28. 
9 For each groups no statistical differences across gender: vmPFC p = .40; nonFC p = .83; HC p = .73. 
10 In each groups no statistical differences across gender in all three subscale (all p >.12). 
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overcome their negative emotion or aversion against these risks in order to trust, which 
allowed us to examine whether vmPFC, a brain region necessary for the normal generation 
of emotions and, in particular, social emotions, may play a critical role in trusting 
behaviour in humans. Previous findings have shown that activity in the vmPFC may be 
critical for making predictions and for anticipating negative emotions and the unpleasant 
state of loss in decision-making (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1997), especially in social 
contexts, when the implications of another individual’ intentions must be taken into 
account before choosing (Rudebeck et al., 2008; Behrens et al., 2009; Moretti et al., 2009). 
In the present study, we found  that investors in the vmPFC group showed higher money 
transfers to their partners than those in both control groups, thereby suggesting that 
damage to this brain area increases investors’ trusting behaviour considerably. 
 
 First of all, we need to exclude other factors that could generate the pattern of 
choice shown by vmPFC patients in the trust game. Our findings revealed a significant 
endowment factor, that is a systematic modulation of investment by initial endowment. All 
subjects, either vmPFC and controls subjects, invested more when they were initially 
endowed with more money. Like control subjects, vmpFC patients were able to adapt their 
investment to the initial endowment available, showing normal cognitive ability to change 
their investment in relation to money available. Therefore, it appears that for vmPFC 
patients trust decisions cannot be accounted for in term of perseveration, since 
perseveration is the tendency to continue or repeat a previously rewarded act or activity 
even when no longer appropriate (Wallis, 2007).  The fact that patients flexibly adapt (e.g., 
change) their investment and repayment in relation to the money they have been offered at 
the beginning of each game works against the hypothesis that they are simply repeating the 
same investment or repayment in every transaction. Furthermore, the absence of feedback 
(e.g., gain or loss) at the end of each trial, also helps to avoid vmPFC patients 
perseverating in a previously rewarded action. 
  
 Furthermore, data indicates a more complex pattern of decisions than that predicted 
by a simple environmental dependency syndrome in vmPFC patients. This hypothesis 
would suggest that vmPFC patients rely on environmental cues to make their choice, 
whatever the ‘social’ circumstances of their decision making context. That is, the more 
money vmPFC patients are given (e.g., environmental cues) the more they send to their 
anonymous (computer or human) partner. Firstly, I found that vmPFC sent more money 
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than controls when they acted as investor (increased trust or risk), but sent less or similar 
amounts of money than control groups when they played as trustee. This clearly indicates 
that they are not only relying on the money they are given to make their choice (investment 
or repayment), but are also sensitive to the specific context and role they play in the game 
(investor vs. trustee) to make their decision. These findings are in line with recent studies 
involving the Ultimatum game (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; Moretti et al, 2009) showing 
that vmPFC patients’ rejection of unfair offers, although higher than control participants, 
was modulated by the amount of money received from another during the game. Secondly, 
the difference between vmPFC patients and controls subjects in the risk game was 
significant only when subjects were playing with the lowest sum (6€). More specifically, 
vmPFC patients invested more than control subjects when they had a lower amount 
available, but not when they had a greater amount available (9€ and 12€).  
 
 Another possibility is that vmPFC patients suffer from a general emotional 
disinhibition. If emotional disinhibition of vmPFC could be a plausible explanation for the 
greater level of trust and risk with low endowment observed in vmPFC, the same 
explanation does not fit with the data regarding the  risk choice with medium (9€) and high 
endowment (12€). In case of a pure emotional disinhibition with greater endowment the 
level of risk in vmPFC should be even greater and not at normal level.  
 
 Apparently, the normal level of risk showed by vmPFC patients in the risk game is 
in contradiction with their tendency to have a greater level of risk than normal found by 
Bechara and colleagues (1994) using the Iowa Gambling task. However, Fellows and 
Farah (2005) in their “shuffled” version of the gambling task11, which used reward 
contingencies that did not initially bias the subject toward any of the decks, found that 
patients with vmPFC damage were not impaired on this version of the task. The results 
suggested that the deficits on the gambling task might have arisen from the problems that 
these patients have in reversing stimulus-reward associations. vmPFC more than risky 
behaviour showed inability in modifying their behaviour in response to negative feedback 
(perseveration). However in our tasks there was no negative or positive feedback on which 
it would be possible to balance the goodness of strategy of choice; on the contrary the task 
measures a pure internal and general disposition to take risks in an ambiguous situation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See description of Iowa Gambling task (Bechara et al. 1994) in chapter II paragraph 2.5.  
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The lack of feedback and the measurement of the initial and not biased disposition to risk 
showed that these patients are not different from controls in risk game.  
 
 
 What mechanisms might be involved in generating the effect of vmPFC damage on 
trusting behaviour? One possibility could be that vmPFC damage causes a general increase 
in altruism and prosocial inclinations. On this account, vmPFC damage should affect not 
only the prosocial behaviour of the investors but also that of the trustees. However, the 
data concerning the trustees’ repayments to their investors in the trust game failed to show 
in the vmPFC group more trustworthy or altruistic behavior than control groups. On the 
contrary, data showed reduced generosity in the trustees’ repayment in the vmPFC than in 
the control groups, thereby indicating that effect of vmPFC damage on trust is not caused 
by increased generosity or inclination to behave prosocially. There are two opposite 
patterns of behaviour for vmPFC subjects. In the trust game they showed a greater 
inclination to behave prosocially, whereas when taking on the trustee role they behave 
antisocially. In the case of the trust game, the main component is the social risk, whereas in 
the case of the trustee the motivational component is that moral rules ‘not betray the trust 
received’. Their ‘antisocial behavior’ is consistent with a recent neuropsychological study 
(Krajbich et al. 2009) demonstrating that vmPFC damage significantly reduces 
trustworthiness, possibly due to impaired sense of guilt, a sociomoral emotion that plays a 
critical role also in moral decisions.  
 
 Another possible mechanism behind the effect of vmPFC on trust is that damage to 
this region alters patients’ subjective expectations about others’ trustworthiness or positive 
reciprocity. In other words, lesions to the vmPFC may render patients more optimistic 
about the probability of a good return from the investment. However, results showed these 
expectations do not differ significantly between vmPFC and control groups, therefore 
ruling out the possibility that vmPFC patients show more trusting behaviours because of 
unusual beliefs about the other players. Furthermore, also self-report measures of trust 
(Interpersonal Trust Scale, Rotter, 1967) and reciprocity (Personal Norm of Reciprocity 
(PNR), Perugini et al., 2003) indicate that vmPFC patients and control groups hold similar 
beliefs about others’ trustworthiness and reciprocity. That is, when vmPFC subjects are 
involved in abstract questions concerning their level of trust or reciprocity they are able to 
answer not differently from controls. This finding is perfectly consistent with results from 
several other studies (Koenigs et al., 2007; Moretti et al., 2009; Krajbich et al., 2009) 
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showing that an explicit knowledge of social rules, as well as expectations and beliefs, 
remains intact and normally accessible following vmPFC damage. Despite this retained 
knowledge, however, vmPFC patients fail in valuing social information in social 
interaction and decision-making (Damasio, 1994).  
 
 A critical finding of this study emerges when comparing mean investors’ transfer in 
the trust and risk games across the three groups of participants. We found, that following 
vmPFC damage, patients showed higher and similar investments in both games. That is, 
wmPFC patients did not distinguish between interactions with an intentional agent and 
those with a computer program that randomly generated outcomes. In striking contrast, 
control participants were less likely to invest when they believed that they were interacting 
with people than a computer opponent (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Houser et al., 2009), 
revealing that normal economic decisions are driven by factors beyond mere probability, 
and that “people care not only about the payoff outcome but also about how the outcome 
came to be” (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004). Accordingly, trust decisions, relative to risk 
decisions, entail additional costs, costs shown to be above and beyond mere monetary 
losses, which diverse authors (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008; Houser et 
al., 2009; Fehr, 2009) have explained as due to betrayal aversion, namely, the fear to be 
exploited by others in social interactions. Here, we suggest that, after vmPFC damage, 
people lack such exploitation aversion, due to impaired social emotions, which makes 
them more willing to take risks arising from interpersonal exchanges. Concerns about 
‘others’ do not matter for vmPFC patients, so that they perceive the decision of whether or 
not to trust basically as a risky choice and decide based on their expectations of 
trustworthiness and their propensity to risk. That is, it does not matter whether the risk is 
constituted through the uncertain behavior by the trustee, or through a random mechanism. 
In this sense, vmPFC patients behave more “rationally” than control participants in our 
trust games: they only care about their own payoffs and are hardly betrayal averse, as 
predicted by the standard economic model. The present study showed how subjects with 
vmPFC lesion may take extreme positions in social relation (prosocial or antisocial) 
because they are unable to consider all possible implications and effects of their choice 
both from an economic and social/emotional point of view. Specifically, they seem unable 
to consider the emotions involved in social situations and use them for shaping their 
decision.  
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 The greater level of trust in vmPFC patients could be related to their incapacity to 
consider negative anticipatory emotional responses related to trusting behaviour, 
specifically they could fail to anticipate in their decision process the value of negative 
emotional responses associated with the risk of betrayal. Obviously, vmPFC patients’ 
neglect of potential betrayal and increased willingness to take social risk may invite 
exploitation and attract selfish actors, which may explain, in part, why their social and 
financial investment are bound to fail. 
 
 Recently, Jenkins and colleagues (2007), by using a repetition suppression 
paradigm, found that vmPFC fail to discriminate between self-referential thought and 
mentalizing about a similar other, suggesting that thinking about the mind of another 
person may rely importantly on reference to one's own mental characteristics. Our data 
showed that in the case of patients with vmPFC damage there is a complete dissociation 
between their beliefs about possible trustee repayment and their real repayment when they 
play in the role of trustee. They do not attribute to the other players their own strategy, 
suggesting a complete distinction between themselves and the anonymous player. Probably 
this non consideration of the mental and emotional processes of others reduces the factors 
that normally are taken into account when we make decisions.  
 
 In conclusion this data has shown that vmPFC, and in parallel emotions generated 
by this brain region, could have a critical role in trusting decisions and, in general, is 
essential for the normal evaluation of social stimuli during an economic exchange with 
another person. These findings are highly compatible with current theories maintaining 
that vmPFC is a critical neural substrate for forecasting the (positive and negative) 
emotional consequences of available options in order to guide future behaviuor, both in 
personal and societal decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Finally, the reported 
findings provide evidence for theoretical approaches to social cognition and decision-
making that emphasize the pivotal role of medial prefrontal cortex in the integration of 
multiple signals to generate adaptive behaviour (Montague & Berns, 2002).  
 
 This study provides an extensive investigation about trust behaviour in patients 
with vmPFC damage. Findings showed how these patients are vulnerable because they 
have distorted level of trust which induces them to expose their self in dangerous social 
and economic relations. On the other hand the data showed a lack of moral obligation in 
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case of social relations, which suggests the view that they can be potentially dangerous for 
others.  
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STUDY II 
AFFECTIVE MODULATION OF SOCIAL  
DECISION-MAKING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim study II is to investigate whether emotional stimuli, both consciously and 
unconsciously perceived, can influence a fundamental social disposition such as trust. 
Before presenting the experimental study, a brief session describes how psychology has 
traditionally investigated visual awareness. The first tree paragraphs (2.1, 2.2, and 2.3) 
introduce important terms and methodological aspects that are used in the experimental 
study investigating visual awareness. In paragraph 2.4 some examples about the influence 
of emotions on choice behaviour are introduced; subsequently (paragraph 2.5) a study 
investigating how incidental emotions can affect the decision of trust is presented.  
 
2.1 Visual Awareness 
In everyday life, we believe that we are fully aware of what we see; however this is not 
completely true. Some recent studies show that visual information can be processed 
correctly and almost fully without any accompanying conscious experience. One example 
of this unawareness is the phenomenon called blindsight (de Gelder, 1999). This 
phenomenon becomes evident in neurological patients with circumscribed brain damage to 
the primary visual cortex, which renders them blind in the associated (contralesional) part 
of the visual field. Nevertheless, if a stimulus is rapidly moved, for example, across the 
blind field, some of these hemianopic patients are able to ‘guess’ the direction of the 
stimulus considerably better than chance. Other data on healthy subjects support the idea 
that visual information can correctly processed without any accompanying conscious 
experience. Several studies have demonstrated that we are aware of far less of the visual 
world than we realize (e.g. change blindness, Rensink et al., 1997; inattentional blindness, 
Mack & Rock, 1998). However, this information processing without awareness helps us in 
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programming actions such as reaching and grasping before we become aware of the stimuli 
that are eliciting these actions (Castiello et al., 1991). Not only, our actions can be 
influenced by the meanings of words that we are not aware of having seen (Marcel, 1983). 
 
 2.2 Automatic processing of emotional stimuli  
 Unconscious routes to action seem to apply particularly when responses need to be 
made with great rapidity. All of us have had the experience of reacting to something that 
scares us by jumping or running away, and become aware of this reaction only when we 
are far away from danger. These automatic reactions elicited by strong emotional stimuli 
offer a significant survival advantage because they permit immediate reactions without 
losing time in engaging costly and slow access to conscious experience. 
 
 Several studies support the notion that emotional processing can be largely 
automatic and take place both irrespective of the focus of attention and independent of 
visual awareness (see for a review, Pessoa, 2005). The emotional processing may be 
overriding (Globisch, 1999), it could interfere with the ongoing processing of other 
information (Hartikainen, 2004). Moreover, unconscious emotional stimuli can elicit basic 
affective reactions with both behavioral and physiological consequences without reaching 
the level of consciousness. Specific examples regarding the unconscious processing of 
emotional stimuli come from neuropsychological literature. Patient GY has right 
hemianopia caused by left occipital lobe damage. This patient is able to discriminate 
between emotional facial expressions presented in his blind hemifield (de Gelder, 1999) 
showing what is called: affective blindsight. This famous single case has been recently 
confirmed by a study conducted by Bertini and colleagues (2010) that observed affective 
blindsight for fearful faces in patients with hemianopia (oral communication at the Society 
of Italian Neuropsychology, 2010).  
   
 
 2.3  Subliminal stimuli: methodological problems 
 There are several challenges associated with the measurement of awareness (see 
Merikle, 1992; Greenwald et al., 1996). These include the duration of presentation of 
stimuli in order to be perceived subliminally, and the criteria used to determine whether a 
participant is aware or unaware of the stimuli. Öhman (2002) suggested that the 
presentation of stimuli for less than 40 ms is the right time for subliminal perception. In a 
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recent work, Pessoa and colleagues (2005) showed that subjects differ widely in their 
sensitivity to fearful faces. In their study 36% of participants were able to detect a fearful 
face presented for 33 ms. Remarkably, some subjects could even detect fearful faces that 
were shown for 17 ms before masking. Some authors have suggested that these differences 
could be related to one’s anxiety level (Etkin al., 2004), with more anxious subjects able to 
recognize fear even when presented for vey short time. 
 
 The second difficulty in measuring awareness regards the criteria used to determine 
whether a participant is aware or unaware of a stimulus. According to ‘objective’ criteria, 
unaware perception occurs when a subject’s performance in a ‘forced-choice’ task is at 
chance, whereas in ‘subjective’ criteria, unaware perception occurs when subjects report 
that they are unable to perform the task better than chance (independent of their actual 
objective performance). An objective forced choice task remains the “gold standard” for 
the definition of awareness in behavioral psychology, although not all studies employ such 
a method.  
 
 2.4 Example about the influence of emotions on choices.  
 Although emotions are a constant presence in our lives, relatively little is known 
about the role that emotions play in decision processes in social contexts. As introduced in 
chapter II, emotions are conceived as discrete responses to an external or internal event 
that entails a range of synchronized features, including subjective experience, expression, 
bodily response, and action tendencies (Phelps, 2009). Some recent research has shown 
that emotional stimuli can influence behavior such as: our propensity to consume goods 
(Winkielman et al., 2005), the speed of our gait (Bargh et al., 1996), one’s level of patience 
(Bargh et al., 1996), the willingness to punish someone (Carven’s et al., 1984) and 
cooperative behavior (Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010). Recently, Winkielman and 
colleagues (2005) investigated how subliminal expressions (happy versus angry faces) 
could influence the pouring and consumption of a beverage, and how subliminal 
expression could modulate the monetary value of a beverage. They used a modified 
version of the subliminal affective priming paradigm in which subjects first took part in an 
apparently unrelated gender classification task and then they performed a beverage task 
and a rating of the monetary value of the beverage. Before the gender task, a questionnaire 
measured their actual level of thirst and their general feeling. During the gender task, 
subliminal emotional faces (happy, angry, neutral) were presented (one emotion for each 
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block). Results showed that thirsty participants poured 114% more of the beverage after 
happy face primes than after angry face primes. Moderately thirsty participants poured 
32% more of the beverage after happy than angry face primes, whereas priming did not 
influence pouring of non-thirsty participants. These results suggest that subliminal facial 
expressions alter beverage consumption depending on the individual level of thirst. 
Moreover, authors measured a more abstract value by asking to subjects to evaluate the 
economic value of a beverage. Participants had to fill a scale ranging from 10 cents to 1 
dollar (U.S.) indicating their willingness to pay for a hypothetical can of the beverage. 
Participants were willing to pay 37 cents after happy primes and only 19 cents after angry 
primes. Remarkably, despite these changes in behavior and judgment, participants reported 
no change in their subjective state (mood, arousal) after the task.   
 
 Is it possible that subliminal emotional stimuli could influence more complex 
behavior such as socio-economic exchanges with others? There is growing evidence of 
automaticity in social psychological phenomena (Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010; Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005; Bargh et al., 1996), however it is widely assumed, especially in social 
psychology, that behavioral responses to social environments are mostly under conscious 
control (Bargh, 1989). Social responses might well be consciously chosen on the basis of 
automatic reaction and feelings, but the ultimate behavioral decisions themselves are 
believed to be made consciously. On this point of view, Devine (1989) proposed a two-
stage model of prejudice in which the perceptual phase is automatic (i.e., activation of 
stereotypes by the target person's features), whereas the second phase of prejudiced 
behavior is a matter of conscious choice, driven by one's relevant and consciously 
accessible values. The two-stage model of prejudice of Devine (1989) does not seem too 
far away from more recent neuroscientific positions that postulate that “rational decisions” 
in social and economic domain result from balancing two opposite processes: an 
affective/intuitive process and a controlled/deliberative process (Greene, 2007). The 
affective/intuitive process consists of emotion-laden processes that automatically evaluate 
socially relevant stimuli along a right-wrong or like-dislike dimension (Haidt, 2003; Fehr 
& Camerer, 2007). The deliberative process consists of highly controlled processes that 
arrive at social judgement or decision through laborious steps of deductive reasoning and 
cost-benefit analysis and optimization. The areas of the brain associated with problem 
solving and deliberate reasoning include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and the 
inferior parietal lobule, while areas that have been implicated in emotion/intuitive 
	  76	  
processing and social cognition are the medial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) and the posterior cingulate gyrus (Greene, 2007).  
 
 Some studies (Carven et al., 1984; Moretti & di Pellegrino. 2010; Dunn & 
Schweitzer, 2005; Bargh et al., 1996) have tried to investigate how incidental emotions 
affect social behavior. In the influential study by Carven et al. (1984), a concept of 
hostility/anger was primed subliminally in a group of participants, whereas a second group 
was exposed to neutral priming stimuli. Participants, in what they believed to be an 
unrelated second experiment, were instructed to give shocks to a "learner" participant 
(actually a confederate) whenever he or she gave an incorrect answer. Compared to 
participants who were exposed to neutral priming stimuli, those presented subliminally 
with hostility/anger-related primes gave longer shocks. On the same line, Bargh and 
colleagues (1996) observed that participants primed with rudeness-related stimuli in an 
ostensibly unrelated first experiment interrupted a conversation reliably faster and more 
frequently than did other participants exposed to a concept of politeness. More recently 
Moretti and di Pellegrino (2010) investigated how an emotion such as sadness and disgust 
could modulate the level of cooperation in the ultimatum game. Three different groups 
were initially exposed to three different kinds of social pictures (neutral, disgust, sadness). 
Subsequently, subjects in a second apparently nonrelated task played several rounds of the 
ultimatum game with anonymous counterparts. Results showed that subjects exposed to 
neutral and sad pictures showed the same level of acceptance of either, fair and unfair 
offers.  Differently, subjects exposed to disgusting pictures were less willing to accept 
unfair offers than other subjects.  
 
 Previous literature (Winkielman et al., 2005; Bargh et al., 1996; Carven et al., 
1984) suggests that subliminal emotional stimuli can modulate not only simple perceptual 
task but also more complex social behavior. Here, I report an investigation aimed at 
assessing whether emotional stimuli can modulate our disposition to trust someone. The 
next paragraph reports how I addressed this question. 
 
  
2.5 Emotion and Trust 
 One fundamental component of our social behaviour is trust. Trust is an essential 
ingredient of human exchange (Arrow, 1974); it promotes social and economic 
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transactions, and has been long recognized as a critical antecedent of cooperative 
behaviour (Ostrom & Walker, 2002). An operational definition suggests that trust involves 
a voluntary transfer of resources (physical, financial, intellectual, or temporal) from the 
investor to the trustee with no real commitment from the trustee (Coleman, 1994).  
 
 The decision of trust is based on opposite expectations/anticipation regarding 
trustee decision. These opposite expectations have associated emotional reactions. 
Accordingly, the decision to trust a stranger concerns two different levels of consideration: 
one economic and the other social. With regard to the economic point of view, there is the 
possibility to have greater mutual benefit from cooperation (greater income in case of trust 
game, see study I), but at the same time there is a negative possibility regarding betrayal, 
that in case of trust games means losing money. On the social point of view, there is the 
chance to send an encouraging signal to start a comfortable and profitable relation and also 
to build a positive reputation. On the other hand, however, there is the possibility of being 
betrayed and thus humiliated by a selfish other. Even if there is new interest about trust 
behaviour, really little data exists on how emotions influence trust behavior. If the decision 
to trust is based on opposite expectations with opposite emotional reactions, it is possible 
to hypothesize that incidental emotions may unbalance this equilibrium of opposite 
emotional reactions present at the time of a trusting decision. In a recent study, Dunn & 
Schweitzer (2005), by using an apparently separated task, induced in participants specific 
emotional states (angry, sadness, happiness). Then, subjects had to fulfill a questionnaire 
regarding trust. They found that incidental emotions significantly influence subjective 
reports of trust in unrelated settings. Specifically participants in a happy emotional state 
showed a significantly greater number of trusting judgments than participants in other 
emotional states. A further interesting result reported by Dunn & Schweitzer (2005) 
concerns that emotions do not influence trust when individuals are aware of the source of 
these emotions.  
 
 The present study seeks to investigate if subliminal emotional stimuli could 
incidentally modulate a real, on-line trust decision. To my knowledge, the following study 
is the first attempt to investigate how incidental emotion can influence real, on-line 
decisions to trust a stranger. In this study, emotions are introduced into a real dyadic social 
interaction requiring trust: such as the case of the trust game. The use of the trust game 
paradigm is particularly relevant because subjects do not make theoretical or abstract 
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judgments about trust, but this game offers the possibility to measure trust by means of a 
more realistic interaction between two people. In the trust game, already introduced in 
study I, two players interact in an anonymous manner. At the beginning, each player is 
endowed with the same amount of money. The first mover, the investor, has to decide how 
much of her initial endowment she wants to transfer (e.g., invest) to the second player, the 
trustee. Any amount sent by the investor is tripled by the experimenter and given to the 
trustee; at this point the trustee has to decide which fraction of money received she wants 
to return to the investor. The amount of money that the investor decides to give to the 
trustee is a measure of trust, whereas the amount that the trustee sends back to the investor 
is a measure of reciprocity. Two different emotions were further introduced during the 
trust game: happiness and fear. These emotions were introduced by presenting during the 
game a human face with one of two emotional expressions. In a social context, indeed, the 
emotional expressions of faces are an important and immediate source of information that 
may promote or discourage certain behavior. The two emotions introduced in the game 
appear congruent with the two opposite expectations. A happy face could emphasize the 
positive expectations of a mutual cooperation and greater benefit (both social and 
economic) for investor and trustee. A face with a fearful expression, on the other hand, 
could emphasize the fear of being betrayed and losing one’s own money. The emotional 
expression of others, such as for example disgust, seems less relevant to the emotional 
anticipation involved in the decision to trust a stranger. I prefer to investigate the effect of 
basic emotion on trust decision as opposed to non-basic emotions, because in my 
knowledge there is no data about the effect of basic emotions on trust decisions in real 
interactions. The effect of basic emotion thus could represent a basic and useful 
comparison in a further study involving more complex emotions. From the methodological 
point of view, I believe that introducing non-basic emotions (for example guilt or regret) 
inevitably requires changes in method and task.  
 
 We predicted that happy faces could evoke a greater level of trust, whereas fearful 
faces could reduce the level of trust. In order to understand if the level of trust is 
modulated not only by emotional content of the face but also by the level of awareness 
with which these emotional stimuli are perceived, half of the participants were exposed to 
subliminal emotional faces, and the other half were exposed to supraliminal (e.g., visible) 
emotional faces. In this case we predicted in accordance with Dunn & Schweitzer (2005) 
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that the effect of incidental emotions could be greater when subjects were not aware of 
emotional stimuli.  
 
 
 
METHOD 
 
 Participants  
 One hundred and seven healthy subjects (35 males) took part in this study.  Their 
ages ranged from 19 to 32 with a mean of 24.7 (SD = 4.09). Participants were students 
from the University of Bologna, all blind regarding the nature of the experiments. 
Informed consent was obtained from each subject prior to commencing the experiment. 
None of the participants reported neurological or psychiatric disorders. The experiment 
was performed in accordance with the ethical standards as laid down in the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Department of 
Psychology, University of Bologna. 
 
 Procedure 
 The experiment was run in individual sessions. On entering the laboratory, 
participants were greeted by an experimenter who dealt with informed consent and who 
collected some  demographic information. Then, the experimenter informed them that they 
would participate in two separate studies: one concerning economic decisions with real 
monetary payoffs, and a second one concerning the perception and attention of briefly 
presented stimuli. 
 
 All participants were presented with the same sequence of tasks: i) three rounds of 
the trust game, in which they played the role of investor, ii) a discrimination task and iii) 
questionnaires and payment. During both the trust game and the discrimination task the 
face of the same man (Figure 2.1 from Ekman & Friesen, 1976) was shown with different 
emotional expression: neutral, fearful, happy. Before participants left the laboratory, they 
were closely questioned for suspicion. Stepwise debriefing revealed that no participant 
guessed the actual purpose of the study. 
 
 Trust Game 
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 The trust game session took place in a quiet room in which an opaque, removable 
partition wall was used to create two separate settings. On either side of the wall, we 
placed a desk with a computer. Participants sat at one desk in front of the computer, while 
at the other sat an actor played the role of trustee. As a result, playing partners could be 
separated visually, thereby providing between-subject anonymity, without separating them 
audibly, thus lending our set-up credibility.  The instructions about the nature and rules of 
the game were presented on the computer, and the experimenter verbalised them to ensure 
that participants understood them. In the instructions, it was emphasized that participants 
in the trust game would play the game anonymously and only once with each opponent 
player, and that they would receive the money earned in the game. Moreover instructions 
mentioned that the presentation of a face had the aim of reminding the participant that they 
were interact with another person. After reading the instructions, subjects were required to 
complete a quiz that required them to state the amount of money that each player would 
receive under various hypothetical circumstances. The game started once the subject 
successfully finished the quiz.  
 
 Participants acted as investor in a series of 3 rounds of a trust game against 3 
different anonymous human partners via a computer interface. At the beginning of each 
round, the actor that played the role of the trustee entered the room and sat at her position. 
When both investor and trustee were ready, the interaction started.  Each round was 
presented as text through a series of screens (see figure 2.1 for a schematic illustration of a 
typical round). A 6-s initial screen indicated the endowment (E) available for both players 
in the current round. All three games presented an endowment of 9€. The second screen 
presented a neutral face or an emotional face: fearful or happy. In the subliminal condition, 
the face (neutral, fearful or happy) was presented for 25 ms followed by a neutral face 
turned upside down for 1,000 ms. In the supraliminal condition, the first face (neutral, 
fearful or happy) was presented for 1,000 ms followed by a neutral face turned upside 
down and presented for 25 ms. The next screen posed the question “How many Euros 
between 0€ and 9€ do you transfer to the other participant?” and remained visible until a 
response was given. Participants were given the opportunity to send any integer amount 
from zero to their entire endowment available, and were instructed to indicate their 
decision by pressing the numeric keys of the computer keyboard. Following the response, a 
screen indicating the investor’s transfer and the amount received by the trustee (three times 
the amount invested) was presented for 4 s. Then, a variable 5- to 15-s waiting screen 
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informed that the trustee was deciding how much of the tripled amount to send back. 
Subjects were informed that the other participant could choose the amount from any 
integer between zero and the tripled amount they have transferred to her/him. Finally, a 
screen signalled the end of the round. The trustee went out of the room and after a short 
break was replaced by another actor to begin the next round. Subjects received no feedback 
between games; only at the end of the entire experimental session subjects could see a 
screen with overall money earned by the subject during all three interactions and receive 
the payment.  
 
 The expression of face (neutral, fearful, happy) presented was manipulated between 
groups. Subjects viewed the same emotional face for all three games immediately before 
deciding the amount of money to transfer to their opponent player. The level of awareness 
in perceiving the emotional faces was also manipulated between groups. For half of the 
subjects, the presentation of emotional faces was at subliminal level: an emotional face 
was presented for 25 ms and successively masked for 1000 ms with an inverted neutral 
face. For the other half of the participants, the presentation was supraliminal: an emotional 
face was presented for 1000 ms and successively masked by an inverted neutral face 
presented for 25 ms. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following six 
conditions: subliminal-neutral, subliminal-fear, subliminal-happy, supraliminal-neutral, 
supraliminal-fear, supraliminal-happy (see table 2.1). 
 
 Discrimination task 
 Following the three rounds of the trust game, participants performed the 
discrimination task in order to check the level of accuracy in perceiving the emotional face 
subliminally presented (see figure 2.2 for a schematic presentation of the task). The 
instruction stressed that in each of 8 trials two faces were presented in rapid succession, 
and that subjects had to recognize the emotional expression of the first face presented in 
the sequence. Moreover, the instruction emphasized that the first face of each pair was 
presented for a short time, and therefore could be difficult to perceive. The task started 
with a screen presenting a fixation cross for a variable interval of time (75-1000 ms); the 
next screen presented an emotional face (either fearful or happy) for 25 ms and 
immediately masked with an inverted neutral face presented for 1000 ms. The next screen 
asked the subject to indicate if the first picture was a face expressing fear or happiness by 
pressing one of two keys. Half of the subjects were instructed to press the key ‘A’ when 
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they perceived a happy face, and the key ‘F’ when they perceived a fearful face. For the 
other half of participants, the instructions were the opposite. No feedback was provided 
during the task.  
 
 The discrimination task included 8 trials, 4 sequences of fear-neutral, and 4 
sequences of happy-neutral, given in random order.  In a pilot discrimination task (8 
subjects) I required to subjects to discriminate emotional vs. non-emotional expression. 
However this task using the same face (emotional expression masked by neutral 
expression) was too easy for participants (89% of correct responses). In order to avoid easy 
recognition I proposed to subjects a more difficult judgment regarding discrimination 
between different emotions.  
 
 Questionnaires  
At the end of the control tasks, three questionnaires on Trust (Rotter Interpersonal Trust 
Scale, Rotter, 1967), Reciprocity (Personal norm of Reciprocity PNR, Perugini, 2003), and 
Impulsiveness (Barratt Impulsivity Scale, BIS-11, Barratt, 1996), were administered. 
Overall feedback about subject’s earnings was given at the end of the experiment.  
 
 To summarize, subjects were randomly assigned to one of 6 different conditions (2 
perceptual conditions: subliminal-supraliminal; X 3 emotion conditions, neutral or fear or 
happy). Subjects took part first in 3 rounds as investor in the trust Game without receiving 
any feedback. Afterwards, subjects took part in a discrimination task and then they filled 
three questionnaires. At the end, participants could see the responses of the trustee and 
received their payment.  
 
 
 Design section 
 The variable measured is the level of trust. There are two factors: 
awareness (2 levels) and emotions (3 levels) see table 2.1. The design is a between groups 
comparison, see six different groups in table 2.1.  
The analysis involves:  
i) Trust level in first trials (one-way ANOVA analysis between the six groups)  
ii) Mean of trust level across all three trials (one-way ANOVA analysis between the six 
groups)   
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iii) Level of accuracy in discrimination task (one-way ANOVA analysis between the six 
groups) 
  
Economists (Berg et al., 1995) suggest that the first trial in the trust game is a more reliable 
measure of trust because there is no history and previous experience that can affect the 
decision to trust a stranger. Differently, subsequent decisions, even when there is no 
feedback, have some information, such as amount of money surely earned because not 
invested, that can affect in some way the second decision regarding whether or not to trust 
someone.  
 
Groups Awareness Emotion 
1 Subliminal Neutral 
2 Subliminal Fear 
3 Subliminal Happy 
4 Supraliminal Neutral 
5 Supraliminal Fear 
6 Supraliminal Happy 
Table 2.1. Groups  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.  Example of 1 round of the trust game. In the subliminal condition, the first face (neutral, fearful, 
happy) was presented for 25 ms and followed by a reversed neutral face presented for 1000 ms. In the 
supraliminal condition, the first face was presented for 1000 ms and the following neutral face for 25 ms.  
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Figure 2.2. The figure presents two trials of the discrimination task, first sequence is fear-neutral, second 
sequence is happy-neutral.  
 
RESULTS 
Only subjects able to response correctly to less than 5 emotional expressions on 8 
trials of the discrimination task were included in the study, except 4 subjects who 
recognised 5 expressions out of 8 but we could not exclude because this would have 
induced an unbalanced distribution of subjects between groups. As reported in table 2.2 
below, 16 subjects recognized correctly more than 75% (≥ 6/8 correct responses) of the 
emotional expressions in the discrimination task. These subjects were excluded from the 
analysis because they were able to recognize the emotive expression. Table 2.2 reports the 
distribution of subjects excluded across conditions.  
 
The remaining 91 subjects (32 males, mean age 24,0) recognized correctly 51% 
(SD: 16) of emotional expressions. This result represents the chance level showing that a 
subject failed to recognize at conscious level the emotional content of a face presented 
subliminally. One-way ANOVA analysis between six groups was performed on level of 
accuracy in recognizing the emotive expression. No difference in accuracy was found 
among all six groups: F (5, 85) = .85, p= .51.  
 
   
  
Face  Condition 
N. of 
subjects 
Discrimination 
>5/8 
Mean transfer in 
subjects with 
discrimination >5/8 
Mean transfer in 
subjects with 
discrimination < 5/8 
Neutra
l Subliminal 17 2 2,9 2,9* 
Fearful Subliminal 19 4 3,5 3,4 
Happy Subliminal 18 3 4,6 4,8 
Neutra
l 
Supralimin
al 16 0 3,8 3,7** 
Fearful 
Supralimin
al 19 4 3,7 3,7 
Happy 
Supralimin
al 18 3 3,8 3,8 
    107 16  3,7       Mean 3,7       Mean 
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Table 2.2. Table reports number of subjects able to recognize more than 5/8 of emotional expression in the 
discrimination task across the 6 different conditions of the experiment. The investors’ average transfer is not 
different considering or excluding subjects with high rate of recognitions.  
*1 subject recognized 5/8 expressions (mean of transfer in group without this subjects was 2,9) 
** 3 subjects recognized 5/8 expressions (mean of transfer in group without these subjects was 3,8).  
As reported in table the average of transfer considering subject recognizing 5/8 expressions does not differ 
from the average of transfer excluding subjects able to recognize less than 5/8 expression.  
 
 Figure 2.3 illustrates investors’ average transfer in the first round of the trust game. 
In order to observe whether the content (neutral, fear, happy) of an emotional stimulus 
could affect trust behavior, one-way ANOVA analysis between six groups was performed 
on amounts invested in the first round of the trust game, separately in the subliminal and 
supraliminal conditions.  
 
 Investors in the subliminal-happy condition showed greater transfers (€4.6) than 
investors in subliminal-neutral (€3.2), and subliminal-fear conditions (€3.1). These 
differences between groups were statistically significant [F (2,42) = 3.75, p = .03]. T-test 
for independent samples revealed that investments in the subliminal-happy condition were 
significantly different from investments in the subliminal-fear [t(1, 28) = -2.32, p = .02], 
and the subliminal-neutral conditions [t(1, 28) = -2.21, p = .03], whereas there was no 
difference between subliminal-neutral and subliminal-fear conditions [t(1, 28) = -0.23, p = 
.81]. The analysis revealed that subliminal happy expressions could influence the amount 
of money that investors send to their trustees as opposed to fearful and neutral expressions.  
 
 In the supraliminal condition, the investors’ average transfer in the first round was 
€3.6 when neutral and fear expressions were presented. When a supraliminal happy face 
was presented, the investors’ average transfer was €3.8. There was no significant 
difference between groups in the supraliminal condition, F (2,43) = .37, p = .69.  
 
 The same pattern of results was observed when the mean transfer amount over the 
three rounds of the trust game was analyzed (see figure 2.4). In the subliminal condition, 
there was a significant difference between groups [F(2,42) = 4.30, p = .01]. Specifically 
the subliminal-happy condition was significantly different from both the subliminal-neutral 
[t(1, 28) = -2.50 p = .02] and the subliminal-fear [t(1, 28) = -2.43, p = .02], whereas there 
was no difference between these two latter conditions [t(1, 28) = .67, p = .50]. In the 
supraliminal condition, there was no difference between groups [F (2,43) = .00, p = .99].  
 
	  86	  
 To understand if the level of awareness in processing emotional expression can 
influence the transfer amount from investor to trustee, subliminal and supraliminal 
condition with the same emotion were compared. There was no difference between 
subliminal-fear (€3,2) and supraliminal-fear condition in the first round, [t(1, 28) = -.60, p 
= .59], or  between  subliminal-neutral and supraliminal-neutral  [t(1, 28) = -.89, p = .37]. 
However, the subliminal-happy condition showed a greater transfer amount (€4.60) than 
supraliminal-happy (€3,13). This difference was statistically relevant: [t(1, 28) = 2.24, p = 
.03]. It must be noted, however, that when mean transfer amounts over the three rounds of 
the trust game were considered, the amount sent in the subliminal-happy condition was 
numerically greater (€4.7) than amount sent in the supraliminal-happy condition (€3.8), but 
the difference was not significant [t(1,28) =1.7, p = .10].  
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Investors’ average transfer in first game, error bars refers to standard deviation  
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Figure 2.4.  Investors’ average transfer in all three games, error bars refers to standard deviation  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Self-report measures of impulsivity (Bis), trust (Rotter), and reciprocity (PNRI, II, III) between 
conditions. 
 
 
 Finally, results of the personality questionnaires (see figure 2.5) revealed no 
statistical differences across conditions for either propensity to reciprocate, trust or 
impulsivity, (all ps > .05), thus indicating that transfer amount differences across 
conditions cannot be attributed to pre-existing behavioral trait or social believes.  
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DISCUSSION ON METHOD 
 
 An important methodological limitation to this study concerns the use of one 
person’s face only. There is good agreement among observers that some faces look more 
trustworthy than others (e.g. Winston et al. 2002; Todorov & Engell, 2008); to avoid any 
confounding effect regarding the trustworthiness of face, the same face was always 
presented for all participants.  
 
 Another limitation to this study is that we did not measure mood/emotion in our 
subjects after the tasks (e.g., emotion manipulation check). It is not possible to say whether 
some stimuli (e.g., fear) were ineffective on trusting behavior because they failed to affect 
participants’ mood/emotion, or because they cannot penetrate trust decisions.  
 
 A further limitation concerns the between-subject design of the present study. In a 
previous pilot (30 participants), subjects were exposed to all three emotional expressions 
(neutral, fear, happy) in random order, thus creating a within-subjects design. However, 
average transfer amounts did not show any modulation by emotion cues. Only the first 
round of the game showed a significant difference between subjects. A possible 
interpretation of this null result is that the emotional activation is not an on-off process, but 
it shows carry-over effects from one trial to the next. Although a between groups design 
presents some limitations, it seems a better way to introduce specific incidental emotions 
into complex task concerning on-line social exchanges. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 Trust requires one to balance economic and social motives, each with both positive 
and negative affective dimensions. The economic motive regards the possibility of gaining 
a higher payoff if the trustee shares, or to lose money if he does not share. The social 
motives concern the positive feeling associated with the possibility of a cooperative 
relationship, or the fear of being exploited by others in social context.  
 
 We have hypothesized that incidental emotions could modulate these motives that 
guide trust behavior. Moreover, the influence of incidental emotion could be greater when 
subjects are not aware of this emotional information. In accordance with Dunn & 
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Schweitzer (2005), our findings confirmed that incidental emotions can be effective in 
influencing trust. In particular, in our study, subliminal happy faces increased investors’ 
transfer amounts relative to neutral faces, whereas fearful expressions failed to affect such 
amounts compared to neutral expressions. Studies investigating trust without any 
incidental emotional stimulation (Berg et al., 1994; McCabe et al., 2001) have shown that 
investors usually send to trustee approximately 30-40% of the money available. In the 
present study, participants exposed to fearful and neutral expression showed a level of trust 
similar to that reported in other studies without emotional stimulation. By contrast, 
subjects exposed to subliminal happy faces showed a greater level of trust. 
  
 A possible explanation of the null effect of fearful faces on trust behavior could 
concern a sort of ‘floor effect’. In the trust game, risk aversion and betrayal aversion are 
powerful inhibitors of trust. As such, fearful faces cannot further reduce trust. Furthermore, 
extremely low level of trust in social exchanges may be not viewed as a cautious decision, 
but perceived as signs of hostility or punishment towards others. Therefore, it is possible 
that trust cannot be symmetrically influenced by positive and negative emotional stimuli, 
because in the anonymous one-shot interaction as those used here, trust is already very 
low. 
 
 The effect of happy face on trust level could occur because emotional primes 
temporarily changed the accessibility of knowledge relevant for interpreting the ambiguous 
situation (Higgins, 1996). In this sense the happy face could be used as a reinforcing 
stimulus supporting the positive components of trust. An alternative explanation could be 
related to general mood change due to presentation of emotional faces. This possibility, 
however, could not be tested because data concerning participants’ mood before and after 
the task were not collected. However the measurement of mood before and after a task 
could be different not because participants saw emotional expressions, but because 
subjects were exposed to a social situation involving taking risks, such as that of sending 
money to a stranger for gain. Furthermore, the difference between priming of positive 
information and induction of positive is quite subtle. 
 
 A referee suggested a possible manipulation of facial appearance, or other 
characteristics of the ‘trustee’ face to increase the relevance of the mood manipulation. 
First we need to be sure that the findings are due to manipulation of accidental emotions, 
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and, second, manipulating the facial appearance of the trustee means changing the only 
information available about the trustee. In the present experiment, we controlled the role of 
facial appearance on trust by presenting always the same individual (a man), in order to 
measure level of trust independent from the facial appearance of the trustee. Manipulating 
the facial appearance of the trustee could help us to understand what is in the 
expression/face/parts of face that inspire more trust (see van 't Wout & Sanfey, 2008), but 
not whether emotions generated by the situation and/or incidental emotions are used in the 
decision to trust. 
 
 Another important result of this study concerns the fact that only unconsciously 
perceived happy faces were effective in modulating trust behavior. In accordance with 
Dunn & Schweitzer (2005), we found that subliminal happy faces increased trusting 
behaviour relative to subliminal neutral (and fearful) faces, but supraliminal happy faces 
failed to do so. It is possible to speculate that cognitive control mechanisms reduce the 
effects of supraliminal emotional stimulation, or that these control mechanisms select the 
relevant information and inhibit irrelevant information. This explanation is congruent with 
several fMRI studies (Hariri et al., 2003; Critchley, H. et al., 2000) that have shown that 
amygdala activation decreases when participants attend to faces in order to evaluate 
emotional features, relative to when participants make a non-emotional judgment of face 
gender, such that the emotion of the face is completely irrelevant to the subject’s task. 
Interestingly, Hariri and colleagues (2003) showed that activation in the right prefrontal 
cortex (PFC) is negatively correlated with activity in the amygdala during conscious 
semantic processing of emotional stimuli. Hariri and colleagues (2003) suggested a 
subcortical, amygdala-based associative level of emotional processing that is subject to 
cognitive modulation by cortical networks involving the PFC. Thus, in case of 
supraliminal presentation of happy faces, cognitive control mechanisms operating on 
emotional processing can decrease the relevance of emotional information because this is 
not relevant for the task. By contrast, in case of subliminal happy faces, this information 
escapes control mechanisms because it is not consciously perceived, and therefore can 
reinforce those motives (e.g. pleasure of cooperation, expectation of a good outcome) that 
favour trusting behaviour.  
 
 Future studies could help us to understand if the influence of incidental emotions on 
trust is entirely dependent on the social aspect of the incidental stimulus (human face) or 
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can be dependent on more general meaning, for example positive or negative valence, 
irrespective of whether the incidental stimulus is social or not. Thus, might presenting a 
knife vs. a flower immediately before the decision of trust have the same effects as  fearful 
and happy human expressions? Another interesting question regards how non-basic 
emotion can influence the decision to trust, and the difference between a basic and non-
basic emotive effect on trust.  
 
 To conclude we examined how incidental emotion, both consciously and 
unconsciously perceived, could influence one’s general willingness to rely on others in 
situations in which betrayal is possible, such as in situations involving trust. Our results 
indicate that, in one-shot anonymous interactions, positive emotions are more effective 
than negative emotions in modulating trust. These results provide important insight into the 
mechanics of trust, and identify incidental emotions as a robust and important determinant 
of trust. In many cases, emotions may play an important role in trust decisions precisely 
because people are unaware of the significant influence their emotional state has on their 
decisions.  
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STUDY III 
 
 
MORAL JUDGMENT AFTER VENTROMEDIAL PREFRONTAL 
DAMAGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.1 Deliberative and intuitive process  
 For decades, moral psychology has been concerned with identifying a rational basis 
of human morality (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). A different and more recent approach, 
however, places strong emphasis on the causal power of affective and intuitive processes 
to drive our moral judgment and convictions (Haidt, 2001). Integrating these opposite 
views, recent work in psychology and neuroscience has suggested that moral judgments 
are mediated by two classes of computational processes (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 
2003; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001). One class, referred to as moral intuition, 
consists of emotion-laden processes that automatically evaluate socially relevant stimuli 
along a right–wrong or like–dislike dimension. A second class, moral reasoning, consists 
of controlled, deliberative processes that arrive at moral judgment or decision through 
laborious steps of deductive reasoning and cost–benefit analyses. For the most part, these 
processes work cooperatively to promote moral behavior. Certain ethical dilemmas, 
however, involve decisions in which the tension or conflict between intuitive and 
deliberative processes becomes apparent (Greene et al., 2001). One such dilemma is 
illustrated by the classic trolley problem (Thomson, 1986; Foot, 1978), in which two moral 
scenarios, impersonal versus personal, are contrasted. On the impersonal version (trolley 
dilemma), a bystander can use a switch to redirect a runaway trolley away from five 
victims and onto a single victim; on the personal version (footbridge dilemma), a bystander 
can push a single victim off of a bridge in front of a runaway trolley in order to stop its 
progress toward five victims. From a simple “economic” point of view, the two dilemmas 
are identical (i.e., killing one person to save five lives). Yet, numerous empirical studies 
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have demonstrated that a large majority of individuals consider it morally acceptable to 
sacrifice one person to save five in the impersonal dilemma, while they believe that it is 
wrong to push the large man to save the five victims (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et 
al., 2007; Mikhail, 2007; Cushman et al.,  2006; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Greene et al., 
2001; 2004; Petrinovich et al., 1993). 
 According to Greene et al. (2001), the reason for these seemingly contradictory 
responses lies in the stronger tendency of personal scenarios (i.e., the push case), compared 
to impersonal scenarios (i.e., the switch case), to engage emotional processes which would 
affect moral decisions. Supporting this proposal, neuroimaging has revealed that 
impersonal and personal moral dilemma yield dissociable patterns of neural activation 
(Greene et al., 2001). Specifically, impersonal moral scenarios characteristically yield 
greater activation in brain areas associated with problem solving and deliberate reasoning 
[including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and inferior parietal lobule], whereas 
personal moral scenarios yield greater activation in brain areas that have been implicated in 
emotion and social cognition (such as medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate 
gyrus). On this view, the thought of pushing someone in front a trolley (i.e., a personal 
moral violation) elicits prepotent, seemingly negative, emotional responses that oppose or 
prohibit such repugnant act. In this case, making “more rational,” “utilitarian” choices (i.e., 
deciding that is acceptable to make a harmful act in order to maximize overall utility) 
would require overriding a strongly aversive emotional response. Accordingly, in a later 
study, Greene et al. (2004) found that the (infrequent) selection of utilitarian responses in 
the context of personalmoral dilemmas elicits heightened activity in both “cognitive” (such 
as dlPFC) and emotional brain areas (including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior 
cingulate area, and anterior insula). Interestingly, utilitarian decisions were also associated 
with increased activity in anterior cingulate cortex, which is thought to reflect the conflict 
between competing processes (Botvinick et al., 2004), namely, cognitive processes 
favoring a utilitarian judgment and the emotional response to the prospect of doing harm to 
others.  
 
 3.2  vmPFC lesion and moral judgments 
 Perhaps the most direct evidence supporting a necessary role of emotion in shaping 
moral decisions has emerged from the neuropsychological investigation of individuals with 
selective deficits in affective processing. More specifically, patients with adult-onset 
lesions in ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) develop a marked, albeit isolated, 
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impairment in social behavior that has been consistently attributed to a defective 
engagement of social emotions, such as guilt, embarrassment, and shame. Recent research 
has demonstrated that vmPFC patients respond normally to impersonal moral scenarios. 
However, they are more likely than control groups to endorse moral violations (i.e., 
inflicting serious harm to people) in personal moral scenarios (Ciaramelli et al., 2007), 
specifically, “high-conflict” personal scenarios, situations in which there are no clear social 
norms to decide whether a behavior is morally right or wrong (Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Hauser, 2006). One interpretation of this result is that vmPFC patients lack automatic 
affective responses, or aversion signals, impeding any personal moral violation. When 
affective reactions dissolve (due to brain damage), principled reasoning aimed at 
maximizing benefits and minimizing costs may prevail, thereby increasing the rate of 
“rationally appropriate” utilitarian choices (Greene, 2007; but see also Moll & de Oliveira-
Souza, 2007 for a different view). Patient lesion studies, thus, strongly suggest that 
emotions, particularly those subserved by vmPFC, are integral constituents of our moral 
views. These conclusions, however, rest entirely on the assumption of general emotional 
blunting or flattened affect following vmPFC damage, a notion based on previous work 
concerning vmPFC and nonmoral (and nonsocial) decision-making (i.e., gambling task; 
Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 1996; Damasio, 1994), or the evaluation of 
emotional responses to standardized social stimuli (see Koenigs et al., 2007). None of the 
existing studies has systematically measured subjects-emotional responses emerging 
during (and, presumably, having an impact on) evaluation of moral dilemmas. This is 
particularly relevant considering that in specific social circumstances, vmPFC patients 
have been found to exhibit increased, rather than reduced, emotional reactivity (Koenigs & 
Tranel, 2007; Barrash et., 2000; Grafman et al., 1996). Therefore, critical evidence linking 
vmPFC, emotion, and moral judgments is still lacking.  
 
  
3.3  Searching psychophysiological evidence for moral judgment  
 The aim of the present study is the gathering of direct psychophysiological 
evidence, both in healthy and neurologically impaired individuals, that emotions are 
crucially involved in shaping moral judgment, by preventing personal moral violations. 
Toward this end, 8 patients with focal lesion involving the ventromedial sectors of 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC patients), 7 control patients with lesions outside the frontal lobe 
(non-FC patients), and 18 healthy controls responded to personal as well as impersonal 
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moral dilemmas while skin conductance response (SCR) was recorded as a physiological 
index of affective state. The SCR is related to the sympathetic division of the autonomic 
nervous system (Boucsein, 1992), and is widely used as a sensitive and objective measure 
of emotional processing (Dawson et al., 2007; Naqvi & Bechara, 2006; Büchel et al., 
1998). Moreover, among cortical regions, vmPFC is presumed to be critically implicated in 
the generation and feedback representation of bodily states of arousal (i.e., somatic 
markers), indexed by SCR, in the context of social, emotional, and motivational behavior 
(Nagai et al., 2004; Bechara et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 1996; Damasio, 1994; Tranel & 
Damasio, 1994). Consequently, SCR is a measure ideally suited to study the relationship 
among vmPFC, emotion, and moral decision-making. First, we expected to replicate 
previous evidence that, compared to normal controls, patients with vmPFC damage are 
more willing to judge moral violations as acceptable behaviors in personal moral 
dilemmas, whereas their performance in impersonal and nonmoral dilemmas is comparable 
to the controls. If emotional state activation mediated by vmPFC plays a critical and 
selective role in shaping personal moral judgments, then we should observe differences in 
SCRs between patients with vmPFC damage and comparison groups during contemplation 
of personal moral scenarios (such as the footbridge dilemma), but not during 
contemplation of impersonal moral scenarios (such as the trolley dilemma). An additional 
prediction, derived from the hypothesis that emotional reactions drive disapproval of 
harmful actions(even when aimed at promoting the greater good), was that skin 
conductance activity during contemplation of personal moral dilemmas would be 
negatively correlated with the tendency toward utilitarianism (i.e., percentage of utilitarian 
judgment made) in normal controls. In other words, we predicted that SCR would be 
higher in participants exhibiting fewer utilitarian choices than in those with a higher rate of 
utilitarian responses. 
 
METHODS 
 Participants 
 Three groups of subjects participated in the study: (a) a group of patients with focal 
lesions involving vmPFC bilaterally (the vmPFC group, n = 8); (b) a control group of 
patients with damage sparing frontal cortex (the non- FC group, n = 7); and (c) a control 
group of healthy subjects (the HC group, n = 18), who were matched on age, education, 
and sex with the vmPFC group. Brain-damaged patients were recruited from the Centre for 
Studies and Researches in Cognitive Neuroscience in Cesena, and from the Azienda 
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Ospedaliera Spedali Civili in Brescia. They were selected on the basis of the location of 
their lesion evident on CT or MRI scans. Table 3.1 shows demographic and clinical data, 
as well as the Mini-Mental Status Examination score (MMSE; Folstein et al., 1983). There 
were no significant differences between vmPFC patients and comparison groups with 
regard to age, education, clinical and personality variables ( p > .05 in all cases). 
 Eight vmPFC participants took part also in study I; specifically participants 
number: 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 (see table 1.4 in study I for lesion site details). In the vmPFC 
group, lesions were caused by rupture and repair of anterior communicating artery (ACoA) 
aneurysm. Lesions involved vmPFC — defined as the medial one-third of the orbital 
surface and the ventral one-third of the medial surface of the frontal lobe, following the 
boundaries laid out by Stuss and Levine (2002) — and adjacent basal forebrain area.1. All 
vmPFC patients presented with clinical evidence of a decline in social interpersonal 
conduct, impaired decision-making, and emotional functioning, but had generally intact 
intellectual abilities (see Table 3.2). The non-FC patients (see Table 3.3) were selected on 
the basis of having damage that did not involve the frontal lobe, and also spared the 
amygdala and the insula in both hemispheres. In this group, lesions were unilateral in six 
patients (in the left hemisphere in 2 cases, and in the right hemisphere in 4 cases) and 
bilateral in one patient. Brain lesions were caused by arterial–venous malformation in one 
case, and by ischemic or hemorrhagic stroke in the remaining six cases. Lesion sites 
included the occipital lobe in two patients, the lateral occipito-temporal junction in three 
patients, and the lateral occipito-parietal junction in the remaining two patients. All subject 
groups were administered a short neuropsychological battery including tests with potential 
sensitivity to frontal damage, as well as intelligence and memory tests (results are provided 
in Table 3.2). The groups differed significantly only in their performance on the Stroop 
task, with vmPFC subjects making more errors than both non-FC patients and healthy 
controls (Mann–Whitney U test, p < .05). Patients were not receiving psychoactive drugs 
at the time of testing, and had no other diagnosis likely to affect cognition or interfere with 
participation in the study (e.g., significant psychiatric disease, alcohol misuse, history of 
cerebrovascular disease, focal neurological examination). Neuropsychological and 
experimental studies were all conducted in the chronic phase of recovery, more than a year 
post-onset. All lesions were acquired in adulthood. Patients gave informed consent to 
participate in the study according to the Declaration of Helsinki (International Committee 
of Medical Journal Editors, 1991) and the Ethical Committee of the Department of 
Psychology, University of Bologna. Normal participants were healthy volunteers who were 
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not taking psychoactive medication, and were free of current or past psychiatric or 
neurological illness as determined by history. Normal controls scored at least 28 out of 30 
on the MMSE. 
 
 Lesion Analysis 
 Lesion analysis was based on the most recent clinical CT or MRI. The location and 
extent of each lesion were mapped by using MRIcro software (Rorden & Brett, 2000). The 
lesions were manually drawn by a neurologist with experience in image analysis onto 
standard brain template from the Montreal Neurological Institute, which is based on T1-
weighted MRI scans, normalized to Talairach space. This scan is distributed with SPM99 
and has become a popular template for normalization in functional brain imaging. For 
superimposing of the individual brain lesions, the same MRIcro software was used. figure 
3.1 shows the extent and overlap of the brain lesions in the braindamaged patients. 
Brodmann’s areas (BA) affected in vmPFC group were areas 10, 11, 32 (subgenual 
portion), and 24, with region of maximal overlap occurring in BA 10 and 11.  
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Materials 
 Stimuli in the present study were 15 personal moral dilemmas, 15 impersonal moral 
dilemmas, and 15 nonmoral dilemmas, randomly selected from a battery of 60 dilemmas 
developed by Greene et al. (2001), and used in previous study (Ciaramelli et al., 2007, see 
some examples of dilemma in appendix). Ten out of 15 personal moral scenarios were 
“high-conflict” dilemmas, whereas the remaining 5 were “low-conflict” dilemmas, as 
identified by Koenigs et al. (2007) on the basis of the reaction times and level of agreement 
among normal controls. Moral dilemmas are supposed to elicit moral emotions (i.e., 
emotions that respond to moral violations, or that motivate moral behavior, such as shame, 
guilt, pride, and compassion; Haidt, 2007; Tangney et al., 2007), whereas non-moral 
dilemmas are not (Greene et al., 2001). Typical examples of nonmoral dilemmas posed 
questions about whether to buy a new television or to have your old television repaired for 
the same price, or whether to travel by bus or train given certain time constraints. 
 
 Task Procedure 
 An IBM-compatible Pentium IV computer running E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, 2002, Pittsburgh, PA) controlled the presentation of dilemmas, timing 
operation, and behavioral data collection. Subjects sat in front of a computer screen (21-in. 
VGA monitor) in a quiet and dimly lit room. Each dilemma was presented as text through 
a series of two screens. The first screen described the scenario and was presented for 45 
sec. The second screen posed a question about the appropriateness of an action one might 
performing that scenario, that is, the “dilemmatic question” (e.g., “Is it appropriate to save 
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the five persons by pushing the stranger to death?”). Participants indicated their judgments 
by pressing one of two different keys on the computer keyboard. There was no time limit. 
Participants were told to respond as soon as they had reached a decision. The intertrial 
interval, during which a blank allowing the psychophysiological response (see below) to 
return to baseline after each trial. For all dilemmas being tested, (“appropriate”) 
affirmative responses implied the maximization of overall consequences (Greene, 2003), 
for instance, killing one instead of five persons (in a moral dilemma), or buying a new 
television instead of repairing the old one for the same price (in a nonmoral dilemma). 
However, only for moral dilemmas did “appropriate” responses result in moral violations. 
Note that “appropriate” and “inappropriate” is a value neutral description of what the 
participant said about the action in the dilemma and not an evaluation of the participant’s 
decision. Both the number of “appropriate, affirmative responses and response times (RTs; 
i.e., the time from the onset of the dilemmatic question to the moment a response was 
given)” were collected. Dilemmas were presented in random order in a single session that 
lasted approximately 70 min. 
 
 Psychophysiological Data Acquisition and Reduction 
 We used the skin conductance activity as a dependent measure of emotional arousal 
and somatic state activation. For each participant, prewired Ag/AgCl electrodes (TSD203 
Model; Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA), filled with isotonic hyposaturated conductant, were 
attached to the volar surface of the middle and index fingertip of the nondominant hand 
and held firmly in place with Velcro straps. Importantly, doing so left the dominant hand 
free for behavioral responses. The electrode pairs forming part of the input circuit were 
excited by a constant voltage of 0.5 V (Fowles et al., 1981; Lykken & Venables, 1971) and 
the current change representing conductance was recorded using a DC amplifier (Biopac 
GSR100) with a gain factor of 5 µS/V and low-pass filter set at 10 Hz. The analog signal 
was digitized using the MP-150 digital converter (Biopac Systems) at a rate of 200 Hz and 
fed into AcqKnowledge 3.9 recording software (Biopac Systems). As subjects performed 
the moral judgment task seated in front of the computer, SCR was collected continuously 
and stored for off-line analysis on a second PC. Each testing session began with a 10-min 
rest period during which the participants’ SCR acclimated to the environment, and the 
experimenter ensured a correct attachment and conductance of the electrodes. Presentation 
of each dilemma was synchronized with the sampling computer to the nearest millisecond. 
Furthermore, each time the subject pressed a response key, this action coincided with a 
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mark on the SCR polygram. During acquisition of the psychophysiological data, the 
participants were asked to remain quiet and as still as possible to avoid confounding these 
measurements. After acquisition, skin conductance values were transformed to 
microsiemens values using the AcqKnowledge software. Also, this software provides an 
extensive array of measurements that can be applied to the collected data. Raw skin 
conductance data were low-pass filtered to remove high-frequency noise. The slow 
downward drift in baseline skin conductance level was removed using a moving difference 
function with a difference interval of 0.05 sec. Before the start of recording, we ensured 
that subjects were able to generate SCRs to external stimuli, such as loud sounds (i.e., 
hands clapping). 
 
RESULTS 
 Behavioral Data  
 The proportion of affirmative responses (e.g., utilitarian choices in the context of 
personal moral dilemmas) for each type of dilemma and each participant group were 
computed (see figure 3.2). The data were subjected to a mixed-design ANOVA, with 
group (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) as a between-subject factor, and dilemma (personal, 
impersonal, nonmoral) as a within-subject factor. The ANOVA yielded a significant main 
effect of group [F(2, 30) = 4.4, p < .05], as well as of dilemma [F(2, 30) = 6.3, p < .005]. 
Critically, the two-way interaction between group and dilemma was significant [F(4, 60) = 
2.6, p = .05]. Pairwise comparisons showed that both control groups gave fewer 
affirmative responses to personal (HC = 0.32, non- FC = 0.30) as compared to impersonal 
(HC = 0.51, non- FC=0.57) and nonmoral dilemmas (HC=0.52, non-FC= 0.51; all ps < 
.05). By contrast, vmPFC patients made a similar proportion of “appropriate,” affirmative 
responses across all types of dilemma (0.59, 053, and 0.57, for personal, impersonal, and 
nommoral dilemma, respectively; all ps > .05). A more focused analysis on response 
patterns within the personal moral dilemmas revealed that vmPFC patients were more 
likely to endorse the “appropriate” (e.g., utilitarian) response than either comparison 
groups when high-conflict scenarios were presented (Kruskal–Wallis test, H = 11.9, df= 2, 
p < .01). In contrast, for low-conflict personal scenarios, the frequency of selecting the 
affirmative response was negligible and with no significant difference between vmPFC 
patients and control groups (H = 1.3, df = 2, p = .5). The RT data (figure 3.3) were also 
subjected to a mixed design ANOVA with group (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) as a between-
subject factor, and dilemma (personal, impersonal, nonmoral) and response (affirmative, 
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negative) as within subject factors. As a violation of the ANOVA, assumption of sphericity 
was detected using the Mauchly sphericity test and the Greenhouse–Geisser correction for 
repeated measures was applied. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of group 
[F(2, 30) = 5.4, p < .01], as well as a significant two-way interaction between choice and 
dilemma [F(2, 60) = 5.9, p < .01]. Moreover, the ANOVA yielded a marginally significant 
three-way interaction [F(4, 60) = 2.6, p = .07]. Pairwise comparisons showed that healthy 
controls and nonfrontal, control patients took longer to make affirmative relative to 
negative responses in personal moral dilemmas (HC: 4996 vs. 3625 msec; non-FC: 8805 
vs. 5709 msec; both ps<.01), but not in impersonalmoral dilemmas (HC: 3548 vs. 3654 
msec; non-FC: 6352 vs. 6597; both ps > .5), and in nonmoral dilemma (HC: 3837 vs. 3759 
msec; non- FC: 6140 vs. 6496 msec; both ps > .5). In stark contrast, vmPFC patients 
showed similar RTs for affirmative and negative responses in either personal (5315 vs. 
6341msec), impersonal (6937 vs. 7365 msec), and nonmoral dilemmas (7725 vs. 7854 
msec; all ps > .1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Proportion of affirmative responses to personal, impersonal, and nonmoral dilemmas in 
ventromedial prefrontal patients (vmPFC), nonfrontal patients (non-FC), and healthy controls (HC). Bars 
refer to 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 3.3 Mean response time for affirmative and negative responses to personal, impersonal, and nonmoral 
dilemmas in ventromedial prefrontal patients (vmPFC), nonfrontal patients (non-FC), and healthy controls 
(HC). Bars refer to 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 Psychophysiological data 
 For analysis, each trial was divided off-line into four separate time periods: (a) 
baseline, the 15-sec time period immediately preceding each dilemma; (b) contemplation, 
the 45-sec time window during which participants viewed the dilemma; (c) decision, the 
time period comprised between the presentation of the dilemmatic question and the 
emission of a response; (d) post-response, the 5-sec time period following participants’ 
response. To examine psychophysiological changes in more detail, the contemplation 
period was further divided into three consecutive epochs, lasting 15 sec each. SCRs were 
computed for each epoch of a trial as “area under the curve” (Naqvi & Bechara, 2006; 
Vianna & Tranel, 2006; Damasio et al., 2000). The “area under the curve” measurement is 
similar to the function of an “integral” except that, instead of using zero as a baseline for 
integration, a straight line is drawn between the endpoints of the selected area to function 
as the baseline. The area is expressed in terms of amplitude units (microsiemens, µS) per 
time interval (sec). All SCRs were square-root-transformed to attain statistical normality. 
 
 Baseline SCRs 
 Skin conductance levels during the baseline period were submitted to a mixed 
design ANOVA with group (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) as a between-subject factor, and 
dilemma (personal, impersonal, nonmoral) as a within-subject factor. Although baseline 
skin conductance level of vmPFC patients was somewhat lower than control groups, the 
analysis did not reveal a significant main effect of group, or a significant interaction 
between group and dilemma (F < 1 in both cases). Likewise, the main effect of dilemma 
was not significant (F<1). 
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 Contemplation SCRs 
 Figure 3.4 shows mean SCRs elicited during each of three consecutive epochs of 
the contemplation period of personal, impersonal, and nonmoral dilemmas, separately for 
each participant group and type of response (affirmative vs. negative response). 
Psychophysiological responses were subjected to a mixed-design ANOVA with group 
(vmPFC, non-FC, HC) as a between-subject factor, and dilemma (personal, impersonal, 
nonmoral), epoch (I, II, III), and response (affirmative, negative) as within-subject factors. 
The analysis revealed a significant main effect of dilemma [F(2, 60) = 5.3, p < .01], 
indicating higher SCRs during contemplation of personal relative to impersonal and 
nonmoral scenarios, as well as a highly significant effect of response [F(1, 30) = 22.4, p < 
.0001], due to increased levels of skin conductance for affirmative versus negative 
responses. Also, there was a significant interaction between dilemma and response [F(2, 
60) = 9.9, p < .001], and between group and response [F(1, 30) = 5.7, p < .01]. More 
important for the present purposes, however, the analysis showed a marginally significant 
three-way interaction between group, dilemma, and response [F(4, 60) = 2.4, p = .058], 
whereas the four-way interaction was not significant [F(8, 120) = 0.9, p = .5]. To uncover 
the source of the marginally significant three-way interaction, separate ANOVAs were 
conducted on contemplation SCRs (collapsing across epochs) for the different types of 
dilemma. For the personal dilemmas, both the main effect of response [F(1, 30) = 19.4, p < 
.001] and the two-way interaction between group and response [F(2, 30) = 4.9, p < .01] 
were significant. Pairwise comparisons using the Fisher LSD test, which is considered the 
most powerful technique for post hoc tests involving three groups (Cardinal & Aitken, 
2006), revealed that both non-FC patients and healthy controls generated larger SCRs 
during contemplation of personal moral dilemmas that were associated with affirmative 
responses (e.g., utilitarian judgments) (all ps < .01); in contrast, vmPFC patients showed 
no differential skin conductance activity preceding affirmative and negative responses in 
personal moral dilemmas (p = .91). For both impersonal and nonmoral dilemmas, 
ANOVAs showed that the factor group did not result in a main effect; neither did it alter 
any of the interactions, suggesting that contemplation of impersonal and nonmoral 
scenarios resulted in similar skin conductance activity across all groups of participants. To 
ensure that our findings were not driven by group differences in tonic level of 
electrodermal activity, we repeated the main ANOVA with baseline skin conductance 
activity as a covariate. The previously (marginally) significant Group by Dilemma by 
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Response interaction remained significant [F(4, 58) = 2.9, p = .026], as did the Group by 
Response interaction [F(2, 29) = 5.5, p < .01]. The response deficit in the vmPFC patients 
is, therefore, not a function of lower baseline electrodermal activity. 
 
 
 Decision SCRs 
 Mean SCRs elicited during the 5-sec period following the dilemmatic question 
were subjected to a mixed-design ANOVA (figure 3.5), with group (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) 
as a between subject factor, and dilemma (personal, impersonal, nonmoral) and choice 
(utilitarian, nonutilitarian) as within-subject factors. Both the main factor of choice [F(1, 
30) = 19.4, p < .001] and the interaction between choice and dilemma [F(2, 60) = 4.5, p < 
.01] were significant. In contrast, the three-way interaction was not significant [F(2, 60) = 
1.4, p=.2]. Nevertheless, for completeness, we also conducted planned comparisons. 
Particularly, we found that normal controls and non-FC patients generated larger SCRs 
prior to utilitarian as compared to nonutilitarian judgments in personal moral dilemma (p < 
.05), whereas vmPFC patients showed similar skin conductance activity regardless of 
choice type (p = .31). Again, no group difference emerged when both impersonal and 
nonmoral dilemmas were considered. Finally, adding baseline skin conductance activity as 
a covariate in the ANOVA did not alter the pattern of results.  
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Figure 3.4 Mean SCRs elicited during each of three consecutive epochs of the contemplation period of 
personal, impersonal, and nonmoral dilemmas, separately for each participant group and type of response 
(affirmative vs. negative). SCR was measured as “area under the curve” in µS/sec. vmPFC = ventromedial 
prefrontal patients; non-FC = nonfrontal patients; HC = healthy controls. Bars refer to 1 standard error of the 
mean. 
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Figure 3.5 Mean SCRs elicited during Decision and Post-response period of personal, impersonal, and 
nonmoral dilemmas, separately for each participant group and type of response (affirmative vs. negative). 
SCR was measured as “area under the curve” in µS/sec. vmPFC = ventromedial prefrontal patients; non-FC = 
nonfrontal patients; HC = healthy controls. Bars refer to 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
 
 
 Post-response SCRs 
 Mean SCRs elicited during the 5-sec period following participants’ response were 
subjected to a mixed-design ANOVA (figure 3.5), with group (vmPFC, non-FC, HC) as a 
between-subject factor, and dilemma (personal, impersonal, nonmoral) and choice 
(utilitarian, nonutilitarian) as within-subject factors. The main effect of choice was 
significant [F(1, 30) = 7.1, p < .05], indicating overall larger SCRs following utilitarian 
versus nonutilitarian choices. However, the factor group was not significant (F < 1), nor 
did it enter in any significant interactions (all Fs < 1). To sum up, the results from the 
ANOVAs revealed that, for healthy subjects and nonfrontal patients, SCRs were stronger 
during evaluation of personal moral dilemmas that subsequently attracted an affirmative 
(e.g., utilitarian) response than during evaluation of personal moral dilemmas that 
subsequently attracted a negative (e.g., nonutilitarian) response. These individuals, on 
average, selected nonutilitarian over utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas. In 
contrast, for vmPFC patients, who were more inclined toward utilitarian judgment, SCRs 
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did not change for personal moral dilemmas, subsequently attracting utilitarian versus 
nonutilitarian choices. This finding relates increases in SCR during the anticipation of a 
utilitarian choice (and therefore, a personal moral violation) with low tendency toward 
utilitarian judgment. One possibility is that anticipatory SCRs, by marking a particular 
option– outcome pair with a negative tag, bias individuals to avoid similar scenarios in the 
future (Bechara et al., 1996; Damasio et al., 1996). To investigate whether anticipatory 
skin conductance activity was predictive of the type of choice on personal moral dilemmas, 
a further analysis was performed. We computed an autonomic utilitarian index [(SCRs 
prior to utilitarian choices − SCRs prior to nonutilitarian choices)/ (SCRs prior to 
utilitarian choice+SCRs prior to nonutilitarian choices)] for each healthy control 
participant, and then entered into a regression analysis with the percent of utilitarian 
choices made by each subject in response to personal moral dilemmas. Results showed that 
the autonomic utilitarian index correlated negatively with the proportion of utilitarian 
judgments (r = −.64, p < .005) (figure 3.6). Indeed, the autonomic utilitarian index 
decreased linearly as the percent of utilitarian choices increased, indicating that low 
utilitarian participants exhibited higher skin conductance activity prior to utilitarian 
judgments of personal moral dilemmas, whereas high-utilitarian participants showed the 
opposite pattern. By contrast, this was not the case for impersonal moral dilemmas (r = .10, 
p = .7), thereby revealing that utilitarian judgments were not related to skin conductance 
activity for this type of moral dilemmas. 
 
  
Figure 3.6 Graph reporting the regression analysis results. Filled circles indicate vmPFC patients. 
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DISCUSSION 
 Recent findings from human lesion (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007) 
and brain imaging studies (Greene et al., 2001; 2004) converge to suggest that medial 
prefrontal cortex constitutes a critical neural underpinning of judgments about personal 
moral dilemmas, where one option involves directly inflicting serious harm to other 
persons. In particular, it has been found that vmPFC-lesioned patients, relative to healthy 
individuals and neurological patients with brain damage in other cerebral regions, are more 
likely to endorse personal moral violations in order to maximize good consequences (i.e., 
the utilitarian response). According to one account, this abnormally increased utilitarian 
pattern of moral judgment would result from impaired affective and intuitive processes, 
mediated by vmPFC, which normally oppose deviations from moral values and rules 
shared by a social group (Greene, 2007). Although these results strongly suggest a causally 
necessary role of emotions in morally relevant decision-making, a mechanistic account of 
how, and at which point, emotional states subserved by vmPFC influence moral judgment 
is still lacking (see Huebner et al., 2008 for a discussion). The present study was designed 
to examine the pattern of skin conductance changes, used as an autonomic index of 
individuals’ affective responses, associated with personal versus impersonal moral 
judgments, both in vmPFC patients and control participants. This study would provide the 
first neurophysiological evidence of emotional activation before making a moral decision.   
 
Eight vmPFC patients had lesion involving the rostral aspect of the anterior cingulated 
cortex (ACC). The ACC, specifically BA 32 and 24, is considered together with OFC the 
cortical components of the limbic system (David et al., 2005). ACC and medial OFC 
lesions lead to a reduction in emotional responsiveness and a reduction in the value that is 
attributed to social stimuli during decision making, respectively (Rushworth et al., 2007). 
In macaques, OFC lesions lead, most notably, to increased aggression and diminished fear 
(Izquierdo et al., 2005; Machado & Bachevalier, 2006). ACC activity has been prominent 
in neuroimaging experiments that have examined interactions between individuals (Rilling 
et al., 2002; Tomlin et al., 2006; Amodio & Frith., 2006). Social exchange experiments are 
necessarily complex and activity changes in the brain are widespread. Nevertheless, the 
ACC gyrus is critical for the normal valuation of social information. Usually, male 
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macaques value the opportunity to observe other macaques, and they are most interested in 
dominant males and in females (Deaner et al., 2005), but macaques that have lesions of the 
ACC gyrus do not exhibit the same social-valuation patterns (Rudebeck et al., 2006). 
Unlike with OFC lesions, changes in emotional responsiveness, such as increased 
aggression or diminished fear, and impairments in visual-discrimination learning are not 
seen consistently after ACC gyrus lesions.  
Traditionally the basal ganglia have been associated with motor processes, although 
evidence for their role in parallel cognitive functions is mounting (for a review, see 
Middleton & Strick, 2000).  Two non-FC patients have lesion at basal ganglia specifically 
on putamen, which appears to subserve cognitive functions limited to stimulus-response or 
habit, whereas caudate seems play a critical role in supporting the planning and execution 
of strategies and behavior required for achieving complex goals (Grahn et al., 2008). The 
main role of putamen seems related to the implementation of action (sensorimotor 
coordination), and, in the case of our patients, could be related to their specific deficit in 
movement coordination.  
 
 In complete agreement with previous data (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 
2007), our present findings reveal that patients with vmPFC damage made significantly 
more utilitarian choices in response to high-conflict personal moral scenarios, compared to 
patients with brain damage that spared vmPFC and to healthy controls. Moreover, patients 
with vmPFC lesions were also faster than control groups to approve personal moral 
violations. On the other hand, their behavior in low-conflict personal, impersonal, and non 
moral dilemmas was comparable to that of controls, both in terms of the quality of the 
choices they made and in the time they needed to make their decisions, further 
demonstrating the rather selective role played by vmPFC mediated emotions on personal 
moral judgments (Young & Koenigs, 2007; Hauser, 2006).  
The psychophysiological data mirrored the behavioral results: whereas autonomic bodily 
signals during consideration of impersonal and non moral dilemmas did not differ across 
participant groups, skin conductance recordings during contemplation of personal moral 
scenarios differed considerably between patients with vmPFC damage and control groups. 
Both healthy subjects and brain-damaged control patients exhibited increased skin 
conductance activity several seconds before choosing the utilitarian option in personal 
moral dilemmas, for instance, deciding that it would be appropriate to kill one person in 
order to save others. In striking contrast, vmPFC patients did not generate SCRs in 
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anticipation of utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas. These findings indicate 
profound differences in the making of moral judgment between vmPFC patients and 
controls. In control groups, emotional/somatic signals were critically recruited during 
moral judgment, and characterized the anticipation of personal moral violations. In 
contrast, no apparent emotional/ somatic response accompanied personal moral violations 
in vmPFC patients. Importantly, somatic responses shaped personal moral judgment. A 
preliminary analysis showed a negative correlation between anticipatory skin conductance 
activity and frequency of utilitarian responses in normal controls, such that individuals 
with higher SCRs before utilitarian choices were more reluctant to judge moral infractions 
as acceptable behaviors than those with lower SCRs. One possibility, therefore, is that 
emotional responses mark utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas with a negative 
tag, discouraging the selection of those options in future decisions. Studies of patients with 
discrete brain lesions and, more recently, functional imaging techniques have strongly 
implicated vmPFC in both generation and feedback representation of states of bodily 
arousal, indexed by SCRs, which may influence cognition and bias motivational behavior 
(Nagai et al., 2004; Critchley et al., 2001; Damasio et al., 1990). In several studies, vmPFC 
patients often exhibit impaired autonomic arousal and subjective feeling in response to 
emotionally charged events (Roberts et al., 2004; Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Tranel & 
Damasio, 1994; Damasio et al., 1990). Importantly, in a now seminal series of studies, 
Bechara et al. (1996, 1999), Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997) and Damasio 
et al. (1990) have shown that vmPFC lesioned patients perform poorly on a gambling task, 
and unlike normal controls, fail to show anticipatory SCRs immediately before selecting a 
high-risk option (i.e., one offering immediate gain but a high probability of long-term 
monetary loss). These findings have led to a proposal that central representations of bodily 
states of arousal guide social behavior and bias decision-making, formulated as the 
“somatic marker hypothesis” (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Bechara et al., 1996; Damasio, 
1990; 1994; 1996). According to this hypothesis, the SCR would operate as an alarm 
signal that, by marking a specific option–outcome combination with a negative tag, 
promotes the avoidance of similar options in the future. This interpretation of the SCR is 
also broadly consistent with the observation of anticipatory SCRs in aversive conditioning 
paradigms (Tabbert et al., 2005; Büchel et al., 1998), and with the proposal that the SCR 
might represent a “somatic marker of erring” (Hajcak et al., 2003; 2004). The lack of 
somatic marker in response to emotional events, as well as vmPFC patients’ inability in 
modifying their behavior in response to negative feedback (Fellows & Farah, 2005) can 
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account for the present findings. It has been suggested that the somatic-emotional reaction 
before making a moral decision may constitute a warning signal alerting subjects they are 
making a potentially disadvantageous choice (Damasio, 1994). The vmPFC patients lack 
this negative somatic reaction before accepting moral violations in personal dilemma, 
whereas their somatic activation is completely normal for dilemmas not involving strong 
negative emotion such as those elicited by impersonal moral dilemma. 
 
Our current finding of increased somatic arousal in control participants immediately before 
endorsing morally reprehensible actions (in the context of personal dilemmas) is highly 
consistent with the anticipatory SCR obtained with Bechara gambling task. In keeping with 
the somatic marker hypothesis, anticipatory somatic states of arousal, supported in part by 
circuits in vmPFC, may help forecast the negative emotional consequences (e.g., shame, 
guilt or remorse) of approving personal moral transgressions (e.g., utilitarian judgments), 
thereby motivating individuals to avoid actions that generate such negative somatic states 
in subsequent choices. Thus, the SCR signal could not only serve as an affective signal that 
alerts us to the moral relevance of a rule transgression (particularly if that transgression 
may cause serious harm to others), but also as a teaching signal aimed at decreasing the 
likelihood of morally impermissible behaviors. Accordingly, the absence of anticipatory 
SCRs in vmPFC patients may indicate that they fail to represent the affective expectations 
of highly aversive personal moral transgressions, thereby lacking a powerful biasing signal 
(e.g., a moral reinforcer) that is critical for driving changes of behavior and compliance 
with moral values (Tangney et al., 2007; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frijda, 2005). This 
conclusion appears in accordance with current theories maintaining that vmPFC is a 
critical neural substrate for representing potential positive and negative action outcomes in 
order to promote approach/ avoidance learning and behavior flexibility (Murray et al., 
2007; Montague et al., 2006; Oya et al., 2005). The interpretation that we offer is 
compatible with recent evidence from fMRI, showing that imagined socio-moral 
transgressions associated with sentiments of guilt elicited activation within medial sectors 
of prefrontal cortex (Zahn et al., 2009; Kédia et al., 2008). Moreover, data from economic 
games indicate that patients with vmPFC damage are abnormally insensitive to guilt in 
social and economic interactions (Krajbich et al., 2009).  
 
 One might even argue that whether moral judgment results impaired in patients 
with ventromedial prefrontal lesions would critically depend on the degree to which the 
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task taps emotional/self-focused processing. Accordingly, patients with ventromedial 
prefrontal lesions report reduced self-conscious emotions after engaging in socially 
inappropriate behaviors compared to patients with dorsolateral lesions (Eslinger & 
Damasio, 1985; Beer et al., 2006). This lack of self-conscious emotions could be the result 
of the lack of somatic activation, especially somatic negative activation. In the study by 
Beer and colleagues (2006) patients who had previously failed to feel that their behavior 
was socially inappropriate were able to recognize it as such on a later video recording. This 
finding suggests on one hand the preserved capacity to understand the social context and 
the reactions of others, but on the other it shows that vmPFC patients are not able to 
anticipate and feel the negative emotions implied in their own inappropriate behavior.  The 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex would be crucial for self-focused, rather then externally-
focused (or even knowledge-driven), social cognition mechanisms (Beer et al., 2006; see 
also Lieberman, 2006). The dissociation found in vmPFC patients between impaired 
personal moral judgment and preserved impersonal moral judgment, both at the behavioral 
and psychophysiological level,  provides further support to this interpretation. 
 
Social abilities, such as empathy, heavily rely on processing in medial prefrontal regions 
(e.g. Brothers & Ring, 1992; Eslinger, 1998), and may be impaired in patients with 
ventromedial prefrontal damage (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005), possibly resulting in 
reduced responsiveness and empathy to victims (see Blair & Cipolotti, 2000). From a 
neuroscientific perspective, however, it is important to demarcate empathy from cognitive 
perspective taking, on the basis of different neural networks for empathy and cognitive 
perspective taking outlined by de Vignemont & Singer (2005). We refer to cognitive 
perspective taking as the ability to understand intentions, desires, beliefs of another person, 
resulting from (cognitively) reasoning about the other's state. By contrast, we refer to 
empathy as an affective state, caused by sharing of the emotions or sensory states of 
another person (Hein & Singer, 2008). Clearly, the incapacity of vmPFC patients to 
anticipate and consider their own emotions or sensory states (especially the negative one) 
affects their empathy: how can they share their emotions with others when they seem 
unable to process their own emotions? However, it would be wrong to say that vmPFC 
patients are more inclined to judge personal moral violations as acceptable than normal 
controls, because of lack of empathy. As our findings suggest, vmPFC  does not govern 
moral behavior or empathy per se, but its role is specifically related to the anticipation of 
(social) emotions in most of circumstance of life, especially in the social and moral 
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domains, in which the emotional value of event is critical to choose among alternative 
options (see Krajbich et al., 2009 for a similar conclusion).  
 
 Finally, our view is also in agreement with the finding that early damage to vmPFC 
can lead to severe deficits in moral sentiments, including guilt, remorse, and empathy, as 
well as profound impairments of moral reasoning (Anderson et al., 1999), thereby 
suggesting that emotional processing mediated by this area is developmentally necessary 
for the learning and acquisition of moral concepts. 
 A different, but not necessarily mutually exclusive, account of the present findings 
would instead invoke the concepts of attention regulation rather than emotion and affective 
valuation of consequences (Botvinick, 2007; Dawson et al., 2007). Indeed, SCR variability 
has been often used as an index of attention-related arousal (Boucsein, 1992). Notably, a 
recent study has shown elevation in skin conductance immediately before actions 
associated with a high demand of controlled cognitive processing (Botvinick & Rosen, 
2009). On this view, the increase in arousal preceding the endorsement of personal moral 
violations could be related to the recruitment of cognitive control needed to solve the 
conflict between incompatible outcomes (e.g., utilitarian and nonutilitarian outcomes) in 
response to difficult (e.g., personal) moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004). One way of 
reconciling these two seemingly disparate accounts is to consider that the anticipatory 
SCRs obtained in our experiments may reflect both affective valuation of the degree of 
cognitive effort and conflict associated with utilitarian judgments, and the socially negative 
consequences of endorsing moral violations in personal moral dilemmas (Botvinick & 
Rosen, 2009; Botvinick, 2007). Such a conclusion would be consistent with model 
proposing that vmPFC represents the composite values of different predictions for 
subsequent decisions and judgments (Montague & Berns, 2002). To conclude, the present 
results suggest that emotion processing mediated by vmPFC plays a necessary role in 
guiding moral decisions about whether or not sacrificing an individual in order to save a 
greater number of persons (e.g., high-conflict personal moral dilemmas). In particular, we 
found that activation of somatic states (monitored through SCRs) prior of utilitarian moral 
judgments is impaired following vmPFC lesion. That is, contemplating morally 
impermissible actions was not emotionally taxing in patients with vmPFC damage. We 
argue that this deficit may prevent vmPFC patients to anticipate the negative emotional 
consequences of moral violations, and, as a consequence, to conform their behavior to 
moral norms and values shared by their social group. 
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 The novelty of the present study concerns the pattern of autonomic activation 
observed in control subjects and the lack of this pattern in vmPFC patients before 
responding to personal moral dilemmas. Our findings provide critical evidence relating 
emotional activation, personal moral judgments and the vmPFC. These findings support a 
necessary role for emotion in the generation of those judgements.  
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STUDY IV 
 
 
EXPERIENCE OF AGENCY AND SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.1 Voluntary action  
 There is a long tradition in psychology of studies about voluntary action and a more 
recent interest in moral decision, but these two themes are mostly independent. The aim of 
the present study is to show how these two apparently different topics are in reality rather 
overlapped, both from phenomenological point of view and in a neuroanatomical sense.  
 Most of the scientific studies about volition investigate only simple voluntary 
actions, such as pressing a button (Libet et al., 1983; Haggard et al., 1999; Brass et al., 
2007; Sirigu et al., 2005; Moore et al.,  2008; Moore et al., 2009). Although there is no 
moral implication in this kind of action, the first problem for neuroscientists is to 
understand the experience of causal relation between thought and action and the causal 
relation between action and effect. 
 One extreme and general solution to this problem proposes that there is no real 
causal relation between our thought, action and effect even though we perceive that there 
is. This solution defines free will as a delay experience that people have when they 
interpret their own thought as the cause of their action (Wegner 1999, 2002). In this sense 
free will is a simple post hoc illusion because the causal relation is a simple inference of 
constant conjunction (Hume, 1784) or something that the mind creates because we really 
do not know what is causing our actions. Several observations support this definition of 
illusion of conscious will, showing how conscious will is weak and malleable (Wegner 
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1999; 2004). An example of the manipulation of conscious will is hypnosis. The most 
profound effect of hypnosis is the feeling that your acts are happening to you, rather than 
that you are doing them (Lynn et al., 1990). Other examples come from 
neuropsychological disorder, for instance anarchic hand syndrome. People with this 
syndrome experience a conflict between their declared will and the action of one of their 
hands (Della Sala, 2005), claiming that the hand had a mind of its own and often did 
whatever ‘pleased it’ (Della Sala, 1994). Normal people often report losing consciousness 
of acting, particularly when the action is repetitive or well-learned (Scooler et al., 2002). 
The hypothesis that the experience of conscious will as mental causation are not genuine 
events but a post hoc reconstruction are not easily compatible with the social principle that 
all of us can control their action and so we are responsible of our behaviour.  
 
 Why do we have this constant, strong, illusion of conscious and free will? Why do 
we have this sensation of control of action, and agency? If there is no free will and no 
causal relation between our thoughts and our actions, how can we explain other 
experiences depending on the causal relation such as, for example, responsibility, guilt and 
blame? 
 Even if we are not aware of what really cause our behaviour, we perhaps need a 
concept like ‘causal agency’ and ‘conscious will’, because these are important way by 
which people understand human actions (Wegner et al., 2004). The illusion of conscious 
will could be a sort of strategic tool to give meaning to all unconscious causes that move 
the human actions. In this prospective conscious will is a sort of reaction to avoid the 
horror vacui, and it has many of the qualities of an emotion, one that reverberates through 
the mind and body to indicate when we sense having authored and intended an action. 
Conscious will could be a retrospective feeling of authorship telling us which events 
around us seem to be attributed to our authorship. This emotion allows us to develop a 
constant sense of who we are and are not. And, most important, this authorship emotion 
allows us to maintain the sense of responsibility for our actions that serve as a basis for 
morality.  
 This definition of volition as morally significant authorship suggests a new and 
useful perspective for neuroscientific investigation, and a possible dialog between illusory 
mental causation and causal responsibility.  A more radical view (Dennett, 1992) suggests 
that conscious intention is not a bona fide mental state at all, but rather an inference that is 
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retrospectively inserted into the stream of consciousness as the hypothetical cause of the 
physical movement of our bodies.   
 
 Modern neuroscience rejects the traditional dualist view of volition as a casual 
chain from a conscious mind or ‘soul’ to the brain and body. Rather, volition involves 
brain networks making a series of complex, open decisions between alternative actions. 
Volition is thus defined as a set cognitive decisional processes, implemented by specific 
brain circuits, and giving rise to body movements. ‘These processes jointly specify several 
kinds of information that determine our actions, so voluntary action is therefore a form of 
decision making’ (Haggard, 2008 pag 937). Brass and Haggard suggested a model with 
three main components of voluntary decision: what, when and whether (WWW) (Brass & 
Haggard 2008). Haggard (2008) distinguished two levels in decisions that concerned  
whether to act: an early, motivational decision whether to make any action at all, and a 
final predictive check before execution.  Second – the ‘what decision’ specifies which 
goals or task to pursue and the selection of movements to achieve them. The ‘when 
component’ often depends on the combination of environmental circumstances and 
internal motivations.  
On the basis of neurological analyses of patients with forebrain lesions, Antonio Damasio 
(2000, 1993) has advanced the ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis of consciousness.  Humans are 
aware of their bodies, our ‘selves’, and this inner-directed attention forms the root of 
consciousness. Damasio argues that consciousness is based upon an awareness of the 
‘somatic’ milieu, and that awareness of inner states evolved because this enables us to use 
somatic states (ie. emotions) to ‘mark’, and thereby ‘evaluate’, external perceptual 
information. He proposes that the subjective process of feeling emotions requires the 
participation of brain regions that are involved in the mapping and/or regulation of our 
continuously changing internal states. The feelings are grounded in the body itself, based 
on multi-tiered and evolutionarily developed neural mechanisms that control the body’s 
state. These feelings help to guide behavioural decisions producing a ‘perceptual 
landscape’ that represents the emotional significance of a particular stimulus that is being 
experienced. These feelings distinguish between inner-world representations and outer-
world representations, and allow the brain to build a meta-representational model of the 
relationship between outer and inner entities. So, the representational image of the body’s 
state provides a neural basis for distinguishing self from non-self, and re-representations of 
this image enable the behavioural neural agent to project the effects of possible actions 
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onto the state of the body, as well as the resultant changes in such feeling states due to 
interactions with other (external) agents. A summary definition based on this description 
suggests that awareness of any object requires, first, a mental representation of oneself as a 
feeling (sentient) entity; second, a mental representation of that object; and third, a mental 
representation of the salient interrelationship between oneself and that object in the 
immediate moment (Craig, 2002).  
 
 
 4.2  Measuring volition 
 Voluntary action is fundamental to human existence. It involves voluntary control 
of bodily movement to achieve a desired goal. The main model describing voluntary action 
in cognitive psychology is the ‘perception model’. In this model, first brain motor system 
produces a movement as a product of its different inputs and second the conscious 
experience of volition is informed of this movement, and it is perceived as being freely 
chosen (Hallett, 2007).  
 The ‘perception model’ considers the conscious will something that we perceive, 
but the perception of conscious will clearly differs from external senses like vision in 
important aspects. Traditional psychological studies generally deliver a known input or 
stimulus to a system and measure the system’s reaction. This approach is clearly not 
suitable to measure the experience of intention or conscious will because the input, in the 
case of will, comes from the person themselves and not from any external stimulus. What 
distinguishes a simple reaction, e.g. a reflex, from a voluntary action is the level of 
dependency on external stimuli. The reflex is an immediate motor response, the form of 
which is determined by the form of stimulation. In contrast, the occurrence, the timing, and 
the form of voluntary action are not directly dependent on any stimulation. Voluntary 
actions involve the cerebral cortex, whereas some reflexes are purely spinal. Moreover 
volition matures late in individual development, whereas reflexes can be present at or 
before birth. 
A useful strategy to detect the voluntary aspect of action is to give partial instruction to the 
subjects. Subjects can choose when they want to perform an action (Libet et al., 1983) 
whether or not perform an action (Brass et al., 2007) and which actions perform (Haggard 
et al., 1999). One problem concerning these studies on conscious will is that generally 
there is no reason or value to motivate the participants to choose one action over other. 
This problem is starting to be solved by introducing a reward component in relation to 
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selected action (Kuhn et al., 2008) but it is far away from being solved completely. In 
general the relation between decision making processing and voluntary action is mostly 
unexplored. Another empty field for the study of volition is the social action. Experiences 
like responsibility, guilt, are fundamental concepts that are necessary to understand and 
organize other people behaviour. However neuroscientists know little about the main 
characteristics of experience of voluntary and non voluntary social/moral actions.  
 
 4.3  The experience of voluntary action 
 Voluntary actions are characterized by two specific subjective components: the 
experience of intention and the experience of agency. The experience of intention is: 
‘planning to do or being about to do something’. ‘Planning to do something’ is defined by 
Searle (1983) ‘prior intention’ and concerns translate desires, goals into behaviour (e.g. to 
telephone a friend this evening) whereas ‘being about something’ is called ‘intention in 
action’, which would occur during the process of reaching for the phone (Haggard, 2005). 
Most of neuroscientific literature on voluntary actions, investigates conscious states 
associated with simple manual actions, corresponding to the Searl’s intentions in action 
concept.  
 The normal experience of intentional action includes an implicit content that the 
action occurred because, and via the intention that the agent had to perform it. However in 
cases of anarchic hand syndrome and utilisation behavior (Boccardi et al., 2002) this 
experience of intention is absent or garbled. These patients, who typically show bilateral 
frontal mesial damage to the supplementary motor area (SMA), or unilateral SMA and 
callosal damage (Della Sala et al., 1991) magnetically respond to environmental objects 
without a specific intention to do so. For example, the mere presence of a pen on a table 
will lead them to pick it up and start writing, even if they have no particular intention to 
write. The patient does not deny authorship of the action, but they clearly have no 
conscious experience that their intentions are the source of the action: ‘‘my hands move by 
themselves’’. Another example of garbled experience of intention occurs in Tourette’s 
syndrome (TS). TS is a neuropsychiatry disorder characterized by motor and vocal tics 
(Albin, 2006). TS patients often cannot say whether their tics are voluntary or involuntary 
(Hallett, 2007). TS patients report having a clear experience that tic is coming before the 
real occurrence of the tic. When they perceive this sensation they cannot suppress tic. 
However they can suppress the tics before the occurrence of this sensation but this requires 
strong afford and a successive sensation of tension. TS reveals an interesting possibility of 
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different levels of intention, since these patients seem to have normal intention for 
voluntary action but reduced sense of intention for their tics. This reduced experience of 
intention for tics could be related to the impossibility to control and suppress the action. 
There is no research about subjective experience of action, both voluntary and involuntary, 
in TS and in general little is know about the intensity of intention and its components.  
 A key experiment for subjective components of intention in voluntary action is the 
famous ‘Libet experiment’ (Libet et al., 1983). In this experiment participants watch a spot 
or clock hand rotating on a screen. At the time of their own choosing they spontaneously 
make a movement of the right hand. The clock stops after a random interval, and the 
participant reports the position of the clock hand at the moment when they first feel the 
urge to move their hand. At the same time electrodes placed on the scalp record the activity 
of prefrontal motor areas in preparing the movement. On average, participants reported the 
conscious intention to act (W: will judgment) around 200 ms before the onset of muscle 
activity. By contrast, preparatory brain activity could begin 1s or more before movement. 
Libet (1983) concluded “that cerebral initiation of a spontaneous, freely voluntary act can 
begin unconsciously, that is, before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness 
that a decision to act has already been initiated cerebrally”. This suggests that the initiation 
of action involves an unconscious neural process, which eventually produces the conscious 
experience of action. Conscious intentions therefore occur as a result of brain activity, and 
do not cause brain activity. Haggard and Eimer (1999) found that the experience of 
conscious intention is tied to the specific body movement that is prepared, rather than to a 
general preparation to move. In this study they showed how judgments of conscious 
intention correlates with the onset of the lateralized readiness potential (later phase of 
preparation, in which brain activity contralateral to the selected hand exceeds ipsilateral 
activity).  
 
The second subjective component of voluntary action is the experience of agency. 
Agency is the subsequent feeling that one’s action has indeed caused a particular external 
event (Haggard, 2005) and necessarily involves the experience of external sensory 
consequences. Two levels of agency have been identified (Jannerod 2009; Synofzik 2008). 
One level is automatic/unconscious, where the agency judgments are outputs from internal 
prediction of motor system of what the consequences of an action are like to be (Frith et 
al., 2000). A second level is non automatic/conscious, where the agency seems to be a 
reconstructive process due to the constant conjunction of cause and effect (Jennerod 2009). 
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This distinction between automatic and non automatic agency resemble in part the useful 
distinction between judgment of agency (JoA) and the feeling of agency (FoA) by 
Synofzik (2008). JoA refers to explicit conceptual attribution of whether one did or did not 
make an action or cause an effect. FoA refers to the subjective experience of fluently 
controlling the action one is currently making, and is non-conceptual, unconscious and 
more related with the sensorimotor prediction (forward model Blakemore et al., 2002). 
Many studies have used explicit judgements of agency in cases where the facts of agency 
are uncertain (Wegner et al., 1999; Tsakiris et al., 2006). Several of these experimental 
studies have investigated agency by asking participants to judge whether they caused a 
particular sensory event (Farrer et al., 2003; Wegner et al., 2003). In these studies delay 
between action and effect reduce sense of agency. Moreover greater spatial distortion 
between the real action and the action’s feedback reduce sense of agency. This data shows 
how agency is strongly dependent on the space-temporal correlation between action and its 
effects. However, these situations resemble judgements of agency rather than the feeling, 
or sense of agency (Synofzik, 2008).  
 Haggard and colleagues (2002) developed an interesting method to investigate one 
feature of sense of agency. When people make a voluntary action, which causes an 
external effect, such as a tone after a short delay, they perceive the action and the effect as 
closer together in time than would be expected from judgements of actions alone, or of the 
effects alone (figure 4.1). This perceptual attraction across time between actions and 
effects is not found if actions are replaced by involuntary movements (Haggard et al., 
2002). For this reason this perceptual attraction is called ‘intentional binding effect’. The 
intentional binding effect tell us that voluntary movement depends on a cascade of 
cognitive-motor process which links actions and effects across time, producing a temporal 
attraction between them (Haggard et al., 2002). This attraction seems an implicit and 
reproducible quantitative measure related to the feeling of agency.  
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Figure 4.1.The intentional binding effect (adapted from Haggard et al. 2005). A) Participants’ voluntary key-
press actions are followed after 250 ms by an effect (a tone) B) Baseline estimates are obtained for actions 
occurring without a following tone, and tones occurring in the absence of actions. This controls for individual 
differences in the perception of these events, and provides a baseline against which to compare the time 
experience of the same events in an agency or passive context. C) In an agency context, intentional actions 
are perceived later and the effects are perceived earlier, than their respective baselines (hollow arrows). 
 
 
 Recent studies showed which factors can modulate the sense of agency. These 
studies are interesting because they show how the sense of agency depends on a causal 
model that subjects create inferring a statistical relation between action and effect. Moore 
and Haggard (2008), by varying the probability by which a simple manual action produced 
an auditory effect, they showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the 
effect could influence agency. In the block where the predictability of the effect was low 
the binding effect occurred only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In 
contrast, when the predictability was high the temporal binding occurred even on trials 
where the action produced no effect. This data suggests that the binding of action towards 
their effects seems to have two components: a predictive component, which depends on the 
action reliably predicting the effect, and a postdictive or reconstructive component, 
whereby the occurrence of the effect triggers a revision of the temporal experience of the 
action (Moore et al., 2008). In the same way the contingency factor modulates the sense of 
agency. Contingency is an index of the casual relation between events, and predicts 
patterns of operant learning animals. Binding increases with the experienced strength of 
association (statistical contingency) between action and effect (Moore et al., 2009). In both 
Moore’s studies is shown how events entirely independent of the motor system have a 
strong influence on the experience of action. They suggest that contingency learning makes 
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a contribution on causal knowledge and also to consciousness of agency. This data show 
how different information that clearly originates outside the sensorimotor system itself is 
nevertheless important for the sense of agency. This does not mean that the sensorimotor 
information is not necessary for the sense of agency but means that agency also depends on 
a complex and integrate pattern of information: sensorimotor, contextual, statistical and 
emotional.  
 
 Reconstruction implies that the effect of action is important in sense of agency, but 
no studies have systematically manipulated key features of responsibility, such as the 
severity of the effect, its moral status, and whether the action directly contributed to 
causing the effect. In the experimental part of this document, there is the first attempt to 
understand how social and moral meaning of action could influence the sense of agency. 
Additional future research could focus on emotive influence and cognitive load on 
experience of agency. 
 
 4.4 Brain circuits of volition 
 In a recent review, Haggard (2008) reports which cortical motor circuits may 
mainly contribute to voluntary actions. He shows two sub-circuits, differently both in an 
anatomical and a functional sense. The first sub-circuit regards basal ganglia and frontal 
cortex sending signals to pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), which sends output to 
primary motor cortex (M1). M1 executes motor commands by transmitting them to the 
spinal cord and muscles. In this circuit pre-SMA seems to have a special role in the 
experience of conscious intention. Patients during neurosurgeons directly stimulate with 
low intensity current on pre-SMA have distinct conscious experience of an ‘urge to move’ 
(Fried et al., 1991). FMRI studies comparing freely chosen movement with non-freely 
movement show a strong activation in the anterior part of the pre-SMA (Passingham, 
1987). Despite several lineax of evidences supporting the key role of pre-SMA for the 
internal generation of voluntary action, what is unclear is the independence of this 
activation from basal ganglia. Several neuropsychologcal and neuroanatomical data 
(Cunnington et al., 1996) show a subcortical loop starting from the basal ganglia 
integrating a wide range of cortical signals. Our understanding of cortico-basal ganglia 
networks is still primitive. In a study by Moore and colleagues (2009) the influence of 
Parkinson’s disease and dopaminergic medication on the temporal experience of voluntary 
actions is investigated. The data show no difference between healthy volunteer participants 
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and PD patients off medication. This result suggests that the disease state itself is not 
associated with changes in sense of agency, at least in the earlier stages. However, a 
significant difference is founded between PD on medication and controls. Dopaminergic 
medication significantly strengthened the temporal binding between actions and effects, 
which is interpreted as a heightened sense of agency. Increased availability of dopamine 
strengthened the experience of association between actions and external events, enhancing 
the sense of agency. These data suggest that dopamine could have a key role on conscious 
experience of action.  
 Self control function has also a fundamental social function. From evolutionary 
point of view the self control mechanisms should have evolved especially for regulation of 
impulsive responses, as in the cases of delayed gratification, revenge, and what we call in 
general immoral or antisocial action.   
 
 
 4.5  Volition in social context: feeling responsible 
 All known human cultures have the concept that an individual is responsible for 
their actions. Responsibility takes both an individual dimension (we have to live with what 
we do), and a social dimension (society may praise or punish us for what we do). 
Responsibility for action in turn rests on a concept of voluntary actions: individuals choose 
and control their own actions.  
There are two main approaches in cognitive psychology to investigate responsibility. One 
approach asks to subjects : ‘are you responsible of this action?’. In this case participants 
perform voluntary action that causes a certain effect which is sometimes veridical and 
sometimes distorted (spatially, temporally: Farrer et al., 2003; Wegner et al., 2003). 
Sometimes another possible agent is present performing a similar movement at the same 
time (Tsakiris et al., 2005; Wegner et al., 2004). These studies generally find a bias to 
judge oneself to be the author of action. This data show how the experience of being 
responsible for an action depends on spatial-temporal correlations between one’s actions 
and its effects. In these experiments the actions have trivial effects and there is no real 
motivation to act.  
The second approach studying responsibility comes from the moral behavior literature and 
investigates the brain activation in moral action. These studies usually induce some sense 
of moral responsibility presenting script such as: “your mum called you and said she did 
not feel well. You ignored her, and the next day she died” (Moll et al., 2007) and compare 
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the brain activation in this kind of script with script without a first personal attribution or 
non moral meaning. Evidence from these kind of studies (Moll et al., 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 
2007) suggests that these complex subjective experiences of moral agency arise from 
distributed activations in neocortical (anterior PFC) as well as phylogenetically older 
mesolimbic and orbitofrontal (OFC) regions (Moll et al., 2005). However these studies fail 
to capture a real sense of causal responsibility and rather seem localize a more general 
‘moral sensivity’ area. 
  
 Imaging studies investigating patients with antisocial personality disorder and 
psychopaths have revealed reduction of grey matter in prefrontal cortex and abnormal 
brain activation in limbic regions, as well as in the prefrontal and temporal lobes (Muller, 
2003). Interesting vmPFC lesions acquired at an early age led to impairments in moral 
reasoning and behavior, indicating that moral development can be arrested by early PFC 
damage.  
 
 4.6 Volition in social context: imputing responsibility 
 On the basis of recent finding and theory dual process theory, the word 
‘responsibility’ is preferable to guilt because provide a good equilibrium between the 
emotive component and a cognitive components of moral action.  
Recently, Buckholtz and colleagues (2009) used event related fMRI to study regions that 
were sensitive to information about criminal responsibility. They scanned participants 
while they determined the appropriate punishment for actions committed by a protagonist 
in a series of written scenarios. They presented three categories of scenario: Responsibility 
scenarios describing intentional crime such as rape and murder. Diminished-Responsibility 
included actions of comparable gravity to those described in the Responsibility set but also 
containing mitigating circumstances, and a No-Crime set which the protagonist was 
engaged in non-criminal actions. The data showed activation in the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC) that was significantly greater in the Responsibility as 
compared with the Diminished-Responsibility condition. Bilateral anterior intraparietal 
sulcus (aIPS) showed a pattern of responsibility-related activity that was similar to 
rDLPFC whereas the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) showed the reverse pattern, with 
more activity in the Diminished-Responsibility as compared with the Responsibility 
condition. The author’s speculate that the early rDLPFC deactivation may reflect a 
perspective-taking-based evaluation of the beliefs and intentions of the scenarios’ 
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protagonist, which is followed by a robust rDLPFC activation as subjects go on to make a 
decision to punish based on assessed responsibility and blameworthiness. 
Interesting, rDLPFC signal amplitude was not correlated with punishment ratings but was 
correlated instead with activation in the right amygdala, and other brain regions commonly 
associated with social and affective processing, including the posterior cingulate, temporal 
pole, dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and inferior frontal gyrus.  
These data seems suggest these areas can influence the decision regarding the amount of 
assigned punishment during legal decision-making showing the role of emotion in the 
attribution of legal responsibility. This data support the idea that the punishment is in first 
instance a deep emotive reaction and secondarily is used to prevent future harm to society 
(Withman, 2003). Thus, participants’ decisions about punishment amount for each of the 
crimes depicted in the Responsibility scenarios were strongly correlated with the 
recommended prison sentences for those crimes, according to real sentencing guidelines. 
The higher activation of rDLPFC in the Responsibility compared to the Diminished-
Responsability condition and during punished versus non-punished trials is therefore 
consistent with a role for rDLPFC in the suppression of emotional reactions (Hausehofter, 
2009). 
 
 
 Experience of volition and moral behavior involve a common neural pattern. There 
is a motivation and basic emotional state which depends on cortical limbic state and a 
cognitive component that is mostly cortical and related with control and inhibitory 
function. On the basis of the limbic circuit conscious will, could have many of the qualities 
of an emotion. This emotion allows us to develop a constant and stable sense of who we 
are and could be perceived as a sort of positive emotive reward. Most important, this 
emotion of conscious will allows us to maintain a constant sense of responsibility for our 
actions that serve as a basis for morality.  
Conscious will could be a sort of strategic tool to give meaning to all unconscious causes 
that move the human actions. In the same way morality is a tool that shapes social 
behaviour. Future research should investigate more systematically the interaction between 
emotional state and control function in experience of voluntary and moral action. Certainly 
culture and education represent a powerful learning signals for brain’s emotive-cognitive 
and motor circuits.  
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 4.7  Experience of agency and sense of responsibility 
 Folk psychology assumes that individuals choose and control their own actions. 
Further, they are aware of what they are doing as they do it, and can normally predict the 
consequences of their actions, or at least the proximate consequences. Therefore, their 
conscious knowledge of what they are doing should allow them to choose between right 
and wrong actions. This view of human action is pervasive in human life, since it forms the 
basis of the legal concept of a criminal action. For example, systems deriving from Roman 
Law require that a crime involve not only a physical act (actus reus), but also a 
corresponding intention (mens rea). Thus, a person may have diminished responsibility for 
their action if they did not intend or could not foresee the consequences of the action, or if 
they performed the action without intention under duress. 
 
 In normal circumstances, people readily associate actions with their outcomes. In 
particular, people have a distinctive ‘sense of agency’, or feeling of control, for events 
caused by their own actions, but not for other events (Synofzik et al., 2008). The sense of 
agency is clearly related to personal responsibility. However, the relations between choice, 
action and responsibility remain unclear, for three specific reasons. First, most studies of 
voluntary selection of action have studied actions devoid of any meaning or consequence, 
and often without any significant element of choice (Fleming et al., 2009). Second, 
quantifying the sense of agency is problematic. Most existing studies have relied on 
explicit judgements of authorship in cases where it is uncertain whose action caused a 
given effect (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Tsakiris et al., 2007). However, these situations 
resemble judgements of agency rather than the feeling, or sense of agency (Synofzik et al., 
2008).  
 
 Here we have used the intentional binding effect (Haggard et al., 2002) as an 
implicit, quantitative measure related to the sense of agency. When people make a 
voluntary action, which causes an external effect, such as a tone, after a short delay, they 
perceive the action and the effect as closer together in time than would be expected from 
judgements of actions alone without tones, or of effects alone without actions. This 
temporal attraction across time between perceived actions and effects is not found for 
involuntary movements (Haggard et al., 2002). No previous studies have investigated 
whether this measure changes according to key features of responsibility, such as whether 
	  130	  
the action directly contributed to causing the effect, the outcome value of action, or the 
moral significance of the effect. 
 
 We have therefore used the intentional binding effect to investigate the relation 
between experience of action, and responsibility. In particular, we set out to ask the 
following questions: 
1. Does the experience of an action depend on the outcome value of action? 
2. Are actions that have morally significant effects experienced differently from other 
actions? 
3. Does the experience of an action vary according to whether the action directly 
causes the effect, or merely allows continuation of a chain of events which would anyway 
lead to the effect? 
 
 To investigate these questions, we have combined a low-level measure of action 
experience (intentional binding) with high-level action scripts previously used in studies of 
moral decision-making. These neuropsychological study on moral decision-making assume 
that the experience of action varies according to the anticipated moral-emotional 
consequences. Further, it is assumed that the experience of action and consequence forms a 
key part of homeostatic design (Damasio, 1994), influencing participants to choose actions 
in a way that avoids excessive feelings of responsibility for undesirable outcomes. 
However, very few studies have directly examined how moral-emotional consequences 
influence the basic phenomenology of action. To investigate this question, we used a low-
level measure of the association between an action and a subsequent external effect, 
namely the temporal attraction, or “binding” between the perceived time of action and 
effect (Haggard et al., 2002). Such implicit measures have the advantage that they do not 
explicitly require any judgement about the significance or value of either action or effect.  
 
 We embedded the temporal binding task within several standard moral and 
economic dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001). We presented the dilemmas, initially as verbal 
scripts for familiarisation, and then represented them as visual schematics during time 
estimation trials. We required to subjects to choose between either acting to intervene or 
not in the circumstances of the dilemma, and to indicate their action choice by a left or 
right index finger movement. During re-presentation of the dilemmas, participants viewed 
a rotating clock hand, which they used to report either the time of their action, or the time 
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that they saw a visual representation of the consequence of their action (Haggard et al., 
2002). We predicted that the experience of action would differ according to the moral 
content of the dilemma, the outcome value, and whether the action directly caused the 
effect, or merely allowed an existing causal chain to continue.  
 
METHOD 
 Participants 
 Thirteen individuals (5 females, 8 male, aged 22-47 years: mean 30 years) took part 
in the study with ethical committee approval and on the basis of written informed consent. 
All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. The data from 2 subjects were 
excluded because they failed to recognize the content of the schematic pictures during the 
experiment. A third subject had an unusually high variability in temporal judgements 
(standard deviation of judgement errors more than 2 times that of the mean of the other 
subjects) suggesting a particular difficulty in using the clock to report subjective 
experiences. The analyses presented here are therefore based on 10 subjects, (5 females, 
aged 23-47 years: mean 31 years). 
 
 Stimuli 
 Nine choice scenarios were presented as verbal scripts, and also as visual 
schematics. An example is the Trolley dilemma used by Greene and colleagues (2001). 
Each picture (97 x 69 mm) shows on the left, the content of the story, and on the right 
branching line representing choice of two different outcomes. Six scenarios involved 
morally significant choices, while three had purely economic significance (Moral – Non 
moral conditions). The overrepresentation of moral scenarios partly reflected our particular 
interest in this condition, and also aimed to correct for imbalances in subjects’ choices (see 
below) that we expected on the basis of pilot data. Example pictures are given in figure 
4.2, and the full scripts are given in supplementary material. Each choice scenario involved 
choice between two possible outcomes. While both outcomes were always negative, they 
differed in value (severe, moderate). For example, the trolley dilemma the severe outcome 
is the death of 5 workers whereas the moderate outcome is the death of only one. The 
pictorial representation of the two outcomes was balanced so that each appeared equally 
often as upper and lower branch of the dilemma on the screen. 
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 Further, subjects could make their choice with two different levels of control over 
outcomes. On 90 trials, question marks beside the two dilemma branches indicated a blind 
decision: participants did not know which branch of the decision is preselected (figure 4.2). 
In these unpredictable effects trials, the participant chooses whether to STAY with or 
CHANGE the preselected outcome, without knowing in advance what the preselected 
outcome is. 250 ms after each keypress, a smaller picture (44 x 30 mm) showed 
participants a vignette of the effect that their CHANGE or STAY choice had on these 
trials. On six further trials (3 moral and 3 non-moral) an arrow appeared along one branch 
of the dilemma, to show which choice is preselected. In these predictable trials, the subject 
knows that pressing a ‘STAY’ key will cause the event shown by the arrow, while pressing 
CHANGE will cause the other outcome. The arrow always pointed at the most severe 
outcome (e.g. the track with 5 workers rather than 1 worker, see the first picture in figure 
4.3). This small number of predictable trials had two control functions, first to check if 
subjects could understand the picture and choose the answer with less negative effect 
especially in non-Moral dilemma, and second to imply by context that the subject could 
really choose between outcomes in unpredictable trials. 
 
 Procedure  
 Participants were first familiarized with the choice scenarios by listening to the 
scripts for each scenario and watching the corresponding picture. During the experimental 
session only the pictures were presented. At the start of each trial a picture of the scenario 
and the possible outcomes appears (Figure 4.3). At the same time, a clock hand was seen 
superimposed on the picture, with a single hand rotating every 2560 ms. After 800 msec 
the picture disappeared but the clock continued to rotate. The participant then decided 
which of two keys to press: the ‘STAY’ key (f9 on the keyboard, pressed with the right 
hand for 6 participants, f4 pressed with the left hand for 4 participants), or the ‘CHANGE’ 
key (f4, pressed with the left hand for 6 participants, f4 with right hand for the other). 
Participants were told that they could press when they wished. Pressing caused a picture, 
showing the effect of the action, to appear after a delay of 250 ms, and remain visible for a 
random interval (1500-2500 ms). When a preselected action outcome was shown 
(predictable effects condition), pressing the STAY key allowed events to run their course 
towards this outcome, and the corresponding effect picture was shown after the keypress, 
while pressing the CHANGE key selected the alternative outcome. When no preselected 
outcome was shown (unpredictable effects condition), one of the two possible effect 
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pictures was shown at random, regardless of whether participants pressed the STAY or the 
CHANGE key (see fig 2). The incidence of moderate and severe outcomes was balanced 
between STAY and CHANGE responses. 
 
 The clock stopped a random interval (1500-2500 ms) after the effect picture. 
Participants then made one of 2 judgments in separate blocked conditions. In one block 
they judged the time of their keypress, in another the time of onset of the effect picture. 
There were 96 trials in each block, corresponding to 2 types of script (Moral, Non-moral), 
2 levels of outcome values (Severe and Moderate). Six trials presented an arrow indicating 
the current setting of the dilemma (predictable trials), 
while 90 trials presented question marks, indicating a blind decision. The six trials with 
arrow serve only as manipulation check, and timing data for these trials were not analysed. 
 
 At the beginning of each block there was a training session of 10 trials. Further, to 
ensure that participants considered the choice scenarios carefully, rather than just pressing 
keys at random, after occasional trials the experimenter asked the participant to report: the 
content of picture, the magnitude and presence of arrow or question mark indicating 
outcome predictability. Finally, participants also performed two baseline blocks. In one 
baseline block, they randomly selected between F4 and F9 keys, pressed the selected key 
at a time of their own choosing, and indicated the time of the keypress. No choice 
scenarios or effects of action were presented. In another baseline block, participants did not 
make any actions, but simply viewed the effect pictures occurring after a random delay, 
and reported their time of onset. There were 30 trials in each baseline block. The order of 
the two experimental and two baseline blocks was randomized. These blocks gave baseline 
estimates of the perceived time of actions and effects. Subtracting each subject’s 
corresponding baseline from their judgments in the experimental condition gave an 
estimate of the binding between perceptions of actions and picture effects in experimental 
trials where the participant’s action caused the subsequent display of the picture effect. 
 
 To summarise, we asked subjects to observe the picture and decide between two 
possible solutions of the dilemma by pressing the ‘CHANGE’ or ‘STAY’ key. The 
participant also had to report the position of the clock hand on each trial. The event that 
they judged varied between blocks. In one block the judged the time at which they pressed 
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the key. In another blocks they judged the time at which they saw the picture showing the 
effect of their choice.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Examples of typical pictures shown in the experiment. Here are presented two non moral scripts , 
frame A e B and two moral scripts C, D. Letters indicate the corresponding scripts in supplementary 
materials. The pictures shown were presented briefly at the start of each trial, and then disappeared. Each 
picture shows a dilemma in which the event shown on the left will lead to either the upper or lower outcome 
shown on the right. The question marks indicate that the participant cannot know which outcome has been 
preselected. In control trials, a single arrow designated that the upper or lower outcome had been preselected. 
The participant pressed one of two keys to indicate whether to STAY with the current setting, or CHANGE 
to the other alternative. Nine illustrative scenarios are presented; 6 involve human life, while 3 involve 
material goods. The outcomes have two alternative values 1 or 5 units, and the participants make blind 
decisions regarding whether to STAY or CHANGE. A second picture corresponding to the outcome of the 
participant’s action (shown as upper or lower branch of the right hand side of each picture) was shown 250 
ms after the action. All picture stimuli were presented in colour. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Schematic representation of a control trial in the experimental blocks.  The arrow is pointing the 
worse effect (5 workers). If subjects press stay a picture with 5 dead worker appears, 250 ms later, otherwise 
if subjects press change a picture with 1 dead worker appear.   
At the start of each trial a picture of the scenario and the possible outcomes appears. At the same time, a 
clock hand was seen superimposed on the picture, with a single hand rotating every 2560 ms. After 800msec 
the picture disappeared but the clock continued to rotate. Subjects had to decide which solution for the 
dilemma and in the same time pay attention to the clock hand position. In one block they have to report the 
clock hand position when they pressed the key, in another block they have to report where was the clock 
hand position when they picture with the effect appeared. 
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 Design section  
 In the experiment, three variables are measured: choice between alternative action 
situations, and estimates of the time of actions and of their effects.There are two 
conditions, in which actions have predictable and unpredictable consequences respectively. 
However the predictable condition is only a check condition in order to control if subjects 
are able to recognize and respond properly at the task. The experimental design involves 
four within-subject factors: action chosen (CHANGE, STAY), choice context (moral, non-
moral), outcome value (severe, moderate), and judgement type (action, effect).  
 
 For the analysis of choice, since the two responses are complementary alternatives, 
statistical analysis focused only on the number of CHANGE responses. CHANGE 
responses in predictable trials are analysed to check if subjects are able to recognize and 
respond properly at the task. 2x2 ANOVA was performed for CHANGE responses in 
unpredictable trials with judgement type (Action, Effect), choice context (moral and non-
moral choices) as main factors. This analysis has the aim of observing if there is any 
difference in responses between blocks and choice contexts.  
 
 Time estimation was only analysed for unpredictable trials, in which participants 
made blind decisions. A preliminary analysis on baseline judgment time estimates is made 
in order to check if differences in visual salience of the effect pictures might have 
influenced judgements.  2x2 ANOVA was performed on baseline time estimates as a 
function of choice context (Moral, and Non Moral) and outcome values (severe, moderate).   
 
 The following analysis has the aim of exploring how outcome value and decision 
modulated the temporal experience of action and effect. Separate ANOVAs were 
performed for baseline-corrected time estimates, one for action judgments and one for 
effect judgements. 2x2x2 ANOVA was performed on baseline-corrected time estimates as 
a function of choice action (CHANGE, STAY), choice context (Moral, Non Moral) and 
outcome values (severe, moderate). The same analysis is performed on an overall binding 
measure, defined as action binding minus effect binding, to capture the perceived temporal 
association between action and effect. 
 
	  136	  
 
RESULTS 
 Choice responses 
 Since the two responses are complementary alternatives, statistical analysis focused 
only on the number of CHANGE responses. In control trials, when an arrow showed 
participants the preselected outcome, CHANGE responses were overwhelmingly chosen 
because the arrow always indicated preselection of the most severe outcome. This 
effectively serves as a manipulation check: subjects clearly understood the dilemma 
pictures, and chose less negative outcomes when they could predict the outcome. Thus 
‘CHANGE’ responses were made on 92% (SD across subjects 0.7%) of predictable trials. 
 
 When no preselected outcome was shown, participants effectively made blind 
decisions. In this case, ‘CHANGE’ responses were reduced, to 48% of trials in moral 
contexts, and 54% in non-moral contexts. 2x2 ANOVA was performed for ‘CHANGE’ 
responses with factors of judgement type (Action, Effect), choice context (moral and non-
moral choices) as main factors. The ANOVA showed no significant effects or interaction 
(all p>.1). This suggests that there is no difference in number of ‘CHANGE’ between 
blocks and between choice contexts. 
 
 Time estimation results 
 First, in order to check if differences in visual salience of the effect pictures may 
have influenced judgements, the mean time estimates in baseline effect judgements for 
each participant were calculated as a function of choice context (Moral, and Non Moral) 
and outcome values (severe, moderate). The 2x2 ANOVA showed no significant results (p 
>= .7).  Therefore, remaining analyses considered that any differences in time estimation 
for different classes of effect pictures reflected the pictures’ meanings rather than their 
visual surface form only. 
  
 Time estimation was analysed only for unpredictable trials, in which participants 
made blind decisions. Baseline corrected time estimates were obtained for each 
participant’s action judgments by subtracting average time estimates for actions in baseline 
conditions from time estimates in the experimental blocks. This subtraction gives a 
measure of binding for actions. By convention a positive value indicates a delay in action 
awareness of action, towards the subsequent effect. Similarly, time estimates of effect 
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onset were corrected by each subject’s mean judgments in the baseline effect condition. A 
negative value indicates an anticipatory shift towards the preceding action. The baseline-
corrected data are shown in Table 4.1. The table shows the standard intentional binding 
effect reported previously (Haggard, 2002; Clark, 2002; Kalogeras, 2002). That is, the 
perceived time of actions is shifted later than baseline values, towards the subsequent 
effects, while the perceived time of effects is, in general, shifted earlier than baseline, 
towards the preceding action. Mean time estimates in baseline action judgements were 
subtracted from estimates in experimental action judgements to measure binding for 
actions.   
 Further, the mean of each participant’s estimates for all pictures in the baseline 
judgements was subtracted from estimates for each type of picture in the experimental 
conditions.  This subtraction gives the shift in the perceived time of each picture due to the 
participant’s action, and is used as a measure of binding for effects of action. Baseline-
corrected time estimates for the unpredictable condition were analyzed as a function of 
outcome value (Severe, Moderate), choice context (Moral vs Non-moral), and action 
chosen (CHANGE vs STAY). Separate ANOVAs were performed for the action 
judgments and effect judgements. ANOVA of action judgments did not show any 
significant effects or interactions (all p > .1). In contrast, ANOVA of effect binding data 
showed significant main effects of context F (1, 9) = 4.5 p= .05.  Specifically, moral 
contexts produced stronger effect binding than non-moral contexts F (1, 9) =12.6: p= .02.  
There was also a main effect of outcome value F (1, 9) = 8.04 p = .02 (see Fig. 4). There 
was no significant main effect of action choice (CHANGE/STAY) F(1,9) = .14 p = .7 , and 
no significant two-way interactions. The three-way interaction between chosen action, 
context and outcome value is close to significance F (1, 9) = 4.2 p = .066  
 
 Finally, we calculated an overall binding measure, defined as action binding minus 
effect binding, to capture the perceived temporal association between action and effect. 
The overall binding measure showed similar results to effect judgments (see figure 4.4). 
Specifically the 2x2x2 ANOVA of overall binding data showed significant main effects of 
moral context F(1,9) = 7.8 p= .02 and outcome values F (1,9) = 7.07 p = .02. There were 
no significant interactions between factors (all p>.05).  
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Figure 4.3 Effect binding; mean baseline-corrected effect estimates (ms). Overall binding, action 
binding was subtracted from effect binding. Bars show standard error across participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 Mean binding effects (SE = standard error across participants)  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 To summarise, we found an expected effect of outcome values on action decisions. 
When participants chose whether or not to intervene to change a predicted outcome, they 
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consistently chose to produce the least negative outcome. This confirms that participants 
understood the choice scenarios and processed them in utilitarian way.  Interestingly, they 
did so in both moral and non-moral dilemmas. However, when the prediction of outcome 
was not possible, the percentage of change and stay responses in moral and economic 
scenario was not statistically different. 
 
 Temporal estimates of action and effects showed the ‘intentional binding’ effect 
reported previously (Haggard, 2002; Clark, 2002, Kalogeras, 2002). Previous studies 
showed strong binding of auditory and somatic effects towards actions, with weaker 
binding of actions towards effects (Haggard, 2002; Clark, 2002; Kalogeras 2002; Haggard 
& Cole 2008; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003). In our experiment, we confirmed the same 
pattern of intentional binding of action when effects of action are presented visually, and in 
the same location as the clock used for time estimation. 
 
 More important, our finding shows how the binding effect is modulated by factors 
relevant to responsibility, such us the moral context of action and the action outcomes. Our 
temporal measures of action awareness confirmed that a broad concept of responsibility 
pervades action awareness. Specifically, we found two results that are readily interpretable 
as enhancing the sense of responsibility. In each case, enhanced responsibility was 
associated with stronger binding, shifting the perceived time of effect towards the action. 
First, we found that moral contexts showed stronger effect binding than non-moral 
contexts. Second, we found stronger binding when the participant’s action lead to the more 
negative of the two possible outcomes. Interestingly, the modulation of effect binding by 
outcome value was present even though participants made blind decisions, and thus could 
not actually control whether the outcome was severely negative or moderately negative. 
That is, subjects experienced a stronger temporal association between their actions and 
severely negative outcomes, despite knowing that they were not, in fact, responsible for 
these outcomes. Finally, these effects did not interact, suggesting that moral context and 
outcome value of action have additive effects on the experience of control.  
  
 Taken together these data suggest that action awareness is modulated by the impact 
of a participant’s action in a situation. When the impact is increased, the link between 
action and effect is strengthened in subjective experience. This impact could depend both 
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on emotive activation due to the moral content of action, and also on outcome value of 
action.  
 
An alternative explanation of our results could be related to differences in the visual 
salience of effect pictures used for different levels of the various experimental factors.  
However we can exclude this possibility because comparing the time estimation in 
baseline effect in moral and economic context there is no significant difference between 
them.  
Our results can also be considered from the prospective of event predictability. Pariyadath 
and Eagleman (2007) recently demonstrated that duration judgments vary as a function of 
predictability, such that predictable events are judged to be shorter than unpredictable 
ones. This interpretation could be related to the subjects’ attempt to create or infer a 
statistical relation between action and effect. In our case we did not formally debrief 
subjects to ask how they interpreted the relation between action and effect. They might, for 
example, have automatically associated the moral context of action with severe outcomes.  
This might in turn lead to stronger temporal association between action and effect 
observed, following Pariyadath and Eagleman’s hypothesis. In this case the greater binding 
for moral contexts, and for severe outcome is not due to the nature of the context or 
outcomes per se, but instead to the subjective degree of predictability. However our stimuli 
were balanced to be equally repetitive and unpredictable. 
 
 A tight temporal association between action and effect seems to be a low-level 
phenomenal marker of the attribution of responsibility. Our results show that this impact 
has at least two separate dimensions: magnitude and moral/emotional significance. In 
contrast, whether the participant intervened (CHANGE choices) or merely let events run a 
preselected but unknown course (STAY choices), had no significant effect. The irrelevance 
of the decision factor for experience of action probably arises because STAY and 
CHANGE are effectively meaningless in ‘blind’ and unpredictable decisions. The two 
action choices in our experiment therefore had only the formal appearance of a ‘what’ 
decision (Brass & Haggard 2008 ), rather than the real content of ‘what’ decision, because 
the choice was not supported by any actual association with the action outcome.  
 
 Our findings showed that we experience the closest binding between action and 
effect when the situation has moral rather than simply material importance, and where the 
	   141	  
consequences of intervention are potentially great. We suggest that these two factors could 
contribute to binding in different ways. The factor of moral significance of action 
presumably represents contextual modulations of action awareness. This factor should 
influence the experience of action and effect quite generally, from the very beginning of 
decision making process, right through to perceiving the effects of action. In contrast, the 
factor of outcome value is quite time-specific in our experiment. Participants did not know 
whether their action had produced a severe or moderate effect until the second picture was 
presented, 250 ms after action. Thus, the effect of outcomes’ value on binding cannot be 
based on prediction or knowledge about the significance of action. Instead, it can only be 
retrospective. We speculate that the sense of responsibility involves two components: a 
general knowledge that one performs an action and is therefore responsible for all its 
effects, and a specific enhancement of this experience when the effects of action are 
particularly important. Interestingly, in our experiment, this enhanced, retrospective 
experience was entirely illusory, since the participants did not in fact have any influence 
over the outcome value of action outcomes in these unpredictable, ‘blind decision’ trials. 
We needed to introduce the unpredictable trials in order to balance the number of 
responses between context and effect, but this imposes a great limitation. Stay/change with 
an unpredictable outcome is effectively like a guess, and the 50/50 responding suggests 
participants treated it as such, reducing the level of intention in the choice and in action. In 
a fully intentional choice condition, such as our predictable condition, participants 
generally chose the least severe outcome, making factorial analyses very unbalanced.  
Some method to control the level of intentionality while maintaining a balance of more and 
less severe outcomes, would have helped considerably with the interpretation of the 
findings. 
 
 
 Our results have interesting implications for both action awareness and for concepts 
of responsibility. Our results suggest that the temporal experience of linkage between 
voluntary actions and outcomes, or which forms part of the sense of agency, is not merely 
a ‘cold’ cognition based on learning associations through ‘constant conjunctions of events’ 
(Hume 1739/1888). Rather, subjects experience strong linkage of actions to their effects, 
when actions are morally and emotively important, and when actions are found to produce 
important outcomes. We used an implicit measure of sense of agency, namely the temporal 
structure of action-event relations, to reveal this enhancement. 
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 One modern view treats moral principles and moral responsibility as an 
institutionalized social expression of basic emotions that are subsequently rationalized 
(Haidt, 2001), and identifies them with the orbitofrontal brain areas (Koenigs, 2007; 
Ciaramelli, 2007). However, the connection between moral judgements and action choices 
has rarely been considered. We show that the impacts of action decisions, including moral 
impacts, have a direct effect on the primary experience of action outcomes.  
This opens the interesting possibility that a deficient sense of moral responsibility in 
individuals with developmental disorders or acquired brain damage may be caused by 
deficits in primary experiences of action-outcome linkage. We have demonstrated an 
enhanced connection between experience of actions and external events when actions are 
important, and when they have moral significance. We speculate that this ‘impact 
enhancement’ of the link between actions and outcomes could be produced by a specific 
cognitive module housed in a yet-unidentified brain area. This would make it logically 
possible that developmental pathology or acquired lesion could prevent some people from 
experiencing the moral impact of their own actions. This hypothetical patient would then 
raise an interesting and socially important neuroethical problem, since punishing them for 
‘immoral behaviour’ would seem worryingly close to punishing them for their brain lesion. 
Currently, such individuals are often judged ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’, on the 
grounds that they do not understand the consequences of their own actions (Moran, 1981). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For long time, decision making has been considered as only influenced by cognitive 
process, a matter of estimating which of various alternatives actions would yield the most 
positive consequences for the agent. This explanation was particularly useful for the 
attempt of decision theorists to define how we should decide in order to be ‘rational’, 
where the word ‘rational’ often was used as a synonym of optimal decision. The rational 
decision was traditionally opposed to irrational decision, where irrational meant a decision 
depending not on rational/cognitive deliberation but on a passion beyond control that can 
override reason, deliberation and/or self interest. In most of recorded human intellectual 
history, as within literature and philosophical discussion, emotions have been viewed in 
largely negative terms, especially due to their unpredictable corrupting influence. 
Examples of this idea are still present in modern legal systems, in which “crimes of 
passion” are treated differently because the perpetrator is viewed as being “out of control”. 
Two prejudices have driven  previous research about decision making: i) decision making 
is only a cognitive rational process and ii) the influence of emotions is only negative and 
against rationality.  
 
Only recently has there been a new appreciation of the positive functions served by 
emotions in governing decisions (Damasio 1994, Greene et al., 2001; Phelps, 2009; 
Loewestain & Lerner, 2003; Loewestain, 2004). Although emotion was considered an 
important variable in this new positive prospective, the role of emotion in decision making 
has rarely been coupled with the detailed investigation of the range of components, factors 
and measures that have characterized the psychological study of emotion and affect. Few 
studies of social and economic decision making have explicitly manipulated or measured 
	  144	  
emotion or affect variables. In many studies and theories, especially in neuroeconomics, 
emotion is inferred, but not directly altered or assessed. The aim of the experimental part 
of this research work was to increase the availability of data about the role of emotions in 
decision making, proposing several tasks where it was attempted to manipulate and 
measure emotions in order to better understand the different ways in which emotions enter 
into decision making and understand which brain areas are mainly involved. In this last 
part of my thesis, using the new data provided in the experimental sections, I will try to 
discuss the possible role of emotions in the choice process.  
 
Loewestein and Lerner (2003) suggested two different ways in which emotions 
could enter into the decision making process. The first influence consists of predictions 
about the emotional consequences of decision outcomes: expected or anticipated emotions. 
Expected emotions reintroduce the concept of expected utility model (see chapter I and II), 
assuming that people attempt to predict the emotional consequences associated with 
alternatives courses of action and then select actions that maximize positive emotions and 
minimize the negative emotions. The second kind of affective influence on decision 
making consists of emotions that are experienced at the time of decision making: 
immediate emotions. The model proposed regards decisions under uncertainty where 
subjects have to be able to predictions, the possible decision outcomes, the probability of 
each outcome and the emotional consequences of decision outcomes associated with them.  
 
In experiment III we observed the role of expected emotions associated with non-
ambiguous alternative solutions. We chose a ‘non-uncertain’ decision regarding moral 
content. In a non-ambiguous choice, subjects can foresee the certain effects of their 
decision. The moral context permits a modulation of affective response (personal and 
impersonal conditions). For example, in the footbridge dilemma, the personal dilemma 
with the highest affective activation, a subject can decide whether to push a single victim 
off of a bridge in front of a runaway trolley in order to stop its progress toward five victims 
or to leave the trolley killing five men. The expected consequences are clear: one dead man 
killed by the subject’s direct action or five men killed by the trolley. The expected 
emotions can be: a sense of responsibility and guilt in the first case, and a general sense of 
impotence in the second case. The situations involving dilemmas that were proposed in the 
task induce a conflict between a rational solution (better one man than five men) and a 
moral solution (follow the commandment: not kill). In front of a not easily solvable 
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conflict, people could use their feeling associated with each possible solution to form their 
judgment. Emotions become thus a kind of information used to solve the conflict. 
Interestingly this implies that individuals care about emotional attributes of a choice 
alternative. Psycophysiological data presented in study III seems to confirm this 
interpretation. Both healthy subjects and brain-damaged control patients (non-FC) 
exhibited increased skin conductance activity several seconds before choosing the 
utilitarian option in personal moral dilemmas, for instance, deciding that it would be 
appropriate to kill one person in order to save others. In control groups, emotional/somatic 
signals were critically recruited during moral judgments, and characterized the anticipation 
of personal moral violations. Importantly, somatic responses seem to have shaped personal 
moral judgment. A preliminary analysis showed a negative correlation between 
anticipatory skin conductance activity and frequency of utilitarian responses in normal 
controls, such that individuals with higher SCRs before utilitarian choices were more 
reluctant to judge moral infractions as acceptable behaviours than those with lower SCRs. 
One possibility, therefore, is that emotional responses mark utilitarian choices in personal 
moral dilemmas with an emotive negative judgment, discouraging the selection of those 
options in future decisions. This negative emotive judgment in a personal moral dilemma 
could correspond to the expected emotions such as the sense of responsibility and guilt. In 
order to avoid this negative emotional experience, subjects prefer to take the non utilitarian 
solution. Another interpretation, applying a modified version of regret theories (Bell, 
1982)12, suggests that the intensity of an experienced emotional reaction could depend on 
the affective comparison between the two possible solutions. In our case the sense of 
impotence forecasted in a non utilitarian solution, compared to sense of guilt forecasted in 
a utilitarian solution, is less negative and less intense as showed by skin conductance 
activity. The selection of the less negative solution on the affective point of view suggests 
a modified version of utility function13 involving mainly “affective forecasting” 
(Loewestein, 2004).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The original regret theories are normally applied for decision under uncertainty. The theories assumed that 
the intensity of experienced regret depends on a simple comparison of the outcome one experiences against 
the outcome one would have experienced if one had made a different choice. 
 
13 We refer to ‘utility function’ and not to ‘expected utility function’ because the decisions required are not 
under uncertainty. 
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vmPFC patients did not generate SCRs in anticipation of utilitarian choices in 
personal moral dilemmas. These findings indicate profound differences in the making of 
moral judgments between vmPFC patients and controls. In contrast, no apparent 
emotional/somatic response accompanied personal moral violations in vmPFC patients. 
This suggests the incapacity of vmPFC patients to give different affective attributes to the 
utilitarian and non utilitarian solutions and thus the impossibility to follow a utility 
function based on ‘affective forecasting’.  
  
 Not all situations involving choices have the entire set of necessary information for 
decision-making. On the contrary, most of our choices are taken under uncertainty. What is 
the role of emotion in decision under uncertainty and risk? We believe that in case of 
decision under uncertainty emotions could have a more intense influence on the decision 
making process. As reported in the case of non-uncertain decision (see above), there is an 
affective influence by the predictions about the emotional consequences of decision 
outcomes (expected emotions) that could guide the selection of option with the more 
positive forecasted emotion (affective utility function). The second influence regards the 
immediate emotions that are experienced at the time of decision making. Immediate 
emotions influence decision making via two routes, direct and indirect (Forgas, 1995; 
Loewestein & Lerner, 2003). Indirect effects are those that are mediated by changes in 
expected emotions or changes in the quality and/or quantity of information processing. 
Direct effects are those that are not mediated by changes in expected emotions or in 
cognitive processing (Forgas, 1995; Loewestein & Lerner, 2003).  The immediate emotion 
appears to play a largely advisory role in relation to the first impact of a subject in facing 
the decision. According to the ‘emotion as information’ hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), in 
ambiguous situations people ask themselves “How do I feel about it? And then use their 
present feeling to form the judgment. Interestingly, the influence of immediate emotions 
depends on the level of knowledge and on the level of ambiguity of the situation. In 
unfamiliar contexts, immediate emotions influence our choice more than in familiar 
contexts (Srull, 1984).  
 
 I investigated choice in situations with very high levels of uncertainty. The trust 
game is indeed a risky situation in which is not possible to calculate or foresee the possible 
economic and social outcomes. The uncertainty of the situation, the absolute lack of 
information and the fact that you can lose money, could generally induce an immediate 
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emotion of insecurity (fear) and irritation. This immediate emotion could be the ‘mood’ 
where is grounded the process of affective utility function related to the expected emotions 
associated with the two possible outcomes (cooperation/increase income, betrayal/lose of 
money). In the study I, we found that investors in the vmPFC group showed higher money 
transfers to their partners than those in both control groups, thereby suggesting that 
damage to this brain area increases investors’ ‘trusting’ behaviour considerably. This data 
suggest on one hand, that vmPFC subjects could have distorted immediate emotion, for 
example they could not feel the insecurity (fear) and irritation; and on the other hand they 
could be not able to consider in their forecasted emotion, especially the negative emotion 
related to the possibility of betrayal and loss of money.  
 Comparison between the same decisions in social (trust game) and non-social (risk 
game) contexts showed that vmPFC patients were unable to consider in their choice the 
specific affective information of social interaction. These findings are highly compatible 
with current theories maintaining that vmPFC is a critical neural substrate for forecasting 
the (negative) emotional consequences of available options in order to guide future 
behaviour, both in personal and societal decision-making (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). 
Emotions seem to reveal their fundamental guiding role especially in our social 
interactions. 
 
 Emotions exert not only a direct influence on behaviour but also an indirect influence 
via their impact on judgments of expected consequences and emotional reactions to them, 
as well as the quality and quantity of information processing. The indirect influence of 
emotion on decision making was investigated in study II, where emotional stimuli were 
introduced incidentally during a decision making process. In that study, the presentation of 
subliminal happy faces increased investors’ transfer amounts relative to neutral faces, 
whereas fear expressions failed to affect such amounts compared to neutral expressions. 
Studies investigating trust without any incidental emotional stimulation (Berg et al., 1994; 
McCabe et al., 2001) have shown that investors usually send to the trustee approximately 
30-40% of the money available. In study II, participants exposed to fearful and neutral 
expression showed a level of trust similar to that reported in other studies without 
emotional stimulation. By contrast, subjects exposed to subliminal happy faces showed a 
greater level of trust. Our findings confirmed that incidental emotions can be effective in 
influencing trust. More generally, the data can support the hypothesis that accidental 
emotions can influence people’s judgments of the probability of positive and negative 
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outcomes (Loewestain & Lerner, 2003). A possible explanation of the null effect of fearful 
faces on trust behaviour could concern a sort of ‘floor effect’. In the trust game, the 
immediate emotion of decision is insecurity (fear) and irritation. Moreover, there is  
negative expected emotion related to the possibility of being betrayed and losing money. 
As such, fearful faces cannot further reduce trust. Furthermore, extremely low levels of 
trust in social exchanges may be not viewed as pertaining to cautious decision, but 
perceived as signs of hostility or punishment towards others. Therefore, it is possible that 
trust cannot be symmetrically influenced by positive and negative emotional stimuli, 
because in the anonymous one-shot interaction as those used here, trust is already very 
low. The effect of a happy face on trust level could occur because the emotional primes 
temporarily change the accessibility of knowledge relevant for interpreting the ambiguous 
situation (Higgins, 1996). Specifically, incidental emotion can influence people’s 
perception not only about the likelihood of different outcomes but also of how they will 
feel about those outcomes. Another important result of this study concerns the fact that 
only unconsciously perceived happy faces were effective in modulating trust behaviour. In 
accordance with Dunn & Schweitzer (2005), we found that subliminal happy faces 
increased trusting behaviour relative to subliminal neutral (and fearful) faces, but 
supraliminal happy faces failed to do so. It is possible to speculate that cognitive control 
mechanisms reduce the effects of supraliminal emotional stimulation, or that these control 
mechanisms select the relevant information and inhibit irrelevant information. This 
explanation is congruent with several fMRI studies (Hariri et al., 2003; Critchley, H. et al., 
2000) that have shown that amygdala activation decreases when participants attend to 
faces in order to evaluate emotional features, relative to when participants make a non-
emotional judgment of face gender, such that the emotion of the face is completely 
irrelevant to the subject’s task.  
 
In the previous three studies we presented how expected emotions, immediate 
emotions and incidental emotions can affect our decisions. However these studies do not 
consider the last component of a decision: the selection of an action representing our 
choice. The selection of action is not a merely instrumental realization of our choice, but is 
actually the real and probably the unique evidence of the choice and the possible linkage 
between decision and outcome. This voluntary action, more than a simple evaluation of 
option and the information processing, makes us responsible for a choice. The experience 
of responsibility/agency is the subsequent feeling that one’s action has indeed caused a 
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particular external event (Haggard, 2005) and necessarily involves the experience of 
external sensory consequences. Choice and judgment do not incorporate the experience of 
external sensory consequences, so they do not include the sense of agency characterising 
the voluntary action. Study IV has showed how the experience of agency can be modulated 
by contextual factors such as the moral significance of action and by the magnitude of 
outcomes. This modulation resembles the distinction between immediate emotion due to 
the emotions that are experienced at the time of decision (context of choice) and expected 
emotions due to the consequences of decision outcomes.  The awareness of action seems 
affected by emotions in the same way observed for decision making processing. Our 
results suggest an interesting alternative to the notion of awareness of action as ‘merely 
cold cognition based on learning associations though constant conjunctions of event’ 
(Hume, 1739/1888). This suggests that the emotional impact of action/decision, related to 
context and the effects, has a direct influence on the primary experience of awareness of 
action. Emotions as well as the predictability of the effect (Moore & Haggard, 2008) are 
factors able to strengthen the awareness of the last step of decision making process, the 
action.  
 
Modern culture is based on the fracture between a scientific-rational knowledge and  
beliefs based on subjective affective experience. In the last ten years, the concept of 
emotion and the role of emotion on decision making has changed, introducing the 
possibility of a positive role for emotion in rational decisions. However the same 
revolution requires one to reshape our conception of rationality in order to overcome a 
dangerous dualistic definition of the human being (rational vs emotional). Actual definition 
of rationality suggests that rational means being able to follow the utility function in order 
to maximize self-interest and reward. This definition of rationality is partial and dangerous. 
If rationality is the best criteria that we possess to choose and act, then rationality has to be 
able to include all components of reality, especially the capacity of being stricken14 and 
moved by what we really care about.  
 
  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In Latin, being striken is affectus.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Study III	  
Examples of dilemmas 
Non-Moral Dilemmas  
1)  Train or Bus. You need to travel from Bologna to Cesena in order to attend a 
meeting that starts at 2:00 PM. You can take either the train or the bus. The train 
will get you there just in time for your meeting no matter what. The bus is 
scheduled to arrive an hour before your meeting, but the bus is occasionally 
several hours late because of traffic. It would be nice to have an extra hour before 
the meeting, but you cannot afford to be late. Is it appropriate for you to take the 
train instead of the bus in order to ensure your not being late for your meeting?  
 
2) Generic Brand. You have a headache. You go to the pharmacy with the intention of 
buying a particular name-brand headache medicine. When you get there you 
discover that the pharmacy is out of the brand you were looking for.  The 
pharmacist, whom you've known for a long time and in whom you have a great 
deal of trust, tells you that he has in stock a generic product which is, in his words, 
"exactly the same" as the product you had originally intended to buy. Is it 
appropriate for you to purchase the generic brand instead of searching further for 
the name-brand product you were looking for?  
Moral Impersonal Dilemmas 
1)  Vaccine Policy. You work for the Bureau of Health, a government agency. You are 
deciding whether or not your agency should encourage the use of a certain recently 
developed vaccine. The vast majority of people who take the vaccine develop an 
immunity to a certain deadly disease, but a very small number of people who take 
the vaccine will actually get the disease that the vaccine is designed to prevent.  All 
the available evidence, which is very strong, suggests that the chances of getting 
the disease due to lack of vaccination are much higher than the chances of getting 
the disease by taking the vaccine. Is it appropriate for you to direct your agency to 
encourage the use of this vaccine in order to promote national health?  
 
2) Sculpture. You are visiting the sculpture garden of a wealthy art collector. The 
garden overlooks a valley containing a set of train tracks. A railway workman is 
working on the tracks, and an empty runaway trolley is heading down the tracks 
toward the workman. The only way to save the workman's life is to push one of the 
art collector's prized sculptures down into the valley so that it will roll onto the 
tracks and block the trolley's passage. Doing this will destroy the sculpture. Is it 
appropriate for you to destroy the sculpture in order to save this workman's life?  
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Moral Impersonal Dilemmas 
1) Lifeboat. You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has 
to be abandoned. The lifeboats are carrying many more people than they were 
designed to carry. The lifeboat you're in is sitting dangerously low in the water-a 
few inches lower and it will sink.  The seas start to get rough, and the boat begins 
to fill with water. It seems to you that there is only one way to stop the boat from 
sinking, and that is to start throwing other passengers overboard, starting with old 
people who are too weak to resist. Is it appropriate for you to throw some of your 
fellow passengers overboard in order to save yourself and the remaining 
passengers?  
2) Submarine. You are the captain of a military submarine travelling underneath a 
large iceberg. An onboard explosion has caused you to lose most of your oxygen 
supply and has injured one of your crew who is quickly losing blood. The injured 
crew member is going to die from his wounds no matter what happens.  The 
remaining oxygen is not sufficient for the entire crew to make it to the surface. The 
only way to save the other crew members is to shoot dead the injured crew member 
so that there will be just enough oxygen for the rest of the crew to survive. Is it 
appropriate for you to kill the fatally injured crew member in order to save the lives 
of the remaining crew members?  
 
STUDY IV 
 
Scripts used for initial verbal presentation of action choices. Scripts were presented via 
audio recording only in familiarization session.  
 
 
UNPREDICTABLE SCRIPTS 
A) Non-moral script, unpredictable 
Turnips. You are a farm worker monitoring an automatic turnip-harvesting 
machine. The machine is out of order and is approaching two diverging paths. On 
one path the machine will destroy 5 bushels of turnips. On the other path the 
machine will destroy up only 1 bushel of turnips. You cannot remember the 
original instruction for the machine, so you cannot foresee which path the machine 
will take. The only thing that you can do is to press a button to change the original 
direction. Do you want the machine to stay on its present course OR do you want to 
change the direction of the machine to the other path?  Press the button to “change” 
or “stay”. 
 
B) Non-moral script, unpredictable 
Factory.You are the late-night watchman in a factory. You see fumes and 
fires spreading into the factory.  In one room of the factory there are 5 important 
electronic devices. In another room there is 1 important electronic device. You 
cannot foresee which room the fire will enter.  The only thing that you can do is to 
hit a switch in front of you connected to a fire door which will cause the fire to 
change direction from one room to the other room. Do you want the fumes and 
fires to stay on its present course OR do you want to change the direction of the 
fumes and fires to the other room.  Press the button to “change” or “stay”. 
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C) Moral script, unpredictable  
Trolley. You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a 
fork in the tracks. On the tracks there is a group of 5 railway workmen. On the 
other track there is 1 workman.  You do not know upon which path the trolley will 
go, but you can hit a switch on your dashboard and so change the original direction 
of the trolley. Do you want the trolley to stay on its present course OR do you want 
to change the original direction of the trolley? Press the button to “change” or 
“stay”. 
 
D) Moral script, unpredictable 
Hospital. You are the late-night watchman in a hospital.  Spilled chemicals 
are rising up through the hospital’s ventilation system. In one room of the hospital 
there are 5 patients. In another room there is 1 patient. You cannot foresee which 
rooms the spilled chemicals will enter.  The only thing that you can do is to hit a 
switch connected to a fire vent.  This will cause the spilled chemicals to change 
direction and enter the other room. Do you want the fumes and fires to stay on their 
present course OR do you want to change the direction of the fumes and fires to the 
other room?  Press the button to “change” or “stay”.  
 
E) Non moral script, unpredictable 
TV Quiz. You are participating in a quiz on a TV show and you win 10 bars 
of gold. But then you make a wrong response and so lose part of your winnings.  
To define the amount of your loss the host starts another game. There are two keys, 
one for room A and one for room B.  In one room there is a message that says 
‘LOSE 1 bar of gold’, in the other room there is a message says ‘LOSE 5 bars of 
gold. You have one key, but do not know which door this key will open. The host 
offers you the option to exchange your key for the other key. Do you want your 
original key or do you want to exchange it for the other key?  Press the button to 
“change” or “stay”. 
 
F) Moral script, unpredictable 
            Commander. It is wartime.  You and your 5 children are living in a territory 
that has been occupied by the enemy. You are taken to the headquarters with your 
family.  The commander says you that there are two prison camps. In one camp you 
and 4 of your children will be killed and only the youngest will survive. In the 
second camp your family could survive but the youngest child will be killed. The 
commander tells you that if you pay him he can change the original destination but 
he will not tell you what the original destination is. Do you want to stay with the 
commander’s original decision or do you want to change the original destination by 
bribing the commander? Press the button to “change” or “stay”. 
 
G) Moral script, unpredictable 
Poison. A viral epidemic has spread in the hospital where you are working. 
You have developed two substances in your home laboratory. You know that one 
of them is a vaccine and the other is a deadly poison. Someone has removed the 
label and you don't know which test tube contains the vaccine. In one room there 
are five patients with severe symptoms. They will die soon if you do not inject 
them the vaccine. In another room there is only one patient with mild symptoms. 
You decide to inject the yellow substance to five patients in more severe condition. 
Do you want to stay in this decision or do you prefer change you previous idea 
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testing the yellow substance to patient with mild symptoms? Press the button to 
“change” or “stay”. 
 
H) Moral script, unpredictable 
Modified trolley. You are on a footbridge over a runaway trolley quickly 
approaching a fork in the tracks. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who 
happens to be very large. There is a group of 5 railway workmen on the tracks. On 
the other track there is 1 workman. You do not know upon which path the trolley 
will go but you can push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below 
where his large body will stop the trolley. The large man can die in order to stop 
the train. Do you want the trolley to stay on its present course OR do you want to 
change the situation pushing the stranger off the bridge in order to stop the train? 
Press the button to “change” the situation or “stay” with the current situation. 
 
I) Moral script, unpredictable 
Modified Commander. It is wartime.  You and your 5 children are living in 
a territory that has been occupied by the enemy. You are taken to the headquarters 
with your family.  The commander says you that there are two prison camps. In one 
camp you and 4 of your children will be killed and only the youngest will survive. 
In the second camp your family could survive but you have to kill the youngest by 
beheading. The commander tells you that your decision can influence his verdict 
and change the original destination but he will not tell you what the original 
destination is. Do you want to stay with the commander’s original decision or do 
you want to stray to change the original destination killing the youngest child? 
Press the button to “change” or “stay”. 
 
PREDICTABLE SCRIPTS 
 
1) Non-moral script, predictable  
Turnips. You are a farm worker monitoring an automatic turnip-harvesting 
machine. The machine is out of order and is approaching two diverging paths. On 
one path the machine will destroy 5 bushels of turnips. On the other path the 
machine will destroy up only 1 bushel of turnips. If you do nothing your turnip-
harvesting machine will go on the path with 5 bushels of turnips. If you want to 
change the direction of the machine you have to hit a switch on your remote 
control. Do you want the machine to stay on its present course and so mash up 5 
bushels of turnips OR do you want to change the direction of the machine to the 
other path and so lose only 1 bushel of turnips.  Press the button to “change” or 
“stay”. 
 
2) Non-moral script, predictable  
Factory. You are the late-night watchman in a factory. You see fumes and 
fires spreading into the factory. In one room of the factory there are 5 important 
electronic devices. In another room there is 1 important electronic device. If you do 
nothing the fumes and fires will rise up into the room containing the 5 electronic 
devices and will destroy them. The only way to avoid the destruction of these 5 
electronic devices is to change the direction of the fumes and the fires. If you hit a 
switch connected to a fire door, the fumes and fires will change direction and enter 
the other room containing the single electronic device. If you do not hit the switch 
the 5 electronic devices will be destroyed. Do you want the fumes and fires to stay 
on its present course destroying 5 electric devices OR do you want to change the 
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direction of the fumes and fires to the other room where there is 1 device.  Press the 
button to “change” or “stay”. 
 
3) Moral script, predictable  
Trolley. You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a 
fork in the tracks. There is a group of 5 railway workmen on the tracks. On the 
other track there is 1 workman. If you do nothing the trolley will proceed on the 
track where the group of 5 workmen is, causing their deaths. The only way to avoid 
the deaths of these 5 workmen is to change the direction of the trolley. If you hit a 
switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the other track, 
causing the death of 1 workman. Do you want the trolley to stay on its present 
course where there are 5 workmen OR do you want to change the direction of the 
trolley to the other track where there is 1 workman? Press the button to “change” or 
“stay”. 
 
4) Moral script, predictable  
Hospital. You are the late-night watchman in a hospital. Spilled chemicals 
are rising up through the hospital’s ventilation system. In one room of the hospital 
there are 5 patients. In another room there is 1 patient. If you do nothing the spilled 
chemicals will rise up into the room containing the 5 patients and cause their 
deaths. The only way to avoid the deaths of these patients is to change the direction 
of the spilled chemicals by hitting a switch connected to a fire vent.  This will cause 
the spilled chemicals to change direction and enter the other room containing the 1 
patient causing his death. Do you want the fumes and fires to stay on their present 
course where there are 5 patients OR do you want to change the direction of the 
fumes and fires to the other room where there is 1 patient?  Press the button to 
“change” or “stay”. 
 
5) Non-moral script, predictable  
TV quiz. You are participating in a quiz on a TV show and you win 10 bars 
of gold. But then you make a wrong response and so lose part of your winnings. To 
define the amount of your loss the host starts another game. There are two keys, 
one to room A and one to room B. You have the key to room B. In room A there is 
a message that says ‘You LOSE 1 bar of gold’, the other message in room B says 
‘You LOSE 5 bars of gold.  The host offers you the key to room A.  Do you want 
to stay with the original key to room B OR do you want to exchange it for the other 
key to room A?  Press the button to “change” or “stay”. 
 
 
6) Moral script, predictable  
Commander. It is wartime.  You and your 5 children are living in territory 
that has been occupied by the enemy. You are taken to enemy headquarters with 
your family.  The commander informs you that there are two prison camps, Camp 
A and Camp B. He has already decided that you and your family will go to the 
Camp A where you and 3 of your children will be killed and only the youngest will 
survive. However the commander also tells you that if you pay him he could 
change the original destination and move your family to Camp B where your 
youngest son will be killed but you and other 4 children will survive. Do you want 
to stay with the commander’s original decision to send you to Camp A (4 die and 1 
is saved) or do you want to change to Camp B (1 dies and 4 are saved) by bribing 
the commander? Press the button to “change” or “stay”.  
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